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Meister Eckhart’s theology is indisputably controversial and the Papal Bull in agro 
dominico demonstrates the concern that the church had in Eckhart’s own time. Several 
scholars however, notably Bernard McGinn and Frank Tobin, have presented a more 
orthodox reading of Eckhart’s theology that reveals his commitment to the church and 
to Christian doctrine. It is unusual therefore that scholars continue to view Eckhart’s 
teaching on the ground and the soul’s ‘indistinct’ union with the Godhead or essence, as 
the pinnacle of his theology. These themes are undoubtedly a major part of Eckhart’s 
unique contribution to Christian thought, as McGinn and Tobin have pointed out. 
However, they are most often cited by scholars who focus primarily upon the German 
sermons and tractates, often at the expense of the Latin commentaries and sermons and 
also at the expense of other equally significant features of Eckhart’s theology. 
This thesis questions the emphasis placed upon Eckhart’s teaching on the soul’s 
‘indistinct’ union with the Godhead or essence and upon the essence itself. Drawing on 
the Latin and German works, it will demonstrate that Eckhart is deeply trinitarian and 
show that he views the Trinity and essence in a way that does not prioritise one over the 
other. Only once we recognise this non-hierarchical metaphysics can we also understand 
how Eckhart conceives of the soul’s existence and identity which, this thesis will show, 
is not absorbed or lost through the soul’s union with God, but perfected and fulfilled. 
The soul’s identity and indeed, all distinction – everything that exists – is properly 
understood, therefore, only in terms of the freedom and grace that defines God’s own 
identity in eternity; as a Trinity of persons whose distinction is not in terms of their 
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I am claiming that Meister Eckhart’s teaching on what essence and Trinity are in God 
and how they relate to each other provides the ontological structure that defines all 
distinction and, specifically, human existence and identity. To make this claim I will 
demonstrate that Eckhart’s theology is inherently trinitarian and that he does not 
subordinate Trinity to essence in his metaphysics.  
To understand Eckhart’s teaching on the soul’s union with God we must read his 
teaching on God’s identity and human identity together, since it is only according to 
God’s Triune personhood that the soul exists as she is and has individual identity at all.  
This will be shown through a reading of Eckhart’s theology which views his teaching on 
apophasis and detachment (abegescheidenheit) as ‘tools’ which reorientate the soul’s 
perspective towards a theocentric view of reality – i.e. towards a view of reality 
connected to God’s existence as both essence and Trinity. The soul only knows herself, 
God or reality truly, when she views all things from within this theocentric perspective; 
when she negates from her thinking, speaking and living, all of the habitual ways in 
which she does not let God be Himself with her.  
Looking at how Eckhart understands the dichotomy between what is true – what 
is theocentric – and what is nothing or attachment, this thesis will reveal how, for 
Eckhart God’s existence as essence and Trinity provides a framework for a completely 
transformed concept of distinction. This transformed distinction is viewed according to 
how God has distinction, as a Trinity of related persons. It is only from within this 
transformed concept of distinction that we can understand how Eckhart views human 
identity and how he subsequently views the human relationship with God, not as one of 
absorption or ontological self-loss, but one of relation and ontological self-discovery. In 




other words, because he sees reality theocentrically Eckhart views human existence and 
identity as gifts received without merit and granted freely from God. 
Only if we identify this transformed concept of distinction can we also 
understand how Eckhart conceives of the soul’s individual identity. The self is 
identified as something essentially expressed and received rather than possessed and 
distinct from the other and in that sense it has distinction in the same way as the Trinity, 
through relation. I will be suggesting in this thesis that to conceive of the self other than 
this is, for Eckhart,  to conceive of it as nothing, or to conceive it from within a 
perspective of reality where God is not being ‘allowed’ to be Himself. It is a perspective 
moreover where, in a certain sense, everything subsequently becomes a kind of nothing 
because it does not depend upon the fact of God’s existence. It therefore becomes 
meaningful to consider Eckhart’s theology and especially his teaching on apophasis and 
detachment, as a negation of atheism – or a denial that Godlessness can be anything but 
an illusion – since through apophasis he consistently negates or denies meaning to any 
perspective of, speech about, or activity which indicates commitment to, a reality where 
God is not what He necessarily is. Eckhart does not simply negate this through an 
apophatic approach to language however, his teaching on detachment shows that 
negation in fact relates to all habits of human action and perspective. 
The soul is thus viewed by Eckhart as an individual from the point of view of the 
same eternal ‘now’ as God is Himself, because she is related to God as her source and 
end (her first and final cause). She is however also herself in time and in that sense 
detachment and apophasis – which themselves signify truths about God (that He is) and 
humanity (that we absolutely depend on God) – are revealed in Eckhart’s teaching as 
practices in life by which the soul’s perspective is reoriented, enabling her to enter her 
truest existence and move finitely towards her perfected and eternal existence as a soul 




in a perfectly loving and reciprocal relationship with God. For Eckhart, if somebody 
longs for the self to be other than what it is in this relationship with God, they are really 
longing to possess the self and thus to inhabit a perspective which prevents both 
selfhood and God from being conceived of as they truly are. I therefore hope to show 
that for Eckhart, understanding the self apart from God is literally a fantasy and any 
meaningful interpretation of what Eckhart thinks about individuality or selfhood must 
be conceived from within his theocentric perspective.  
I will conclude my thesis by suggesting that in a certain sense the self does 
‘disappear’ in Eckhart’s theology, but that this lost self is, by Eckhart’s definition, non-
existent, a fantasy defined to a greater or lesser degree by attachment to things other 
than God. The truly existing individual is identified through the negation of this false 
self, in just the same way as the truly existing God is signified through the negation of 
negation. The individual self is then affirmed in the strongest possible sense, as 
something which definitely exists but the distinct existence of which is encountered in a 
different sphere to where we normally define distinction. We usually view distinction in 
terms of objects in the world or objects of thought defined by their separateness from 
other objects. Distinction for Eckhart is trinitarian; it is fundamentally relational, self-
giving and free. In other words distinction is not possessed but expressive and receptive, 
distinction, or identity, only exists through reciprocity. The individual exits in terms of 
its movement to and from the other, and in that sense its distinction mirrors God’s own 
distinction, His Triune self-expression. Bearing this in mind, it is clearly important that 
the Trinity is not subordinated to the essence in Eckhart’s theology since doing so 
would remove the principal ‘category’ in God that defines distinction and thus provides 
the metaphysical structure behind Eckhart’s understanding of the soul’s existence and 
identity. 




Chapter 1 will focus upon Eckhart’s teaching on God’s essence. By examining 
some of the secondary literature which prioritises essence over Trinity, alongside 
Eckhart’s First Parisian Question, the General Prologue to the Opus Tripartitum, and 
the Commentary on Exodus, I will show how a proper grasp of Eckhart’s teaching on 
God’s essence depends upon his understanding of analogy and apophasis. We shall see 
that according to Eckhart, the truest signification of God is the negation of negation, 
since our method of signification must itself negate all creaturely attribution to ensure 
that what we are actually speaking about is God. In light of this I shall illustrate, 
drawing primarily on the Commentary on Exodus, that Eckhart apophatically signifies 
God’s necessary existence, thus identifying godlessness, or atheism, as nothingness in 
light of this necessity. In support of this, we will also begin to see how the apophatic 
signification of God does not negate the Trinity, but signifies God’s necessity and 
creates an opening within the way we normally know things – i.e. in a creaturely way – 
through which, through the negation of creaturely knowing, we can see the Trinity as 
the self-expression and activity of the same God who necessarily exists, whose essence 
is his existence. Eckhart’s apophasis, in other words, does not leave us with nothing, it 
leaves us with everything – or rather, everything as it is conceived theocentrically, from 
a perspective of true faith in the Christian God who is both one and three, essence and 
Trinity. 
In chapter 2 I will explore in detail how Eckhart understands the Trinity and its 
equality with God’s essence. Building on the view of the Trinity suggested in chapter 1, 
2a will further illuminate how apophasis affirms the Trinity as something true about  the 
God who exists and upon whom all subsequent existence depends. The Trinity is not 
negated because it is not one of the creaturely concepts or categories negated through 
the first negation. Instead it is something about God which is true in the truest sense, i.e. 




it could not not be and is in that sense included in the apophatic affirmation – the 
negation of negation. In 2a we will look again at the Commentary on Exodus, where 
Eckhart shows that relation, a category which defines the persons of the Trinity, is not 
absorbed into the essence like other properties, perfections or accidents.  
In 2b we will then look at Eckhart’s teaching on the boiling up (bullitio) and 
boiling over (ebullitio) of the Trinity and the emergence of creation (creatio) from 
God’s Triune self-expression. In this section I will go into more detail on the connection 
between creation and the Trinity. I will show how Eckhart teaches that while things 
only exist because God is existence itself – where his essence is identical with his 
existence – that is not a complete picture of how or why they exist. The universe and 
everything in it also exists in the way that it does because God causes existence through 
the overflowing of his self-expressive and self-giving Trinity which is equal with his 
essence.  
Finally, in 2c, I will consider how Eckhart employs ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ 
as terms which help to describe the coequality between the essence and persons and 
how these two are not actually two in God, but two expressions of a single reality which 
cannot be captured simply in human language because, by God’s very nature, he 
transcends the limited categories of distinction and unity which we apply to creatures. 
The three sections of chapter 2 are sufficient to prove that Eckhart’s concept of God 
allows for a very different understanding of distinction and of personhood than the one 
which exists in the non-theocentric or atheistic perspective which Eckhart negates 
through apophasis (in the Latin and German works) and detachment (one of the 
principle themes of Eckhart’s German works). For Eckhart, creaturely distinction and 
personhood are conceived of in terms of the flow from and towards God (exitus and 
reditus), where both distinction and personhood are caused by and perfectly epitomised 




in the relations of the Trinity. This trinitarian understanding of distinction, which takes 
into account God’s necessary existence and the manner in which creation flows from his 
self-expressive triune act, will in turn form the basis for my argument about how, for 
Eckhart, human identity or individuality is only possible because of our relationship 
with God. Relationship with God is the precondition of human existence and enables 
true self-discovery and fulfilment, it does not therefore stand for a union where the 
soul’s uniqueness is lost or absorbed into God. 
In chapters 1 and 2 I will be drawing primarily upon several of the Latin works. 
In chapter 3 I will turn to the German works more specifically to consider Eckhart’s 
teaching on detachment. I shall explore Eckhart’s concepts of detachment 
(abegescheidenheit) and the ground (grunt), interpreting them in light of the 
understanding of God’s essence from chapter 1 and the Trinity from chapter 2. The 
soul’s ground and God’s ground are the same ground says Eckhart, and in this sense he 
affirms the primordial existence of the soul in the indistinction of the essence ‘before’ 
(logically not ontologically) the boiling up of the Trinity. In the course of this analysis 
of the ground I shall show that the process of detachment is the means by which the soul 
enters or is (re)united with its ground and suggest that detachment therefore performs a 
similar, if not identical function as apophasis in the Latin works. I will show how 
Eckhart himself suggests as much by identifying the soul’s ground as a place of 
‘potential receptivity’ to the life, will and activity of the Trinity. The breakthrough 
(durchbrechen) to the ground is the soul’s opening up of her potential to share in the 
divine life and unsurprisingly, considering the apophatic principle outlined above, she 
does this by negating all of the nothings or attachments which block her from God’s 
life, or which block God from her life. Detachment, like apophasis, is both the negation 
of these nothings and the affirmation of God’s being. However, in the German works 




detachment is also more obviously related to praxis than apophasis was in the Latin 
works, as one might expect from the German sermons and tractates, considering their 
genre.
1
 The ‘attachments’ which are negated define the way in which the soul habitually 
approaches activity, things in the world, herself, and God, in a manner that does not see 
these from the point of view of their connectedness with who and what God actually is. 
Attachments are therefore the habits of thought, speech and action which represent and 
perpetuate the soul’s view of things as if they were something in and of themselves, 
separate from God. Detachment reorientates the soul’s perspective away from this 
habitual fantasy view of reality and towards a theocentric perspective. This reorientation 
in turn overflows into the soul’s activity, where the soul’s detachment is now expressed 
in her activity and where that activity is no longer understood as the soul’s own but as 
God’s own activity working through the soul. 
In 3b, we come finally to the crux of the argument about the affirmation rather 
than denial of the soul’s individual selfhood.  I will suggest here that detachment and 
apophasis, since they negate every way in which God is removed from the centre of the 
soul’s perspective – its speech, thought and activity – represents a certain loss of 
control, an acceptance of existence and identity as something received rather than 
owned, something freely given rather than something deserved. By exploring Eckhart’s 
teaching on grace, primarily in sermon XXV, I will suggest that the habits of mind and 
body, of speech, thought and action, which are perpetuated thoughtlessly by the soul in 
every area of her life and understanding – create an ignorance of the grace and freedom 
that defines God’s existence and activity and within which he enables all reality and 
every individual self to come to be. It is within this doctrine of grace, where the soul’s 
                                               
 
1 As McGinn points out, Eckhart is both ‘Lesemeister and Lebemeister’ and our interpretation of his 
theology must pay proper regard to the differences between the contexts in which Eckhart wrote and 
preached. The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart: the Man from Whom God Hid Nothing (New York: 
The Crossroad Publishing Co., 2001), Ch. 1.  




every act, every ‘motion’ of body or mind is understood as dependent upon grace, that 
we can most understand what it means to be a distinct self. This understanding cannot 
however be purely noetic, since to engage with it as a reality, means actually 
undergoing the transformation or reorientation which Eckhart teaches and preaches. To 
understand what it means to be an individual created, sustained and defined by a 
relationship with God, one must actually allow oneself to be that individual, or one’s 
understanding of it will always be precisely the kind of limited and false understanding 
which Eckhart negates. In other words, Eckhart fundamentally affirms the necessity of 
faith to discover truth about reality, about the self and about God. In this theocentric 
reality being an individual person is defined in the same terms as God’s triune 
personhood: in terms of the perfectly trusting, free and grace-filled reception of identity 
and existence from relation with the other, where the other is all that fills the perspective 
of the person who receives full personhood from that other and who thus receives 
distinction through relation alone.  
I will suggest in the conclusion that the soul’s individuality is not preserved 
(however much we want it to be) as an ‘object’ which she knows and possesses distinct 
from other ‘objects.’ Her individuality is instead revealed as existing in a reciprocal 
relation from God and towards God. The soul’s distinct identity is therefore most 
fulfilled and most truly individual when she is oriented wholly towards God, because 
only then does she acknowledge the truth about what she is. According to my thesis, 
just because the soul sees God alone, even when she looks at herself, does not mean that 
she ceases to have individuality. In reality, by viewing God alone she responds to the 
fact of her individuality in the truest possible way – by being an individual oriented 
towards God. This, as I will suggest throughout, makes sense of passages in sermons 
such as Pr. 52, where Eckhart speaks about the soul knowing herself in the unity of the 




primordial ground or essence.
2
 Distinction and identity are therefore viewed from the 
same point of view as God’s own flow of triune relationality which exists in the same 
detachment, the same freedom and grace, wherein the soul exists, has her identity and 







































                                               
2 Pr. 52, p.421. 










Introduction: The Inscrutable Meister and ‘I’ 
 
Bernard McGinn points out that the question of whether God’s essence is prioritised 
over the Trinity is one of major the problems that interpreters have to face when 
approaching Eckhart’s theology.3 In his work, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart, 
he suggests that understanding Eckhart’s ‘mysticism of the ground’ is a helpful window 
into Eckhart’s entire teaching, both the Latin and German works.4 McGinn’s careful 
analysis of Eckhart’s ‘master metaphor’ of the ground includes a close reading of 
Eckhart’s concept of God as both essence and Trinity.5 However, despite the work of 
scholars such as McGinn, it remains common in the secondary literature to focus upon 
passages from Eckhart’s works – in particular the Germans sermons – which seem to 
imply that God’s essence,  also referred to as the unity or ground, is somehow more 
important than the Trinity. This subsequently becomes the basis on which Eckhart’s 
teaching on the soul’s union with God is interpreted. This union is then often viewed 
primarily as an indistinct union with God’s essence, since the divine category of 
distinction within which the soul’s individuality could be sustained, the Trinity, is 
negated by the interpreter. The denial of the Trinity does not therefore simply risk 
misunderstanding God’s nature in Eckhart’s theology, it risks removing the eternal 
                                               
3 He states, “the second major problem with the Meister’s ways of speaking about God, [is] the priority he 
gives to the hidden Godhead, the God beyond God. It would be foolish to deny that Eckhart holds to such 
a priority, just as it is evident that he did not feel that this in any way conflicted with his Christian belief 
that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were each fully God in the most proper sense of the term. His 
Avignon judges and Pope John XXII, however, did not agree that his account of the equality of the three 
Persons with the divine essence was an adequate theological explanation of Christian faith, for they 
included two articles relating to it in the Bull of condemnation.” McGinn (2001), p.35. 
4 Although he adds that in the German works the ‘ground’ is focused upon more explicitly and is ‘a 
central object of [Eckhart’s] preaching’. p.41. 
5 See p.37-8. See also Ch.5 for his examination of Eckhart’s metaphysics relating to the structure of 
God’s existence as essence and Trinity in relation to the exitus-reditus cycle of medieval neoplatonic 
thought. 




category of God’s distinct personhood by which Eckhart understands the existence of 
creation and the individual identity of the human soul within creation. It is worth briefly 
exploring this tendency in scholarship since it will give a sense of the context in which I 
believe the need has arisen for a more specifically trinitarian reading of Eckhart’s 
theology. I am claiming that it is wrong to suggest that Eckhart’s teaching on the soul’s 
union with God is primarily in terms of her union with God’s essence, unity or oneness. 
I am also suggesting that this inevitably leads to the suggestion that Eckhart denies 
distinct selfhood to the human individual in her relationship with God. Both of these 
mistaken conclusions can be avoided if we pay closer attention to how Eckhart thinks 
about the Trinity, since it is the Trinity which provides Eckhart with a vocabulary to talk 
about God’s distinct identity, with which the soul can have a relationship and because of 
which the soul’s individuality is created, preserved and perfected. 
Eckhart’s teaching on detachment in the German sermons is often presented by 
scholars, and sometimes by Eckhart himself, as if the first ‘step’ in the soul’s 
detachment is the stripping away of images and the soul’s subsequent union with God’s 
essence in the ground. In accord with this logical (though not ontological) order, I will 
begin my argument by considering how Eckhart conceives of God’s essence.6 This will 
allow us to consider Eckhart’s teaching on God’s necessary and self-sufficient 
existence, something that distinguishes him from creatures and from creaturely 
signification. It also provides insight into how Eckhart understands language – 
specifically in his use of analogy and apophasis to show how language must be applied 
differently to God and creatures if it is to be truthful. It is also useful for the order of my 
argument to begin by trying to understand what Eckhart means when he talks about 
God’s Essence, since it is through an examination of how Essence and persons relate 
                                               
6 The reason why I have called this simply a logical order will be clear from the rest of the thesis.  




that I shall later demonstrate his commitment to the Trinity – a commitment that refutes 
the mistaken suggestion that Eckhart prioritises essence over Trinity in God. 
The suggestion that Eckhart prioritises the soul’s union with God’s essence over 
the Trinity is not without reason. In one of the frequently cited sermons used to make 
this claim, Pr. 2, Eckhart states: 
 
So one and simple is this citadel in the soul, elevated above all modes, of which 
I speak and which I mean, that...for God to see inside it would cost Him all His 
divine names and personal properties: all these He must leave outside, should He 
ever look in there. But only insofar as He is one and indivisible, without mode or 
properties (can he do this): in that sense He is neither Father, Son, nor Holy 




This passage, taken alone, suggests that the soul’s union with God is primarily in terms 
of something ‘beyond’ the Trinity in the mutual ground which God and the soul share 
and where the soul is so indistinct from God that she can conceive of herself as her own 
cause.
8
 The citadel of the soul, an image which Eckhart uses to represent the soul’s 
ground, is inaccessible to God as Trinity, but receives him in his ‘somethingness’ where 
he is one, indivisible and without mode or properties. In other words, in their mutual 
ground God can only be present in the soul as essence. Passages such as this are often 
cited as evidence that Eckhart places the Trinity somehow ‘below’ the essence. 
However in 2c, when we look at how Eckhart speaks about potentiality and actuality in 
                                               
7 Pr. 2, p.81. 
8 Pr. 52, pp.421-2. 




God and the soul we will see quite clearly that this ordering of the Trinity and essence is 
logical, not ontological.
9
   
It is interesting, though perhaps not surprising, that some of the most frequently 
cited sermons in the secondary literature, for instance Prr. 2, 10, 15, 48 and 52 also 
contain some of Eckhart’s most complex and controversial statements.10 Scholars who 
focus upon passages like that quoted above from Pr. 2 frequently view Eckhart’s 
teaching on the soul’s union with God in terms of the unification of the soul with God’s 
indistinct essence. The essence is seen as higher than, prior to or more important than 
God’s triune existence and the soul’s relationship with the persons of the Trinity.11 
These features of Eckhart’s teaching are often used for a particular point of comparison 
with Buddhist or Hindu mystical teaching.
12
 They are also a common feature of the 
                                               
9 Frank Tobin also points out the problem with the reliability of the sermons authorship because they were 
noted down by members of the congregation and not by Eckhart himself. The condition of the texts as 
well as this possible issue over their accurately representing Eckhart’s own teaching should make us wary 
of using single texts as clear example of Eckhart’s broader theological teaching and instead we should 
search for a deeper theological consistency across the primary material in Meister Eckhart, Thought and 
Language (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1986), p.19. 
10 One possible reason for this is that Prr. 2, 6, 48 and 52 are contained in the volume Essential Eckhart 
which was for a long time, and remains still, one of the most reliable translations into English of a number 
of Eckhart’s texts and is cited by almost all scholars who do not make their own translations from the 
German. 
11 For examples of works which understate the centrality of the Trinity in Eckhart’s theology see Albrecht 
Classen ‘Meister Eckhart’s Philosophy in the 21st Century’, Mystics Quarterly, Vol. 29, No1/2 
(March/June 2003) pp.6-23 (pp.11-12); David E. Linge, ‘Mysticism, Poverty and Reason in the Thought 
of Meister Eckhart’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 1978) 
pp.465-488  (p.472); John D. Caputo, ‘Fundamental Themes in Meister Eckhart’s Mysticism’, The 
Thomist, 42 No.2 (1978) pp.197-225 (p.213); James Kellenberger, Dying to Self and Detachment 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) Ch.1-5. See also Robert Dobie, ‘Meister Eckhart’s “Ontological Philosophy of 
Religion”’, in The Journal of Religion, Vol. 82, No.4 (Oct., 2002) pp.563-585 (pp.581-2). 
12 As Beverly Lanzetta comments, “Both Buddhist scholars and contemporary philosophers resonate 
deeply with the Meister’s anarchic use of language and his obvious prescinding from the standard 
metaphysical categories of the day. Each sees reflected in Eckhart’s mysticism a partner with his or her 
own thought, albeit slightly veiled by his Christian roots, and each holds that Eckhart in some way leaves 
behind metaphysics for a radical and liberating nothingness.” ‘Three Categories of Nothingness in 
Eckhart’, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 72, No. 2 (April, 1992) pp.248-268 (p.249)). Analyses such as 
these are of immense value for interfaith dialogue and the parallels between Eckhart’s mysticism and the 
Eastern mystical traditions cannot be denied. However, Lanzetta rightly criticises this approach when it 
comes to trying to grasp Eckhart’s teaching in and of itself. To do this requires us to see the centrality of 
Christology and soteriology, as well as to understand that the mystery of God’s simultaneous Oneness 
and Threeness, cannot in any way be ‘solved.’ She states, ‘The startling power of Eckhart’s mystical 
theology rests squarely on this dynamic relationalism that is not subverted or compromised in lieu of a 
final, metaphysical end,’ refuting the suggestion that the indistinction of the Godhead is somehow the 
pinnacle of Eckhart’s concept of God. (p.259). Oliver Davies points to Rudolf Otto’s Mysticism East and 
West as the origin of the strand of Eckhart scholarship that focuses on eastern mystical parallels in 




existentialist and post-modern appropriation of Meister Eckhart’s theology, as in the 
case of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.
13
 Since the quantity and complexity of 
Eckhart’s theology prevents simple overarching analyses, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the works of certain scholars are limited by brevity and must focus on certain texts at 
the expense of others to construct some kind of argument. The result, however, has been 
a tendency amongst some scholars to undervalue the importance of the doctrine of the 
Trinity for Eckhart’s theology. This is not perhaps so significant when a scholar aims 
specifically to analyse certain of Eckhart’s works. However, these close analyses are 
sometimes then used as the basis for more general claims about Eckhart’s theology. For 
instance, David Linge’s article begins by focusing on the First Parisian Question, a text 
which is not concerned with the Trinity but with the question of whether being and 
understanding are the same in God.
14
 As we shall see below, he then turns towards 
general claims about Eckhart’s theology which, through omission, undervalue the role 
of the Trinity, and which are rooted in a reading of this single text.
15
 If our concern is to 
understand Eckhart on his own terms it is essential to view individual works, even 
particularly controversial examples such as Pr. 2, in the broader context of Eckhart’s 
theology. If we do not, then we are left with scholarship that frequently overlooks the 
centrality of christology, soteriology and trinitarianism (as for instance Linge’s article 
does) in Eckhart’s works. Scholarship, moreover, which gives such a fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                         
Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian (London: SPCK, 1991), pp.16-17.For examples of other 
comparisons of Eckhart with Buddhist and Hindu thought, see for instance Joseph Politella, ‘Meister 
Eckhart and Eastern Wisdom’, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April, 1965), pp.117-133; 
Charlotte Radler, ‘Losing the Self: Detachment in Meister Eckhart and Its Significance for Buddhist-
Christian Dialogue’, Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 26 (2006) pp.111-117; Robert E. Carter, ‘God and 
Nothingness’, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January, 2009), pp.1-21. For an extensive list of 
literature connecting Eckhart to Buddhism and Hinduism, see Lanzetta, (1992), p.248, note 1. 
13 For Heidegger see Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (Fordham University Press: 
New York, 1986) Ch.3 and 4. For Derrida see Ian Almond, ‘How Not to Deconstruct a Dominican: 
Derrida on God and “Hypertruth”’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol., 68, No. 2 (Jun., 
2000) pp.329-344 (pp.339-340). See also Caputo, ‘Mysticism and Transgression: Derrida and Meister 
Eckhart’, in H. J. Silverman ed., Derrida and Deconstruction (Routledge: New York, 1989) pp.24-38. 
14 Q. par. I, p.43. 
15 pp.471-5. 




unbalanced view of Eckhart’s theology and so deeply undervalues the distinctly 
Christian nature of his faith and teaching that claims made subsequent to this error are 
difficult to accept.  
Despite this Eckhart’s emphasis on negation, which in turn relates to his 
teaching on detachment,
16
 has unfortunately lent itself to the mistaken view that God as 
Trinity is something ultimately negated as well, something to pass beyond to get to the 
‘true God.’ John D. Caputo’s article ‘Fundamental Themes in Meister Eckhart’s 
Mysticism’ is a case in point. Through a close reading of Pr. 52, he suggests that 
Eckhart seeks to show us a form of rare religious experience.
17
 The pinnacle of this 
experience is, according to Caputo, union with God in his unnameable oneness: ‘For 
Eckhart, the highest name one can give to God is to call Him a nameless One, a unity in 
which all the divine attributes interfuse. To call God the One is to admit our inability to 
name God.’18 The Trinity is subordinate to this oneness, this unnameable God since it 
is, Caputo suggests, a set of properties which cannot be applied to the one and are 
absorbed into the unity of the one.
19
 This suggestion that the Trinity is a distinct set of 
properties falls down in the face of a closer reading of Eckhart’s teaching on analogy 
and apophasis, which I will offer below and which in turn clarifies Eckhart’s position on 
what properties and perfections are, how God has all properties and perfections 
indistinctly in the unity of his essence and how the Trinity differs from these as 
                                               
16 Turner for instance suggests that detachment is an ‘apophatic anthropology’. Denys Turner, The 
Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) p.168. 
17 ‘[Eckhart’s] sermons introduce us to a rare and exalted religious experience. Meister Eckhart is no 
theoretician of this experience; he does not speak “about it”, but “from out of it”.’ p.225. 
18 p.197. 
19 “one of the most astonishing features of Eckhart's thought is that the Godhead is said by him to lie 
deeper than the divine Trinity. The ‘trinity’ of persons is subordinate to the ‘unity’ of being or nature. 
Now the standard teaching of Aquinas and the other Christian masters had been that the unity of God's 
being was a rational or philosophical attribute of God which could be known by all men, whether 
Christian or Jew or Moslem. But the trinity of persons is a revealed truth which uncovers the hidden 
workings of the divine life and is accessible only to those with the light of the Christian faith. ‘Unity’ is 
overt, but the Trinity is hidden. Eckhart, however, takes the opposite position. The trinity of persons is a 
multiplicity whereas God's inner being is a unity. The Trinity names God's properties, His power (the 
Father), wisdom (the Son) and love (the Holy Spirit), whereas the true God is unnameable...The Trinity is 
a set of knowable properties. The divine unity is a mysterious recess.” pp.211-2. 




something placed ‘alongside’ not ‘below’ the essence. Caputo’s claim that the Godhead 
lies deeper than the Trinity depends upon this understanding of Trinity as ‘multiplicity’ 
in contrast to the inner unity of the true God. However, Eckhart’s use of the term 
Godhead is far from clear, and its relationship with essence is left unexamined by 
Caputo, despite its obvious significance for his claim.
20
  
Caputo’s view that Eckhart radically denies the equality between the Trinity and 
the one enables his characterisation of Eckhart as a speculative thinker, or ‘mystical 
atheist.’ He states: 
 
To unite with God we must overcome the distinction between God and the soul. 
But to overcome this distinction we must be rid of God. Here Eckhart's mystical 
speculation reaches its climax. Eckhart proposes a kind of mystical atheism in 




This claim that the indistinct union with the Godhead, or essence (the two are the same 
here) is the ‘climax’ of Eckhart’s speculative thought leaves little room for the 
trinitarianism that I will examine throughout this thesis. As several scholars have 
pointed out, the view that Eckhart advocates some form of mystical experience also 
undermines his whole approach to activity or charity – whether human or divine – and 
grace.
22
 The suggestion, albeit hopefully rhetorical, that Eckhart’s theology is a ‘kind of 
                                               
20It is not clear whether by Godhead (Gotheit) Eckhart means God in general, or whether it means 
essence, as McGinn points out in The Mystical Thought, note 60, p.223. From the Latin texts, McGinn 
translates in divinis as ‘Godhead,’ but it is important to remember the difference between the Latin use of 
this term which is employed consistently and the German term Gotheit used in various different, and 
sometimes contradictory ways in the sermons. 
21 pp.210-211. 
22 For an example of scholarship which suggest Eckhart advocates a form of mystical experience, see 
Michael Stoeber, ‘Introvertive Mystical Experiences: Monistic, Theistic, and the Theo-Monistic’, 
Religious Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 1993) pp.169-184 (p.178). Robert K. C. Forman also suggests the 
notion of Pure Consciousness Event as a way of discussing Eckhart’s mystical teaching, in ‘Mystical 
Knowledge: Knowledge by Identity’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 61, No. 4 




mystical atheism’ is also a confusing description of his apophatic teaching, which does 
not negate things that are true about God – including the Trinity – but negates, sin, evil, 
ignorance of God and the false ways in which humans try to know God or seek to 
follow God in their lives. Bernard McGinn responds directly to Caputo’s article by 
suggesting that while Eckhart’s use of language is certainly provocative, he is not 
questioning the orthodox equality between God’s Trinity and essence – he does not 
intend to make the Trinity inferior to God’s essence.23 Since my thesis is built on 
precisely this claim, that Eckhart does not ultimately deny the Trinity or subordinate it 
to God’s essence, in the course of my argument I will have to address the problem of 
how to interpret Eckhart’s trinitarianism in the face of its apparent denial in the sermons 
where this occurs. I will suggest through my argument that Eckhart’s ‘radical 
apophaticism’ is in fact a radical and persistent negation of atheism, not of 
trinitarianism, which leaves literally no space for the individual soul to be attached to 
nothings and nothingness – or godlessness and godless ways of viewing things – if she 
is to live in a way that accepts what is true about her self, reality and God.  
There are two major hurdles that I hope to identify and overcome during the 
course of my thesis, which may prevent a modern reader from immediately grasping 
how Eckhart understands personhood and how individuality is not lost through the 
soul’s relationship with God. The first is to do with ontology. It is simply not true, as 
Caputo’s approach suggests, that Eckhart’s ‘speculation’ begins with some kind of 
                                                                                                                                         
(Winter, 1993) pp.705-738 (pp.711-12). For an example of a reductive approach that limits mysticism to 
pure psychological experientialism separated from God through the author’s assumption of His non-
existence, see Evan Fales, ‘Can Science Explain Mysticism?’, Religious Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 
1999) pp.213-227. Two scholars whose work on Eckhart criticises the views of the above works are 
Richard Kieckhefer, ‘Meister Eckhart’s Conception of Union with God’, The Harvard Theological 
Review, Vol. 71, No. 3/4 (July – October 1978) pp.203-225 and Amy Hollywood’s truly conclusive 
account of this union between contemplation and activity, The Soul as Virgin Wife: Mechthild of 
Magdeburg, Marguerite Porete, and Meister Eckhart (Notre Dame; London: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1995).  
23 McGinn ‘The God Beyond God: Theology and Mysticism in the Thought of Meister Eckhart’, in The 
Journal of Religion, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January, 1981), pp.1-19 (p.10). 




Cartesian first principle, where the thinking subject exists autonomously from God who 
is the object of their ‘study’ or ‘speculation.’ For Eckhart, there is no ‘ontological 
scaffolding’ outside of God. 24 There is no autonomous self who exists prior to God and 
who, after establishing who or what she is and how she knows truth, can then approach 
God. The ontological scaffolding within which Eckhart thinks is theocentric. To be a 
self and to seek to understand anything at all is to be and to seek understanding in a 
context in which God already exists. Not only that, but he exists in a certain way, as a 
non-hierarchical essence and Trinity where this is itself the structuring principle behind 
reality and behind human existence and individuality.  
The second hurdle helps to define the first and could be characterised as 
anthropological. What it means for Eckhart to be a self and to ‘seek truth’ is inextricably 
tied up with the humble admission of dependence upon God’s grace for existence and 
salvation. For Eckhart, as I just suggested, there is simply no such thing as a self who 
knows what or who they are and from that pre-position then goes out to ask questions 
about God, such as ‘does God exist?’ and ‘what is God like?’ The fact of God’s 
existence is premised in the first ‘I am’ of the human individual, in the first act of being 
and the first stirring of thought or speech in that individual’s mind. As Eckhart says in 
his First Parisian Question, there is an absolute distinction between creaturely being 
and divine being, a distinction defined by dependence, such that ‘nothing in the creature 
is in God except as in its cause’.25 He states this even more plainly in the Latin sermon 
XXV:  
 
                                               
24 L. Stafford Betty uses the term ontological scaffolding in his article, ‘Towards a Reconciliation of 
Mysticism and Dualism’, in Religious Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1978) pp.291-303 (p.295). I 
will return to Betty’s article in the conclusion. 
25 Q. Par. I, p.48. 




Everything that exists praises what it is and proclaims its source. ‘From it’ 
efficiently, ‘through it’ formally, and ‘in it’ finally is ‘what is and ‘what it is.’ 
For this reason ‘what is’ is always material, potential, and a subject [of 





The existence of anything is, in other words, dependent upon God as its efficient, formal 
and final cause, where these three define everything that exists and define the specific 
existence of each individual thing. As such, any signification of ‘what is,’ i.e. any 
speech or thought that arises from an encounter with something in the universe, is 
always limited to creaturely categories of distinction. These categories, as we shall see 
in this chapter, cannot be applied to God, and as such, God – the source – is always the 
predicate of everything that exists and of each individually existing thing, in fact, he 
exists behind and before the speech act which seeks to signify him, enabling the 
existence of that speech and its speaker even if the content of the speech is something 
that seeks to deny God. Considering this, it is not surprising perhaps that Eckhart’s 
teaching can be misread in our own time, when these features of his perspective are 
likely to be alien both to the ontological ground upon which we are taught to do our 
knowing and the anthropological context in which we learn to understand ourselves. But 
it is the case for Eckhart and I will show that a reading of his theology which 
acknowledges this can illuminate how he affirms the soul’s individual identity as 
something created, sustained and saved through a relationship with God, a claim which 
in turn depends upon his doctrine of the Trinity.  
 
 
                                               
26 Sermon XXV, p.216. 




1a. (i) Analogy and the First Parisian Question 
 
Beginning with an examination of Eckhart’s teaching on God’s essence immediately 
presents us with a problem.  There is a clear discrepancy between his earliest extant 
text, the First Parisian Question, and his Opus Tripartitum, which he never completed 
but to which he wrote the Prologues as well as several parts of the Book of 
Commentaries.
27
 In the First Parisian Question, ‘Are Existence and Understanding the 
Same in God?’ Eckhart states quite plainly: ‘it is not my present opinion that God 
understands because he exists, but rather than he exists because he understands. God is 
an intellect and understanding, and his understanding itself is the ground of his 
existence.’28 He later adds, ‘existence does not belong to God, nor is he a being, but he 
is something loftier than being.’29 In apparent contradiction to this, in his summary of 
the prologues to the Opus Tripartitum he states repeatedly that ‘Existence is God’.30 He 
also explores this at great length in his Commentary on Exodus, drawing on Exodus 
3:14.
31
 This discrepancy between the First Parisian Question and the texts comprising 
part of the Opus Tripartitum could have been indicative of a radical change in Eckhart’s 
theology if the Opus Tripartitum were taken, as it was by Tobin in 1978, to be a much 
later work than the First Parisian Question.
32
 Even then however, Frank Tobin 
convincingly argues otherwise with a careful analysis of how Eckhart uses analogy. He 
points out that the different use of esse in reference to God in the First Parisian 
Question and in the Commentary on Exodus, depends upon an analogy of attribution: 
 
                                               
27 See Tobin, pp.3-29. The First Parisian Question, states Maurer, was written between 1302-1303, 
suggests Maurer, during Eckhart’s first period as Magister in Paris. Maurer, p.11. 
28 Q. Par. I, p.45. 
29 Q. Par. I, p.50. 
30 Op. tri, pp.77, 85-7. 
31 In Ex., p.45. See Ch. 1 below for full examination of Eckhart’s treatment of ‘esse est Deus’ in the 
Commentary on Exodus. 
32 Tobin suggests that the plan for the Opus Tripartitum and the Prologues were probably written quite 
late, either in Strasbourg between 1314-1322 or Cologne, after 1323. pp.8 and 20. 




If we attribute esse to creatures, then we must use some other term for God, such 
as intelligere or puritas essendi. If, on the other hand, we call God esse, then 
creatures cannot in any real sense also be included in the term. They are rather in 
themselves pure nothing. Nowhere does Eckhart mention any kind of analogy in 
which both objects have an attribute formaliter. When he speaks of analogy, he 




We do not therefore have to see a contradiction between Eckhart’s First Parisian 
Question and his Opus Tripartitum (or the Commentary on Exodus) because the two are 
using analogy in a different way – in the first case primarily signifying being of 
creatures and thus denying it of God and in the second place signifying being of God 
and denying it of creatures.  
As Markus Enders points out, scholarship now suggests that the Opus 
Tripartitum was in fact written as early as 1305.
34
 If this is true, it refutes the suggestion 
that Eckhart underwent a transformation in his theology and further supports this view 
of his theology as dialectical, rooted in his use of analogy and apophasis as tools to 
speak truthfully of the relationship between God and creatures.
35
 We also do not have to 
accede to the position of scholars such as Linge who, based on a reading of the First 
Parisian Question alone, moves to a general analysis of Eckhart’s theology as a 
                                               
33 pp.44-5. See also O. J. Keenan, “Theological Epistemology in Eckhart’s First Parisian Question”, 
Medieval Mystical Theology, Vol. 22, No. 1/2 (June 2013) pp.27-44. Keenan points out that disentangling 
the apparent contradiction between the Parisian Questions and the Opus Tripartitum which state, God is 
not essence (Q. Par. I) and esse est Deus (Op. tri.) requires an ‘understanding of Eckhart’s nuanced 
appropriation of the doctrine of analogy’. p.39. 
34 See Loris Sturlese “Meister Eckhart in der Bibliotheca Amploniana. Neues zur Datierung des ‘Opus 
tripartitum,’ ” (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 23 (1995) pp.434-46. Cited in Markus Enders, “Meister 
Eckhart’s Understanding of God,” in Jeremiah M. Hackett (ed.), Brill’s Companions to the Christian 
Tradition: A Companion to Meister Eckhart, Vol.36 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013) p.369, note 34. 
35 Tobin gives clear evidence that Eckhart’s theology is intentionally dialectical. He points to Eckhart’s 
Second Lecture on Ecclesiasticus, Ch.24, where Eckhart uses the example of how health is predicated of 
food and urine in an analogy of attribution where health refers properly to the human being and only 
secondarily to food or urine whose healthiness is always relative to the health of the human. This defines 
the analogy of attribution. Tobin refers to In Eccli. N. 52: LW II, 280-1 (p.44).  




‘metaphysics of intellection’ which subordinates the Trinity to ‘intellect’, in this case a 
term synonymous with essence.
36
 When, in the First Parisian Question Eckhart draws 
upon Exodus 3:14 to state that God cannot be called existence, only puritas essendi, 
Linge reads this as ‘purity from being.’ He is then able to suggest that Eckhart prefers 
this formula because ‘a metaphysics of intellection offers greater possibilities for 
protecting the absolute unity and oneness of God.’37 He supports his claim that this view 
is representative of Eckhart’s theology more generally by referring to Pr. 9 which states 
that being is the ‘forecourt’ of God’s habitation, but intellect is the temple in which he 
truly dwells. Linge then states ‘The intelligibility of Eckhart’s mystical teaching 
depends on this doctrine of divine intellection, for in the mystical experience the 
Christian penetrates the inner stillness of God and participates in God’s self-
knowledge’.38 There are a number of problems with this claim and the most obvious is 
Linge’s dependence upon minimal source material. Tobin, like Linge, quotes Pr. 9, but 
almost immediately points to Pr. 19 which refers to God’s house as ‘“the unity of his 
being” (diu einicheit sînes wesens; Pr.19; DW I, 314, 1-2),’ and thus contradicts Pr. 9 




Linge also totally overlooks Eckhart’s teaching on analogy and apophasis which 
Tobin uses to justify the congruence between the First Parisian Question and the Opus 
Tripartitum and which supports my claim that essence, or in this case the synonym 
‘intellect’ which still refers to God’s unity or oneness, is not the deepest or highest part 
of God, but something that must be understood alongside Eckhart’s trinitarianism as 
well. The importance of analogy is difficult to overstate, not least since Eckhart himself 
                                               
36 pp.471-2, 476. 
37 p.472.  
38 p.473. 
39 pp.38-39. 




felt that it was misunderstood and said as much in his defence at Cologne. He refers to 
the Latin term ‘in quantum’ (insofar as) stating:  
 
To clarify the objections brought against me, three things must be kept in mind. 
The first is that the words ‘insofar as,’ that is, a reduplication, exclude from the 
term in question everything that is other or foreign to it even according to 
reason. Even though existence and understanding are the same in God, still we 
do not say that God is evil although we can say that he understands evil. 
Although in God the Father essence and paternity are the same, he does not 
generate insofar as he is essence, but insofar as he is Father, even though the 




As we shall see later, this is actually a restatement of precisely the same point that 
Eckhart makes in the Commentary on Exodus, n.56. It is very useful for understanding 
how he thinks that analogy relates to the apophatic signification of God’s necessary 
existence and for how essence and Trinity relate to each other. For now it is simply 
useful to show that Linge’s position does not take full account of the subtlety of 
Eckhart’s theology. If we look at the First Parisian Question as an analogy of 
attribution we can see that what is being denied of God, or subordinated to 
intellect/essence, does not have to be God’s being in itself, since this still exists in an 
absolute and necessary sense and is, according to the Commentary on Exodus n.58, 
identical with his understanding. Instead it is creaturely being that is denied of God. 
God is not ‘a’ being, but is prior to everything that constitutes the existence of particular 
beings in the distinct universe. He is prior to it as first and efficient cause, and above it 
                                               
40 Defense, p.72. 




or ahead of it as final cause.
41
 Linge is right to identify the use of intellect as an 
affirmation of God’s unity and oneness, but he misses the crucially dialectical nature of 
Eckhart’s teaching on God’s existence and the relationship between God and creation.  
This dialectical method depends upon Eckhart’s use of analogy, which, as Tobin notes, 
is the means by which Eckhart affirms God in himself and negates all of the false ways 
in which humans erroneously signify God: 
 
For Eckhart to say that God and creature are analogous to each other is to say 
that there is no single positive quality, be it existence, goodness, truth, justice, or 
any other, which they both possess. The being that creatures possess bears no 
essential similarity to anything in God. If creatures can be said to be, then some 
entirely different term must be used to refer to God. In a verbal context where 
creatures are being, God is above being, the purity of being. Or, more frequently, 
God alone will be said to be being. Creatures, in themselves, or insofar as (in 
quantum) they are creatures, are simply nothing. However, since nothing exists 
outside God, besides being ‘analogous to’ or separate from God, creatures are 
also indistinct from or one with him. What has become distinct from God 
through creation remains at the same time indistinct from him with regard to 
everything that raises it above its own nothingness. As separate from God, a 
creature is just a sign pointing to what is real. As one with God, a creature really 
is, is good, is just, and the like. As separate from God it is subject to change and 





                                               
41 as we saw in Sermon XXV p.216 above.  
42pp.63-4. 




Here Tobin clearly outlines the dialectical quality of analogy and also points to its 
apophatic character. When we speak about God analogously with creaturely terms 
nothing positive can be said truly, but when we reverse the analogy of attribution and 
signify from the point of view of what is true about God, i.e. apophatically, then 
creatureliness is identified as that which possesses nothing positive and creaturely terms 
become nothing in the face of God’s everything-ness. What analogy says about God and 
creation does not however simply end with the negation of creaturely knowing or being. 
Because creatures do in fact exist and receive their existence from God, they are not 
disregarded in Eckhart’s theology, nor does he deny the value of creaturely distinction. 
This is again shown through analogy, where a creature is a ‘something’ insofar as it 
receives its somethingness from God and, when conceived of separately from God – i.e. 
when we make positive statements in purely creaturely terms and thus view the creature 
separately from God – it is ‘nothing.’ Analogy and apophasis are therefore used to say 
something about how the soul should orientate herself ontologically, not just 
grammatically, towards her creator. The apophatic becomes a category by which the 
soul structures her life, a tool by which she acknowledges God as being itself and as 
cause of her own being. When she does this she identifies the ways in which she makes 
God less than he is by viewing him through the lens of her creaturely perspective, her 
creaturely knowledge, speech, actions and desires. As I will argue throughout this 
thesis, the apophatic therefore becomes the safeguard of the authenticity of the soul’s 
relationship with God. If this is correct, then it is obviously also true that a better 
understanding of Eckhart’s position on God’s essence is one that takes account of the 
dialectical method inherent in his theology and presented in his understanding of 
analogy and apophasis. 




Anastasia Wendlinder offers another in depth approach to Eckhart’s use of 
analogy in her analysis of how it functions ‘non-contrastively.’ Like Tobin, she claims 
that Eckhart employs analogy as a tool to speak simultaneously about God’s 
transcendence from and immanence to, the whole of creation and especially to the 
human soul.
43
 The distinction Wendlinder draws in analogy is a significant one for 
Eckhart’s metaphysics, since the dialectical relationship of simultaneous transcendence 
and immanence between God and creation is defined by God’s existence as both 
essence and Trinity. As Eckhart makes clear in sermon XLIX, God does not create or 
indwell insofar as he is essence, but insofar as the persons of the Trinity ‘boil up’ 
(bullitio), ‘boil over’ (ebullitio) and create (creatio) in a single flow from the essence.44 
In other words, it is only because God is an essence, which overflows from itself as self-
expressive and creative Trinity, that creation exists at all. The self-expressive flow of 
the Trinity is the precondition for creation and thus the precondition for the possibility 
of human existence and human speech about God. In a sense, Eckhart’s own teaching 
therefore recognises its creaturely condition and dependence upon the pre-condition of 
the Trinity for its own existence.  If God were only or primarily essence then all speech 
about God, including analogy, would lose its truth value, since what it fundamentally 
points to is God’s creative activity, not his indistinct essence. But God is not simply or 
primarily essence, he is fundamentally self-expressive and eternally active. This is clear 
from the German sermons where Eckhart repeatedly states that God ‘always’ gives birth 
to the Son in the same eternal now in which he is himself,
45
 it is also clear from the 
bullitio-ebullitio-creatio flow, mentioned about and which we shall examine at length in 
                                               
43 Anastasia C. Wendlinder, ‘Beyond Analogy: Articulating God’s Transcendence and Immanence 
According to Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of 
Notre Dame, 2004), p.32. 
44 Sermon XLIX n.511 pp.236-7. See 2b for a fuller account of this sermon and the trinitarian teaching 
therein. 
45 See for instance, Pr. 101, p.29. See also In Gen., n.7, p.84. 




2b. Moreover, it is through this giving birth, or through the ‘boiling up’ of the whole 
Trinity that God is able to create, and thus the existence of creation is a sign of God’s 
triune activity. 
God does not actively or communicatively relate to creation as essence, since as 
the First Parisian Question makes quite clear, God’s essence is totally separate from 
creaturely ‘being’.46 His self-expressive and creative triune existence however, boils up 
from this essence, and in the same eternal boiling, boils over into creativity. The Trinity 
is therefore the dimension of God which makes analogy meaningful, because it is only 
God as essence and Trinity who creates and who in creating opens up within the distinct 
universe the possibility for a relationship between God and humanity. 
In this opening discussion (1a), I am therefore suggesting, as Eckhart himself 
pointed out in his defence at Cologne, that a proper understanding of what he is trying 
to show in his theology, depends upon his use of analogy and apophasis, which makes 
possible an understanding of his concept of God that does not prioritise the essence over 
the Trinity. This claim in turn provides us with a framework in which the soul’s union 
with God need not be viewed in terms of an ontological (and eternal) absorption of her 
individuality, but can instead be seen as a perfected relationship, where the false view of 
distinction as the separateness between things, is overcome by the divine view of 
distinction, where things are distinct through their relationship with one another, just as 
the persons of the Trinity receive their distinction relationally. This point is central to 
my argument and I will return to it several times throughout this thesis. 
For Eckhart, as I stated earlier, a proper understanding of reality is theocentric. 
In a certain sense this means, as C. F. Kelley suggests, that the detached soul views 
                                               
46 Another example from Par. Q. I, can be found when Eckhart shows how human knowing depends upon 
the existence of things, but divine knowing causes the existence of things. As such, Eckhart states: “A 
principle is never the same as that which follows from a principle, as a point is never a line. Now God is 
the principle or cause of existence or being itself; hence he is not the being or existence of his creature. 
Nothing in the creature is in God except as in its cause, and it is not there formally.” Q. Par. I, p.48. 




everything from God’s point of view.47 However, to make sense of this statement 
requires a careful interpretation of how the soul relates to God as a whole; to his essence 
and to his persons. God’s perspective is the truest perspective of everything that is since 
it is the cause and end of creation and also because only God can know himself 
perfectly. This is shown by Eckhart, as we shall shortly see, through the negation of 
negation which functions as the highest form of affirmation of God’s existence, utterly 
negating all falsehood or limitation from what God is and from what he knows – where 
his being and understanding are not, properly (or rather, apophatically) speaking, 
distinct from one another. The soul, insofar as she sees what is true about God through 
apophasis, shares in God’s self-knowledge. Even though she simultaneously negates the 
creaturely categories with which she formerly thought she knew things, she still has a 
kind of knowledge, an apophatic knowledge, which sees God as that which he is. It is 
only from the point of view of this apophatic knowledge that the soul comes to a true 
understanding of her own self as well, for what she is, is inextricable from what God is 
since he is her cause and end and his identity is the reason for the soul’s own distinction 
and individuality.  
It might seem as if sharing in God’s knowing in this way precisely suggests the 
kind of absorption or disappearance of individual identity into God that I am trying to 
show is not part of Eckhart’s theology. We must however think carefully about what a 
theocentric ontology or perspective really means. For Eckhart, this accusation of 
absorption is only meaningful if we think that there is truth value in a perspective of 
reality that does not view absolute theocentricity as the highest good of human being 
and understanding. Eckhart however, does not attribute value to a perspective which is 
in any sense less than theocentric. Indeed, it is fair to suggest that such a perspective 
                                               
47 Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge (First published New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977; repr., 
California: Frog Books, 2008) pp.1-14. 




would be precisely the kind of ‘nothingness’ or ‘attachment’ which he negates through 
the apophatic signification of God in the Latin works, and the teaching on detachment in 
the German works.
48
 To understand why the soul’s sharing in God’s knowledge does 
not negate her identity or the uniqueness of her individual perspective therefore requires 
us to attend carefully to Eckhart’s theocentric perspective. To say that the detached soul 
sees everything from God’s point of view means simply that she sees truly, where 
seeing truly means, from the perspective of eternity, seeing God alone, and from the 
perspective of time, seeing God in all things. In time the soul must approach God in her 
activity, ethics, and creaturely relations, whereas in eternity she approaches God 
through the unity of divine relationality.
49
 In one sense the eternal perspective, which is 
identical with God and the temporal perspective, which more clearly identifies the soul 
as an individual, are the same, since God as existence itself contains everything in 
himself and is the cause of all things.
50
 But just because the soul’s perspective is aligned 
to God’s does not mean that she no longer ‘inhabits’ her own perspective or ‘viewing 
point,’ it means rather that she sees truly. In other words, for Eckhart any true 
perspective must include the fact of God’s existence and to include this fact properly in 
the way the soul thinks and acts means recognising it in everything, since all things are 
what they are through their dependence upon God. The soul’s viewing point is therefore 
the self-expression of her existence, and the closer she moves to God, the more fully her 
existence is affirmed and expressed and the more fully her perspective is filled with 
God. She is not absorbed into God through her relationship with him; she is perfected 
by it and becomes more fully existent and self-expressive the closer she moves towards 
God. As I shall suggest in the conclusion to this thesis, the reason why this seems to us 
                                               
48 I will provide ample evidence for this in chapter 3. 
49 c.f. Pr. 103, p.59. In a future study it would be essential to spend more time on the distinction drawn 
here. Due to the constraints of this thesis, I am not however able to do so. 
50 For God as existence itself, see analysis of In Ex. below.  




as if the soul’s individuality disappears, is because we habitually define distinct 
personhood or individuality as if they are separable from God, but from the point of 
view of Eckhart’s teaching that means we are viewing them precisely in terms of the 
‘nothingness’ and ‘attachments’ negated through apophasis and detachment. The 
opposite of this is to view the soul’s individuality according to the true categories of 
distinction and personhood which are triune, defined by relation and self-expression, not 
separateness and self-possession. In other words, if we are to take Eckhart at his word, 
we must admit that we express our own attachment to our self, or to nothingness, when 
we think that Eckhart’s concept of the soul’s union with God denies her individuality. 
We do not therefore express something ontologically true about the detached soul whom 
we observe in Eckhart’s theology. The only ontological claim we make in this case is to 
highlight the creatureliness of our own perspective.
51
  
 This prioritising God’s existence as a necessary predicate of all subsequently 
existing beings, or of human speech and thought about God, is one of the hermeneutic 
obstacles identified in my introduction. Robert Dobie also comments upon this in his 
analysis of Eckhart’s approach to the authority of revelation. He states: 
 
The goal of any talk about God is not to describe God or to give us speculative 
knowledge about God, for all such talk is ultimately futile. It is rather to lead the 
believer into a new mode of existing in God, one that is possible, paradoxically, 
only when the human intellect has been stripped of any and all preconceptions 
about the nature of God, so that there is a new basis for knowing God not as this 
                                               
51 In the conclusion to this thesis I will return to the view presented in this paragraph after having 
interpreted Eckhart’s theology, and thus tie it in more securely with Eckhart’s own teaching. 









The emphasis here is upon gaining understanding through participation in something 
true, in a real relationship with a real God who is both one and three. The understanding 
that comes through this relationship is not something the soul can know through its 
reason alone, since its reason is also subsequent to God who causes the soul’s existence 
and reasonable capacity. As Eckhart himself states: 
 
The work of grace, because it is supernatural, is superior to every created work. 
Because it is above nature as something higher...the operation of God’s grace is 
also unknown to an intellect that is based only on the natural light of reason. 
(And so children who die without baptism know nothing about the glory of the 
blessed, and this seems to be the real reason why they do not grieve that they 




This interesting passage from sermon XXV highlights the difference between a modern 
approach to truth and Eckhart’s 14th century Christian perspective. He considers God as 
above or prior to everything else, identifying God’s primordiality not only to all existing 
things, but also specifically to the capacity of natural reason.
54
 The example of the un-
baptised child may sound unreasonable to a modern interpreter, however it stands as a 
perfect example of the fact that Eckhart’s theology grants genuine authority to God’s 
                                               
52 Logos and Revelation: Ibn ‘Arabi, Meister Eckhart, and Mystical Hermeneutics (Washington DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2010) p.64. 
53 Sermon XXV, n.268, p.221. 
54a point Thomas Aquinas makes in the very first article of the Summa: ‘It was necessary for man’s 
salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by 
human reason.’ STh 1a. 1. 1.  




revelation in scripture and in the church and engages with their teaching through faith, 
not simply through reason. The soul therefore does not primarily know God with her 
reason, she knows God by recognising him as prior to her reason, as that from which 
she flows; as the underlying cause of the fact that she can reason in the first place. In 
other words, for Eckhart all being and knowing exists in the context of a universe where 
God exists and where God’s existence, because of the nature of his relationship with 
creation as its creator, is in fact a necessary predicate of everything that exists, including 
every act of knowing. There is no clearer statement of this in Eckhart’s theology than in 
his answer to the question ‘Does God exist?’ in the Opus Tripartitum: 
 
I reply that he does...If God does not exist, nothing exists. The consequent is 
false and therefore the antecedent is also false, namely that God does not exist. 
The inference is proved as follows: If existence does not exist, no being exists, 
or nothing exists, as nothing white exists if whiteness does not exist. Now 
existence is God, as the proposition states. Hence, if God does not exist, nothing 




The difference between a modern philosophical concept of reason and truth, and 
Eckhart’s, dependent as it is upon God’s necessary existence, could not be plainer.  It is 
only when we recognise the inseparability of faith and reason for Eckhart that we can 
properly understand his metaphysics which, despite at times sounding similar to Eastern 
mysticism and 20
th
 century post-modern or existential philosophy, should not be 
carelessly compared if our aim is to understand Eckhart on his own terms as much as 
possible. Without making explicit the role that his Christian faith has in his ontology, it 
                                               
55 Op. tri., n.13, pp.86-7. 




is easy to omit Eckhart’s commitment to the Trinity from our interpretation of his 
theology and we saw Caputo do just that above. However, when we take Eckhart’s faith 
commitment seriously, such an omission appears highly unusual, if not patently absurd. 
Having now established some of the essential principles of Eckhart’s teaching – the 
importance of apophasis, analogy and dialectical language – and suggested how the 
difference between Eckhart’s medieval perspective and a modern perspective might be 
one cause of the disregard of the Trinity in his theology, I will turn to Eckhart’s 




1b. God’s Essence in the Commentary on Exodus  
 
As I discussed above, Eckhart’s First Parisian Question is dialectically opposed to the 
Opus Tripartitum and the Commentary on Exodus in terms of how it considers God’s 
intellect and being. As we saw, David Linge suggested that Eckhart’s use of the term 
puritas essendi meant purity ‘from’ being.56 Paying more careful attention to the 
dialectical nature of Eckhart’s theology, Markus Enders points to the same term, but 
suggests instead that it signifies a kind of being above being. It is, in other words an 
apophatic statement; it is not about what God is not but about what God most 
superabundantly is, as signified through the negation of negation.
57
 In the First Parisian 
Question Eckhart uses the term puritas essendi when he draws on Exodus 3:14 to 
support his argument about God’s being-lessness as first cause or principle of creation. 
                                               
56 p.472. 
57 Enders comments: “Eckhart sees the refusal to ascribe any creaturely forms of Being to the divine 
intellect as a genuine statement of negative theology, which, like negative theology as a whole, is in 
reality a superabundantly affirmative statement about God, since it does not deny to him anything that 
would be his by nature, but merely asserts ‘that he contains everything in himself antecedently in purity, 
fullness, and perfection, more amply and more broadly, since he is the root and cause of all things.’ [Q. 
Par. I, n.12 LW V, 48, 4-8].” p.365. 




For Eckhart, this purity of existence is expressed directly in the statement ‘I am who [I] 
am’. He comments: 
 
When someone who wants to conceal his identity and name is asked at night 
‘Who are you?’ he replies, ‘I am who I am.’ So the Lord, wishing to show that 
he possesses purity of existence, said, ‘I am who I am.’ He did not say simply ‘I 
am,’ but added ‘who I am.’ Therefore existence does not befit God, unless you 




If we view this in a more specifically apophatic sense as Enders suggests, then 
Eckhart’s point here is two-fold: first, that God is not not his own being (‘I am who I 
am’) and second, that he is not creaturely being (‘I am’ on its own). As we saw above, it 
is creaturely being, not divine being, that Eckhart seeks to remove from our definition of 
God and it is therefore creaturely being, not divine being, which is negated from God in 
the negation of negation.
59
 If Enders is correct to suggest this – in direct opposition to 
Linge’s interpretation of puritas essendi – then the kind of being apophatically signified 
here is the same as the being which ‘God is’ in the Opus Tripartitum and the same as 
the being of which Eckhart speaks in the Commentary on Exodus, where he draws on 
Ex. 3:14 again to consider, once more through apophasis, how God’s existence and 
essence are in fact identical.  
In the First Parisian Question, Eckhart wanted to show that creaturely 
signification could not be applied to God, since human knowing depends upon the 
existence and experience of an object, whereas God’s knowing of objects causes their 
                                               
58 Q. Par I, p.48. 
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 This fundamental distinction is the essence of analogical speech, since 
analogy, when it signifies from time, is always limited and ultimately false inasmuch as 
creaturely categories are used to speak about God, since God is, properly speaking prior 
to and the cause of, creatures and their categories. On the other hand, because of his 
existence as primordial cause, God can be signified through the negation of speech, 
through the pointing behind or beyond language to its necessary source. This is the 
point when apophatic speech enters theological discourse and enables human speech – 
necessarily analogous – to point beyond itself, highlighting its own limitation whilst still 
point to God as that which he is. This apophatic mode of signification is one of the key 
ways in which Eckhart talks about God and his relationship to creation in the 
Commentary on Exodus. There are three main points from this text that I wish to discuss 
for the sake of my thesis. The first is, as we have already begun to explore above, God’s 
necessarily existent and self-sufficient essence, and his primordiality or priority to 
creation. The second is the way in which this is signified apophatically. The third point 
is how the Trinity is still in fact included in Eckhart’s signification of God’s eternal 
existence. This third point will be the focus of chapter 2, and I will not therefore 
consider it here.  
One of the most interesting passages from the Commentary is Eckhart’s exegesis 
of Exodus 3:14. We have already seen that Eckhart referred to this passage in the First 
Parisian Question. This time, in the Commentary, Eckhart begins his analysis of the 
passage by drawing on Avicenna’s Metaphysics 8.4. He claims that the ‘I am who am’ 
of Exodus 3:14 is a statement of the synonymy between what God is and that God is: 
 
                                               
60 Eckhart states: ‘our knowledge is different from God’s. His knowledge is the cause of things whereas 
our knowledge is caused by them.’ Q.Par. I, p.48. 




note the term ‘am’ is here the predicate of the proposition when God says ‘I am,’ 
and it is in the second position. As often as it occurs, it signifies that pure naked 
existence is in the subject, from the subject, and is the subject itself, that is, the 
essence of the subject. It also signifies that essence and existence are the same, 
which belongs to God alone whose ‘what-it-is’ is his ‘that-it-is,’ as Avicenna 





The subject here is God, so the identity between God’s what-it-is and his that-it-is, is a 
statement of the identity between his nature and the fact of his existence. In other words 
he exists necessarily. This is only true of God, since God, as we saw in the First 
Parisian Question, is the cause of all that exists and, as such, does not depend upon  any 
kind of caused existence for his own existence, or he would have the same kind of 
existence as creatures and would not be God. Eckhart makes this point clearly in the 
Commentary: 
 
in every created thing existence and essence, differ, the former coming from 
something else and the latter not coming from something else, the question 
whether something exists, which asks about the ‘that-it-is’ or existence of a 
thing, is different from the question about what it is, which asks about the ‘what-
it-is’ or essence of a thing. That is why it is foolish to answer someone who asks 
what a man or an angel is by saying ‘He is,’ or that a man or an angel exists. But 
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in God where ‘that-it-is’ is the ‘what-it-is’ itself, a fitting answer to someone 
asking who or what is God is ‘God is,’ for God’s existence is his ‘what-it-is.’62 
 
We can see here that the synonymy between God’s essence and existence identifies an 
ontological difference between God and creatures. As Vladimir Lossky, suggests, this 
passage signifies God’s unity and his uniqueness.63 This indicates the limitedness of 
creatures, whose essence and existence are different from one another and the 
limitlessness of God, who is his own self-sufficiency and is cause of creaturely 
existence. The statement ‘God is’ which is, as we shall see, affirmed through the 
negation of negation, identifies the causal dependence of creatures (and speech) upon 
God and, subsequently, points to God as that which is beyond language and creaturely 
existence. Speech about God and indeed all speech is only completely true when in 
itself it acknowledges both of these points; signifying God as the creator beyond 
creatures, and signifying creaturely dependence upon God as necessary cause. This may 
seem like Eckhart is begging the question of God’s existence in his approach to speech 
about God and, in fact, he is, since God’s existence is for Eckhart the truest or most 
basic fact about reality as we saw in the Opus Tripartitum, a fact, moreover, 
encountered through faith and apophasis, as much as through reason. The simple fact 
that creation exists and we are in it is evidence enough for Eckhart of the fact that God 
exists – so implicit is faith in Eckhart’s perspective of reality. 
In accordance with the Aristotle’s principle of the prime mover which moves 
itself,
64
 Eckhart names God as self-sufficient existence: 
                                               
62 In Ex., n.18, pp.46-7. 
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l’Être qui est Dieu : solus Deus proprie est ens.” Théologie Négative et Connaissance de Dieu, Chez 
Maître Eckhart, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1960) p.98. 
64 Aristotle, Metaphysics book Λ, 1071a – 1072a in Hugh Lawson-Tancred (trans.), Aristotle, The 
Metaphysics: (London: Penguin, 2004) pp.365-370. 





to need something and not to be self-sufficient is totally foreign to God’s 
essence. ‘The First is rich through itself.’ Therefore, when he says ‘I am who 
am,’ he teaches that the subject ‘I am’ itself is the predicate ‘I am’ that comes 
second, and that the denominator is what is denominated, the essence is the 
existence, the ‘what-it-is’ is the ‘that-it-is,’ the essence is self-sufficient and its 
own sufficiency. That is to say he ‘does not need any creature’s essence or 
anything outside himself to establish him or perfect him, but his essence is self-





Eckhart distinguishes here between God’s essence and creaturely essences as things 
outside of God. Creaturely essence depends upon something exterior to itself to cause 
change or movement in it, or to actualise its potentiality for something – e.g. its 
reception of a particular perfection, such as goodness or wisdom. God alone is self-
sufficient, meaning that he depends upon nothing but his own essence for his existence. 
For Eckhart, this represents a truth about God as creator, since everything that exists 
depends upon God as the cause of its existence.
66
 Having said this he goes on to 
consider the difference between God and creatures in more detail: 
 
                                               
65 In Ex., n.20, p.47.  
66As we shall see later, for Eckhart God also does not rely on any cause or source for the distinct 
dimension of his existence as self-expressive and creative Trinity since the Trinity boils-up (bullitio) from 
the essence eternally, in such a way that its ‘emergence’ from the essence does not create an order of 
priority between essence and persons. It is this non-priority that Eckhart is perhaps referring to in his 
German sermons when he states ‘God’s ingoing is his outgoing’ (Pr. 53, p.152) and ‘the unity is the 
distinction, and the distinction is the unity. The greater the distinction, the greater the unity, for that is 
distinction without distinction’. (Pr.10, p.338). 




In everything that is beneath God, the essence is not self-sufficient to and in all 
things. For example, an artist’s nature is not sufficient for his work unless the 
will to work, and the power and knowledge and the like (things which are not 
the artist’s nature itself) accompany it. Therefore, substance and power, 




In this passage Eckhart begins to consider how God and creatures possess perfections 
differently according to their different essences – dependent and self-sufficient. 
Creatures are shown here to have perfections, substance, power, etc., which are distinct 
from one another. However, in God these perfections are contained indistinctly in his 
essence: 
 
We are wise through one property, have power through another, and will 
through a third. It is not so in the Creator, but in him wisdom is power itself and 
is will itself, so that he does not have wisdom through one property, power 
through another, will through a third, but is wise powerful, and willing through 




                                               
67 In Ex., n.20, pp.47-8. 
68 In Ex., n.42, p.56. Eckhart sometimes uses the term ‘substance’ to refer to the same aspect of God as 
‘essence.’ We can see this at the beginning of In Ex. n.14, “Discretivum pronomen meram substantiam 
significant: meram, inquam, sine omni accidente, sine omni alieno, substantiam sine qualitate, sine forma 
hac aut illa, sine hot aut illo.” (LW II, p.20, 3-5). He describes substance here in terms of the same 
negation of qualities with which he describes the essence which is existence itself. In n.14-15, essentia, 
substantia  and esse are synonymous. He seems to be using substance in the same way in the passage 
above, and, as such, it appears that relation is a category which remains outside of the essence which is 
existence, and which is not identical with the Godhead (in divinis) in this Latin text. He also states this 
quite clearly in n.65: “In deo autem idem est et hoc ipsum esse quod essential sive substantia. Igitur 
omnia praedicamenta accidentalia in deo transeunt in substantiam secundum genus suum et modum 
praedicandi, quem sorti<un>tur a subiecto et ex habitudune ad subiectum.” (LW II, p.69,13-16). Here 
Eckhart states that substance and essence are the same and that it (substance or essence) absorbs all 
accidental categories into itself. I am making this clear here to show that both essence/substance and 
relation (or persons as we shall see below) are categories which describe God and are contained together 
in the Godhead (in divinis) a term which Eckhart uses simply to denote God as he truly is, or God in his 
entirety.   




In this passage Eckhart suggests that creatures depend upon the reception of a particular 
perfection to grow in wisdom, or power, or will, whereas God has all of these 
essentially and as such he lacks nothing. This lacking nothing is the same as being 
existence itself and Eckhart therefore points out that God’s fullness is itself the 
sufficiency of all things, since  
 
if existence is full, then it is also life and wisdom and every other perfection. 
Just as he exists for himself and for all things, so too he is sufficient for himself 
and for them all; he is his own and everything’s sufficiency. ‘Our sufficiency is 
from God’ (2 Cor. 3:5).69  
 
For this reason, perfections, which actualise potentiality in creatures, depend upon God, 
who is existence, for their own actualisation (or existence) as perfections: ‘because each 
of them in and of itself is essentially a mode of existence itself, depending upon it and 
inhering in it, and also because it would be nothing without existence, neither wisdom 
nor anything else, but pure nothing.’70 Because perfections are contained within God’s 
essence, they are contained without the distinction with which we perceive them, for the 
essence cannot in any sense contain creaturely multiplicity. God contains perfections in 
a higher way than creatures, indistinctly as their cause, a fact represented through this 
negation of the distinction between perfections. Eckhart’s understanding of how God 
and creatures possess perfections therefore depends upon his use of the analogy which 
we saw in the first part of this chapter, since the negation of perfections from God is not 
a denial that God is perfect, but is instead a statement about God as cause of the 
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distinction and existence of perfections in creatures.
71
 Eckhart himself identifies the 
analogous nature of how humans signify perfections in God when he answers the 
question of whether human signification of perfections actually says something true 
about God: 
 
From this the true answer of that knotty and famous question whether there is a 
distinction of attributes in God or only in our intellect’s way of grasping is clear 
and evident. It is certain that the distinction of divine attributes, for example, 
power, wisdom, goodness, and the like, is totally on the side of the intellect that 
receives and draws knowledge of such things from and through creatures. 
Creatures, by the fact that they are from the One but below the One, necessarily 
fall into number, plurality, distinction, guilt, and fault, a condition by which they 




We find here a clear identification of multiplicity as less than God’s essence, and can 
therefore identify the same negation of creaturely signification that we saw in the First 
Parisian Question. Eckhart states that signification in creaturely terms or in terms of 
multiplicity cannot be properly applied to God. When we understand perfections by 
observing them in creatures, we understand them in a creaturely way which is 
completely different from how God possesses perfections eternally.  
God’s possession of perfections is in fact causally opposite to creatures, whose 
possession of perfections is as the actualisation of their potential. Creatures act in 
creation and actualise their potentiality, or move towards their own perfection, through 
their reception of perfections which they receive accidentally, i.e. as something added to 
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them, not as something identical with their substance. These accidents or perfections in 
turn depend upon the existing individual for their own existence as accidents of that 
individual and as such, ‘their existence is inhering existence, that is, existence in a 
subject, and their existence is in the existence of the subject, for they do not have an 
existence apart from that of their subject.’73 God however, exists completely beyond 
accident or distinct perfection since all accidents or perfections are absorbed into his 
essence: 
 
[In] God Existence Itself is the same as the essence or substance, and therefore 
in him all the accidental categories are absorbed into the substance according to 
the genus and manner of predication which they receive from the subject and 




According to this, we cannot therefore truthfully apply perfections to God in a 
creaturely way, since God possesses perfection in an opposite sense to creatures. God’s 
essence completely surpasses the creaturely mode of existence in every way and is prior 
to all existing things as the cause of their existence, since he is existence itself. God is 
thus signified through the negation of creaturely signification. The difference between 
God and creatures is identified in the double meaning of the apophatic affirmation. On 
the one hand it affirms God in his necessity, and on the other it identifies all creatures 
and creaturely signification as non-existent, nothing, or false, insofar as creatures and 
speech are conceived of apart from existence itself, that is, apart from God.  
This view of God’s absolute freedom and independence from cause, his 
indistinct containing of perfections within his oneness or essence, and his dependence 
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upon himself, as well as his subsequent necessity is drawn from Aristotle, Augustine 
and from Eckhart’s predecessor as magister regens at the University of Paris, Thomas 
Aquinas.
75
 Like Thomas, Eckhart uses these Aristotelian principles apophatically in his 
theology.
 76
 For Aristotle these principles describing the first cause or prime mover 
describe things that are true about the universe which is an effect of that first cause. 
They remain so for Thomas and Eckhart, but they are also axioms about God’s being 
which highlight – because they are descriptions of things that are true about God – the 
problem of how human language can point meaningfully to God; a problem which 
scholastic (and mystical) theology frequently sought to comment upon, often with 
recourse to the Dionysian cycle of reditus-exitus, or cataphasis-apophasis.
77
  
By exploring Eckhart’s teaching on God’s essence we have seen how he views 
the complete otherness of God from creatures. God is that which necessarily exists, 
apart from all creaturely dependence upon causation and properties – since God is self-
sufficient – and his existence is his essence. God’s necessary and self-sufficient 
                                               
75 For evidence of Eckhart’s use of Augustine, Aristotle and Thomas as sources see the footnotes to 
pp.45-70 in Teacher and Preacher (pp.131-136). Eckhart’s first term as magister was in 1302 when he 
wrote his Parisian Questions. He then returned on May 14th 1311, as McGinn says, ‘the General Chapter 
held at Naples posted him back to Paris for a second stint as magister – a rare privilege, hitherto granted 
only to Thomas Aquinas. Eckhart spent two academic years at Paris (autumn 1311 to summer 1313).’ 
(2001), pp.4-9.  
76 According at least to the reading of Thomas through the 20th century Thomist revival. See for instance 
the treatment of Thomas’s ‘five ways’, arguments taken from Aristotle’s concept of the Prime Mover, by 
Herbert McCabe, who states: “We should...be misled if we took it that his [Thomas’s] arguments for the 
existence of God start from a ‘nominal definition’ of God, as though he said: ‘This is what people use the 
word ‘God’ to mean, this is how we can at least pick out God from other things, now let us see if there is 
one.’ It is, to my mind, of the greatest importance that his arguments end with, but certainly do not begin 
with: ‘and this is what people call “God”.’ The arguments do not presuppose any view of the nature of 
God, they simply begin with philosophical puzzles arising from features of the world that we understand 
and take us to what we do not understand. They start with questions we can answer and lead us to a 
question we cannot answer...in this case we know that we cannot give the answer for that would be to 
know God’s nature which is beyond the margins of our ways of grasping meanings.” Herbert McCabe, 
“The Logic of Mysticism”, in Martin Warner ed., Religion and Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1992) p.48. 
77 David Knowles rightly points to the Pseudo Dionysian legacy in this regard. He notes the far-reaching 
effect of Dionysian theology in the Middle Ages, which “accepted...many of the characteristic doctrines 
of Neoplatonism. God is above all attributes and qualities, even above Being itself, and to attain to a true 
expression of what He is we have to pass through assertion and denial to a re-assertion at a level above all 
that we can know or comprehend”. (David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (London: 
Longman Group Ltd., 1962) pp.55-8). This cycle of assertion, denial and re-assertion above denial is, as 
Denys Turner points out, the cycle of cataphasis, apophasis which resolves not in the final apophatic 
denial, but in the denial of apophaticism, the negation of negation. “Apophaticism, Idolatry and the 
Claims of Reason,” in Silence and the Word (Cambridge: CUP, 2002) pp.11-34 (pp.19-20). 




existence is identified as a principle undergirding the existence of all things and upon 
which all things subsequently depend. While these statements do in one sense refer to 
things that are true about God, the primordial structuring principles of all reality which 
they signify are not indicated in the normal manner of human speech, they are signified 
apophatically. As with Thomas Aquinas and in accord with the Dionysian cycle of 
cataphasis-apophasis which transcends itself through the negation of negation, we find 
that these statements about God’s essence are simultaneously apophatic statements 
about the quality of creaturely knowledge and language. 
In a very real sense then, the apophatic affirmations of God’s necessary 
existence and the subsequent synonymy between his existence and essence are 
principles which determine the rest of speech, since all existing things depend upon this 
necessary and apophatically signified reality for their own existence. It is not simply 
speech which is negated through apophasis however, nor is it knowledge alone. The 
apophatic affirmation of God’s ultimate somethingness and the identification of all 
things apart from this as nothing, is a statement about the ontological status of 
creaturely being just as much as it is a statement about the status of speech or 
understanding.
78
 Apophasis therefore points to God as the principle which determines 
the truth value of speech and defines the real somethingness of existence, since 
dependence upon God is the causal structure within which both existence and 
understanding, and therefore also speech, become possible.
79
  
                                               
78 This is perhaps an obvious point, since speech and thought are themselves events within the ontological 
reality of human existence, but the ontological, rather than just the hermeneutic, nature of what is negated 
through apophasis is not always considered. A good example of  this can be found in Rik Van 
Nieuwenhove, Jan van Ruusbroec, Mystical Theologian of the Trinity (Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2003). Nieuwenhove criticises Denys Turner’s treatment of apophasis in The Darkness of God. 
Turner, suggests Nieuwenhove, makes apophasis into a purely hermeneutic category separate from the 
ontological reality of God. He states, ‘Turner’s interpretation seems to open up a reductionism of its own: 
mystical theology ends up revealing something about the limitations of our language, rather than 
revealing something of God and his relation to the world.’ p.36. 
79 Bruce Milem points this out in his examination of the self-referential quality of Eckhart’s preaching 
style, where the sermons indicate their own status as created events. He shows this with Eckhart’s 




As we have seen, distinction between perfections cannot be applied to God, 
since he possesses all perfections essentially. The negation of human speech which 
signifies God in a creaturely way does not however negate the reality of perfections. 
Instead, perfections continue to exist indistinctly in God’s essence. God still possesses 
perfections in a certain sense, but only when we view his possession of perfection 
apophatically, that is, from the point of view of God himself – from eternity – rather 
than from a creaturely point of view. Eckhart is therefore able to state: 
 
that ‘knowledge, goodness, and the like, which are in the other genera of 
accidents’ are not distinguished by opposition to substance because the genera 
by reason of which they were distinguished from substance are absorbed into 
substance so that it serves in place of the genera for all of them. Hence it is clear, 
secondly, that knowledge in the Godhead is substance whereas in us it is a 
quality. And it is evident, thirdly, that just as the same thing in us makes us wise 
and that very thing and not another makes us like to and in possession of this 
quality, so in the Godhead the Father knows by means of the same thing by 
which he is and by which he is God, namely, his substance. The same is true of 
the Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore, knowledge and substance in God belong to a 
single mental category, which is the idea of substance in both cases, just as in us 




We see here the same identification of essence as that which absorbs the distinct 
categories of perfection, accident and, in this case, genera as we saw above. But Eckhart 
                                                                                                                                         
sermons when he considers their self-referential quality, identifying themselves as speech events in time, 
dependent upon the God about whose simultaneous immanence and transcendence they try to speak 
about. The Unspoken Word, Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart’s German Sermons (Washington: 
CUA Press, 2002), pp.149-59. 
80 In Ex. n.68-9, p.66. See also n.62, p.64. 




also suggests here that the essence then acts as the genera or category which contains 
united in itself all accidents, perfections and genera which are negated for the sake of 
speaking truthfully about God as he is in himself. Eckhart therefore states that God’s 
substance (here synonymous with Essence) is the same as knowledge in the Godhead, 
whereas in us it is an additional quality or accident which actualises some potentiality 
within us. Still using in divinis (Godhead) as a term signifying God’s wholeness and 
including the Trinity within it, Eckhart adds to what we saw in his discussion of 
perfections earlier in the Commentary on Exodus, by considering how these perfections 
relate to the Trinity. In direct contrast to Caputo’s suggestion that the Trinity is an 
attribute absorbed into the Godhead, Eckhart here states that the Trinity possesses the 
same perfections as the essence and that each person of the Trinity possesses these 
perfections through their mutual essence or unity. If we view this in terms of our 
reading of apophasis, we can see that it is because God is essence, or rather, because he 
necessarily exists and is the self-sufficient cause of creation, that the Trinity possesses 
perfection through its substance. The Trinity, like the essence, does not have qualities 
added to it, and neither is it a quality or property of the essence itself. Rather, the Trinity 
is shown to be identical with the essence in terms of its reception of perfections, since 
the Trinity, as we shall see in chapter 2, is the self-expression of the same God who 
remains, as it were, unexpressed and indistinct in his essence. 
The purpose of bringing out this trinitarian teaching in relation to the perfections 
in God is to show quite clearly that the negation of creaturely categories of perfection 
does not leave us with nothing, quite the opposite in fact, because the negation of 
negation is really the negation of nothing. It therefore leaves us quite literally with 
everything, since the negation of negation is the highest form of affirmative speech 
which we can apply to God who is existence itself and through whom all things ‘“live 




and move and have their being” (Acts 17:29)’.81 Eckhart makes this point in a passage 
on the negation of negation, where he refers to the ‘ego sum qui sum' as the reflexive 
returning of the subject upon the predicate in precisely the same was as he does in the 
Commentary in n.16, which as we shall see in 2b, is concerned with the emergence of 
the Trinity in the Godhead through the boiling up (bullitio) and boiling over (ebullitio) 
of the divine life. For now we shall only consider the passage from n.74:  
 
He says, ‘I am who am,’ because he is nothing else but pure existence. The 
conclusion is that the affirmation that consists in the existence and identity of the 
terms properly belongs to God...Everything that is less than God, since it is less 
than existence, is [both] being and nonbeing, and some kind of existence is 
denied to it since it is below and less than existence. And so negation is a part of 
it. But to existence itself no existence is denied, just as to the genus animal no 
particular animal, such as lion, is denied. Therefore, no negation, nothing 
negative, belongs to God, except for the negation of negation which is what the 
One signifies when expressed negatively. ‘God is one’ (Dt. 6:4; Ga. 3:20). The 
negation of negation is the purest and fullest affirmation – ‘I am who am.’ It 
returns upon itself ‘with a full return’; it rests upon itself, and through itself it is 
Existence Itself. So no negation belongs to God – ‘He cannot deny himself’ (2 
Tm. 2:13). Existence cannot deny that it is Existence Itself: ‘Nothing abandons 
itself.’ Nor can it deny itself to anything, according to the maxim ‘The First is 
rich in itself.’ Further it cannot deny anything, according to the text ‘He works 
all in all’ (1 Co. 12:6). He says ‘in all’ because he denies it to none; he says ‘all’ 
because he denies none. Just as nothing is denied to Existence Itself, so too 
                                               
81 See In Ex., n.40, p.55. 




existence denies itself in nothing (‘It cannot deny itself’) and denies nothing. It 




In this passage Eckhart specifically identifies the negation of negation with Exodus 
3:14. The Exodus passage and the apophatic method both affirm the same synonymy 
between God’s existence and essence.  He also plays upon the double meaning of nihil 
negatum as both affirmative and negative, signifying God’s complete distinction from 
what is not, and his absolute connectedness with everything that is and which receives 
existence from God who, as existence itself is completely distinct from nothing and 
non-existence. The final section of the paragraph can therefore be read as an apophatic 
double entendre encompassing negations of nothings and non-existence and 
affirmations of actual existence which comes from God and is identical with God who is 
existence itself.
83
 Creatures are also defined as both ‘being and nonbeing,’ depending 
upon God for the reception of their existence, but also possessing some kind of 
nothingness by virtue of existing in the multiplicity of creation. The negation in 
apophasis therefore refers only to this aspect of nothingness, which exists in creatures 
but not in God, and is thus necessarily negated from him. There is also however a 
second sense of necessity which appears in this passage. God is necessarily existent as 
we have already seen, but as existence itself, he cannot deny himself to anything that 
exists. Or rather, he has not denied himself from existing things, as shown through the 
fact that they exist. Eckhart states this both affirmatively, ‘Nor can it deny itself to 
anything, according to the maxim “The First is rich in itself”,’ and negatively, ‘Just as 
nothing is denied in Existence Itself, so too existence denies itself in nothing (“It cannot 
                                               
82 In Ex. n.74, p.68. 
83 “Iterum etiam nihil negare potest, secundum illud: ‘operatur omnia in omnibus’, 1 Cor. 12. ‘In 
omnibus’ inquit, quia nulli negat ; ‘omnia’ ait, quia nihil negat. Sicut ergo ipsi esse nihil negatum est, sic 
et ipsum essee nulli se negat – ‘se ipsum negare non potest’ – et nihil negat. Gratis accipit, gratis dat.” In 
Ex., n.74 (LW II, p.78, 4-7). 




deny itself”).’ God therefore necessarily gives himself to creatures freely, or in other 
words, everything that exists and that is not nothing therefore receives its existence and 
particularity from God. As we shall see in the following chapters, the freedom in which 
God chooses to grant existence to everything that is, is the same as the bestowal of 
grace or the giving of gift, which, in the passage above, defines the freedom of God’s 
own activity and existence, and which also defines God’s triune life and the truest 
activity and existence of the soul which mirrors the relational identity of the Trinity. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks for Chapter 1 
 
Eckhart’s apophaticism in the Commentary on Exodus gives us an understanding of the 
different ways in which we can truthfully use language to talk about God and creatures. 
But it is not a purely ‘negative’ theology in the sense that it leaves us with nothing; it is 
not, in other words, some kind of atheism because it leaves us with reality as it actually 
is, where God is recognised as connected to everything that exists. God is not himself 
apophatic, he does not contain negation but is the negation of negation – he is absolutely 
existing, and is existence itself. Negation that does not negate itself and become 
affirmation is therefore an entirely human category, since only creatures are made up of 
both somethingness and nothingness, a fact which we shall see in chapter 2, is presented 
by Eckhart in accordance with the Christian teaching of creatio ex nihilo. For Eckhart, 
true speech about God begins with the apophatic affirmation; that God exists in the way 
that he does and not in the way the human soul might falsely imagine him to exist. 
Apophasis therefore functions in Eckhart’s theology as a way of speaking and a way of 
knowing which de-centres the soul’s self-focus and creatureliness in her approach to 
God and acknowledges God as he actually is in relation to the soul that he creates, 
sustains and fulfils. By using the principle of negation as a form of affirmation Eckhart 




therefore ensures that the soul’s habits of speech, thought and action, which represent, 
inform and structure her perspective and being, are rooted in what is actually true about 
God and about reality. Negation thus provides the soul with the possibility of a real 
vocabulary and a real knowledge because it points out what is not real – that is, 
anything which does not acknowledge, or arise from the fact of God’s necessary 
existence.  
We have seen from this chapter that for Eckhart negation is a necessary habit to 
employ in human speech and human thought if the God whom we seek to know, and 
about whom we wish to speak, is to truly be God. It is only when analogical speech 
incorporates apophasis that it says things which are true about God, since the apophatic 
acknowledges the status of the soul (and of creation) in relation to the creator she seeks 
to know. For Eckhart negation is the principle by which we can avoid the mistake of 
replacing God with an idol in the way we speak, think, act and perceive. Apophasis 
ultimately ensures that God, with whom the soul has a relationship and whom she can 
identify as the source of her existence and identity, is truly God. Allowing God to be 
himself, and engaging with him as he actually is in his relationship with the human soul, 
is the imperative which Eckhart seeks to imbue in the hearts of all whom he addressed 
in his works. As he states in Pr. 5b: ‘My dear friend, what harm can it do you to do God 
the favour of letting Him be God in you?’84 In direct contrast to Caputo’s article cited at 
the beginning of this chapter, Eckhart’s apophasis is not therefore in any sense part of a 
‘mystical atheism’ that negates the Trinity.85 Instead, the apophatic can be meaningfully 
thought of as a negation of atheism and Eckhart’s theology can be viewed in one sense 
as a continual attempt to identify and respond to the ways in which human beings deny 
God in their thoughts, words and deeds. To understand more fully what Eckhart thinks 
                                               
84 Pr. 5b, p.110. 
85 Caputo (1978) pp.211-2. 




about this God, we must turn to consider in greater depth how the apophatic affirmation 
leaves space for a real discussion of God’s triune existence, since the Trinity is in no 
way the same kind of thing as the creaturely distinctions which are erroneously applied 



























‘Trinity! Higher than any being, any divinity, any goodness!’ 
 
 
Introduction: Letting God be Himself 
 
In this chapter I aim to demonstrate that Eckhart does not subordinate the Trinity to the 
essence, which can now be viewed in light of the discussion from chapter 1. A proper 
understanding of essence and Trinity, I shall suggest, is dialectical, where each is 
defined in terms of the other and together they form a complete expression of what God 
is. The first part of the chapter, 2a, will consider how Eckhart shows this by placing 
‘relation’ alongside essence as a real category in the Godhead. One unusual implication 
of this is that it could appear to imply that essence and relation are somehow two ‘parts’ 
of God, distinct from one another. The next two sections of this chapter should help to 
remove this sense of distinction between the essence and the persons of the Trinity. The 
first (2b) is on the bullitio and ebullitio dynamic and the second (2c) presents Eckhart’s 
novel understanding of how potentiality and actuality apply to God’s essence and 
persons in eternity. Both of these ways of speaking about God, 2b and 2c, appear in the 
Commentary on Exodus and as such it is reasonable to read them alongside and in 
accord with Eckhart’s teaching on relation seen in 2a. These three examples presented 
in this chapter are not the only ways in which Eckhart talks about the Trinity, but they 
are frequently connected to each other, especially in the Latin texts. They also combine 
well to give a strong sense of the dynamism of God’s life as Eckhart perceives it, a 
dynamism that is not conveyed so clearly by each alone and where a reading which 
combines the three is in accord with Eckhart’s own intention in his exegesis. As he says 
in the Commentary on John:  
 




Please note that the preceding words have been interpreted in many ways so that 
the reader can freely take now one and now the other as it seems useful to him. I 




While he is speaking here about numerous interpretations of single passages of scripture 
(in this case, ‘In the beginning was the Word’), this principle applies just as much to his 
approach to metaphysics from across his works. To a certain extent this attitude might 
explain the variety of imagery Eckhart uses and why he does not seem to offer concern 
at any point that what he says in one work might contradict his own teaching in another 
work. This interesting insight Eckhart offers into his method accords well with a 
description of metaphysics offered by Austin Farrer in the 20
th
 century. Farrer suggests 
that real metaphysics depends upon the metaphysician allowing their encounter with the 
other, the object of their attention (or their faith), to determine their choice of 
terminology rather than clinging to particular concepts or words and fit the other into 
these conceptual or linguistic preconditions. At each point, the metaphysician should 
identify the falsehood in the language chosen, seek better terms, and in the process be 
drawn deeper and deeper into the attempt to describe and encounter that which ever 
more absorbs their attention and shapes their life.
87
 Only then does the metaphysician 
give real respect to the object of their enquiry, to the God of their faith. It is only by 
allowing God – or the other more generally – to break down the concepts the soul 
houses him within, that she allows him to be himself and only if she lets him be himself 
can she have a real relationship with him. As Farrer says: 
 
                                               
86 In Ioh., n.39, p.135. 
87 Austin Farrer, The Bampton Lectures for 1948: The Glass of Vision (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1948), 
p.68. 




[I]f our experiencing of things and persons is limited to the trying on them of 
pre-arranged tests devised by ourselves, full respect for their being is excluded 
from the first. If we respect any being, we allow it to make its own impressions, 
and, as it were, to formulate its own claims upon us. Just as a man confessing his 
sins cannot choose what he will confess, and what he will hide, but must confess 
all, because he is not making a judgment, but submitting to judgment: so a man 
who feels respect for any being cannot choose what he will explore and what 
ignore in the object of respect, but must give to his thoughts the most self-
denying adaptability, ready to apply or improvise whatever thought-forms the 
nature of the object may require, if the aspects it insists on presenting are to be 
appreciated. He cannot even be content to appreciate every given aspect; he will 
endeavour to integrate the aspects in the unity of their being, for it is being, not 




This is akin to what I am suggesting we should acknowledge in our reading of Eckhart 
if we are to understand why the Trinity is not subordinated to the essence and from that 
grasp what Eckhart thinks about the soul’s identity in her relationship with God. It is 
only by recognising how God’s identity makes him available for a relationship with the 
soul through the eternal act of triune self-expression, creation and salvation, that we can 
properly grasp what, for Eckhart, the soul is in her relationship with God. Moreover we 
can then identify the transformative effect that this relationship has upon her being and 
understanding when she chooses to recognise her own self and God for what they truly 
are. It is not therefore Eckhart’s words themselves which house the truth about God and 
convey it to his congregations, to the novices, to his confreres or to his spiritual 
                                               
88 Farrer, pp.66-7. 






 Rather, the speech of Eckhart’s sermons and the words of his scholastic 
works and German tractates are intended to prompt the believer to enter properly into a 
relationship with the Christian God.
90
 More than anything else, Eckhart wants his 
readers to listen to God’s Word. This requires them to identify the habits of thought and 
action which prevent them from knowing God as he is in himself; as he is signified 
through apophasis which does not negate but actually makes possible a true 
understanding of his triune life: 
 
There are three things that prevent us from hearing the eternal Word. The first is 
corporeality, the second is multiplicity, the third is temporality. If a man had 
transcended these three things, he would dwell in eternity, he would dwell in the 





We have already seen one sense in which Eckhart believes these blockades of 
corporeality, multiplicity and temporality are overcome in the soul’s knowing: through 
habitually viewing God apophatically, allowing him to be himself beyond these 
creaturely categories. As we shall see below, Eckhart seeks to show how the apophatic 
‘allowing God to be himself’ transposes into the practice of detachment which identifies 
                                               
89 For information on Eckhart’s responsibilities as a Dominican in the various roles he fulfilled 
throughout his life see Walter Senner O.P., “Meister Eckhart’s Life, Training, Career, and Trial,” in 
Companion to Eckhart Jeremiah M. Hackett (ed.), pp.7-84 (pp.11-44). 
90 A good example of Eckhart’s commitment to the Christian teaching on salvation and the incarnation of 
salvation is Pr. 78, p.175. Eckhart here distinguishes himself slightly from Bede’s position, suggesting 
that the incarnation is simply part of God’s entire activity, directed towards uniting humanity, and 
creation, with himself. It is not something that begins in the incarnation, but the incarnation is itself an 
expression (in time) of this same eternal reality that defines God’s entire activity and self-expression: his 
desire for distinct self-expression through relation, with himself and with creation which is part of this 
same self-expressive act of triune boiling up and over, as we shall see in this section.  
91 Pr. 12, p.295. 




what the soul is in her union with God, whose nature is detachment.
92
 Apophasis is not 
therefore a ‘flight out of history and the flesh’.93 Instead, it identifies what the soul is in 
time where she must journey towards her beatitude and ‘unlearn’, or ‘unknow’ the 
habits of attachment or of creaturely understanding which prevent God from being 
himself and thus prevent the soul from being herself most fully – that is, as she is in her 
relationship with God, since ‘she is far more with what is His than with her own, and so 
too her bliss is more dependent on His action than on her own’.94 
 
 
2a. Essence and Relation 
 
As I stated in chapter 1, Eckhart does not subordinate the Trinity to the essence in his 
understanding of God, except insofar as the two are placed in an order for the sake of 
presenting an understanding of God according to human logic which Eckhart still 
deliberately subverts to prevent us from believing that our linear logic and static verbal 
signification of God actually represent God truly.
95
 In this first part of chapter 2 we will 
explore more closely Eckhart’s teaching in the Commentary on Exodus on the 
inappropriateness of applying names to God. We will then look at how Eckhart employs 
the term ‘relation’ (relationis) to signify the presence of the Trinity in the Godhead 
without contradicting his negation of creaturely signification from God. 
In his exegesis of Exodus 15:3, where Eckhart is specifically concerned with 
how we use names to signify God, he once again denies that God can have perfections 
or attributes applied to him.
96
 He divides this discussion into four sections: first, ‘what 
                                               
92 For Eckhart on God’s nature as detachment, see On Detachment, p.569. 
93 Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2004) p.1. 
94 Pr. 102, p.44. 
95 This is clear in his apophatic style which is deliberately self-subverting, and also the use of language in 
the German sermons, which, through the use of paradox, chiasmus, hyperbole and various other poetic 
effects, creates images, breaks through them and rebuilds them to mean something beyond what they 
previously signified. For an analysis of this use of language in the German works see Tobin, pp.147-83.  
96 In Ex., n.28-32, p.50. 




some philosophers and Jewish authors think of this question and of the attributes which 
name God.’ Second, ‘a brief summary of what Catholic writes think of these 
predications or names.’ Third, ‘why do Boethius and the theologians generally teach 
that only two kinds of categories, substance and relation, can be used of divinity?’ and 
fourth, a discussion of the name ‘Tetragrammaton’.97 The first section (n.34-53) is 
distinctly apophatic in nature and considers God’s complete separateness from 
creaturely perfections and signification:  
 
all positive statements about God are improper expressions, since they posit 
nothing in him. To posit nothing in something and still to speak positively about 
it is unsuitable, improper, and not in keeping with the truth. Hence all things that 
are positively said of God, even though they are perfections in us, are no longer 
so in God and are not more perfect than their opposites.
98
   
 
Eckhart here agrees with the view of Rabbi Moses Maimonides. However, as Lossky 
points out, he brings to his apophatic signification of God’s essential and self-sufficient 
existence a dimension of metaphysics which his Jewish (and Muslim) sources do not 
use – the doctrine of the Trinity.99  
                                               
97 In Ex., n.34, p.53.This fourth section actually forms his Exegesis on Ex. 20:7 and I will not be 
considering it in this thesis.  
98 In Ex., n.44, p.56. 
99 “A present c’est la Monade elle-même qui se nomme, en affirmant son identité dans un ‘retour 
complet’. Nous avons eu l’occasion de constater que cette réflexion sur soi-même, dans l’affirmation 
redoublée de Ego sum qui sum, était rapprochée par Eckhart de la maxime  ‘hermétique’ sur la monade 
engendrant la monade et réfléchissant sur elle-même son ardeur. Le texte de l’Exode recevait ainsi un 
sens trinitaire qu’il ne pouvait avoir pour ‘Raby Moïses’.” Lossky, Théologie Négative et Connaissance 
de Dieu (1960), p.97. Lossky here refers to the passage from In Ex. n. 16 (p.46), when Eckhart uses the 
bullitio and ebullitio image to speak about the reflexive return of existence, or the monad, upon itself, 
where the monad reflects back upon itself with love or ardent desire. 




Eckhart concludes the first part of his exegesis of Exodus 15:3 by drawing upon 
what he considers to be the root of Rabbi Moses’ argument about God’s separateness 
from creation or multiplicity: 
 
The universal rule is that in God there neither is nor can be any addition of 
dispositions whatever. But all affirmative names predicate or imply some 
addition which they posit about God; otherwise they would not be positive 
expressions. Therefore, nothing affirmative is properly and aptly said about God, 




On the basis of this total denial of the value of affirmative speech about God, Eckhart 
constructs seven proofs that demonstrate God’s total separateness from creaturely 
distinction, disposition, or multiplicity. In order they seek to demonstrate: 1. God’s 
simplicity,
101
 2. God’s fullness,102 3. That God possesses no disposition or accident and 
cannot therefore be a subject dependent upon something exterior to himself,
103
 4. God’s 
oneness and infinity,
104
 5. his unity,
105
 6. That since God is existence and everything 
apart from God is nothing, he cannot therefore possess disposition as a medium between 
him and creatures, 
106
 and 7. (this proof leads on from 6) that one of two things cannot 
be a medium between the two, since it cannot be in between the two and at the 
extreme.
107
 Eckhart then adds an 8
th
 proof of his own, where he identifies multiplicity or 
number – and thus also accidents or dispositions – as a sign of a defect, that is, a sign of 
                                               
100 In Ex., n.47, p.58. 
101 Ibid., n.48. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., n.49. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. n.50, pp.58-9. 
106 Ibid., p.59. 
107 Ibid. 




a subject’s dependence upon something exterior to itself for the actualising of its 
potentiality: ‘dispositions and numbers...in created things are not perfections, but are the 
remedies and reinforcements of the imperfection and defect of some act of existence.’108 
He then states that God possesses no multiplicity or number since he is necessarily his 
own sufficiency and thus not in any sense defective.
109
 At this stage of Eckhart’s 
argument, these eight proofs really put the final nail in the coffin for cataphatic speech 
about God in this part of the Commentary on Exodus, as Eckhart states: 
 
Therefore, the root and ground of what went before is evident and also how all 
affirmations or positive names in no way belong to God and how there is no 
disposition at all in him, either substantial or accidental, even those that are 
perfections in us, such as power, wisdom, life, and the like. Hence some wise 
man said that God is ‘powerful in his substance, alive in his substance,’ 
intelligent in his substance and the like. For this reason the saints commonly said 
that God’s greatness is his existence and his knowledge is his existence, and the 
same of the other attributes. The reason is that he is powerful, lives, is wise, and 




We have here a restatement of the same argument seen in the Commentary in chapter 1 
above, where the nature of God’s essential existence excludes from him all creaturely 
attributes. Our signification of God must therefore be apophatic if it is to speak 
truthfully of him. Eckhart goes on to consider what Christian teachers say on this topic. 
This follows in a similar vein to the first part of the exegesis of Exodus 15:3 and 
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Eckhart draws upon, amongst others, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, to further deny 
that we can apply categories or genera of properties to God.
111
 Having considered God 
primarily in terms of the apophatic signification of his essence, Eckhart then makes an 
interesting shift in his argument. In the third section of his exegesis of Exodus 15:3, he 
identifies relation as a category which is not absorbed into essence (or substance, as it is 
referred to in the passage above). This simple distinction opens up the possibility for 
Eckhart’s discussion of the Trinity in the Godhead which here receives its longest 
treatment in the Commentary so far.  
By examining how Eckhart understands the category of relation, we can see 
quite plainly that, in this text at least, he is fundamentally not subordinating the Trinity 
to the essence in the Godhead. Eckhart states: 
 
From what went before, where we said that God is and does all things by his 
substance, it is clear that in him there is only one category, namely the substance 
by which he exists, is powerful, wise, good, and the like. In creatures these 
things belong to the nine categories of accident. But then comes the question 
how Augustine, Boethius, and the saints and teachers in harmony say that there 
are two categories, substance and relation, in the Godhead. The response is from 
what was noted above. We said that we speak in one way about beings and 
things, in another way about categories, and also that the truth of a predication 
corresponds first and in itself not so much to the things as to the conceptions of 
things and the ways of signifying. Relation, even though it is an accident, still 
does not signify in the manner of an accident, because it does not do so as 
inhering in a subject or substance. You can see an example in the case of 
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whiteness and the white thing. Although whiteness exists in a subject and is an 
accident or something inhering in a subject, the term does not signify whiteness 
as something inhering. Just as the word ‘white’ signifies the quality alone (as 
does ‘whiteness’), it co-signifies or connotes the subject also, and for this reason 




Relation (relationis) Eckhart says here, exists alongside essence, again referred to here 
as substance (substantiae), in the Godhead (in divinis).
113
 Other perfections, 
dispositions, accidents and genera are all absorbed into the unity of the essence which is 
existence itself and which thus causes the distinct existence of everything that is 
absorbed into its indistinction. As such, the essence cannot contain the distinct existence 
(which is an effect) of any of these things in themselves, since it is the prior cause of 
their existence and distinction.
114
 Eckhart points out above that most categories of 
accident depend upon the existence of a subject for their existence as accidents of that 
subject – as we saw in chapter 1.115 This is not the case for relation, which does not 
signify in such a way that it inheres in a subject but instead, 
 
by reason of its genus and the fact that it is a relation, relation posits nothing at 
all in the subject and does not say that anything exists or inheres [i.e. that the 
subject has particular accidents], but it posits that the thing that exists comes 
from another and is directed to another, that it originates there and dies there, 
and that it is ‘simultaneous in time nature and intellect’ with, in, and through that 
thing. Because relation as such is nothing positive in a subject, and because it 
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that which follows from a principle, as a point is never a line.’ p.48. 
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signifies only what was said and in that way (this is true of relation alone among 
the nine categories), and because as such it is not the principle of any of the 
subject’s operations (for God is wise, good, almighty, and the like, by reason of 
his substance, but by his substance is not related to any other thing whatsoever), 
hence relation perdures in the Godhead according to the mode of signifying and 
predicating which constitutes its own genus as a category. It is different with all 
the other eight kinds of accident, as is evident to one who considers them. 
Therefore, this is the reason why every kind of accident except for relation is 




In this passage we see that, unlike other categories of accident which signify something 
inhering in a subject and actualising the subject’s potentiality for the possession of that 
accident or perfection, relation signifies a kind of ‘movement’ between subjects. For 
Eckhart relation is not therefore like other categories of accident which are absorbed 
into the essence. These categories depend upon a substance for their inhering existence, 
but relation, alone amongst the categories, simply signifies something to do with the 
movement of substance, either towards another substance – one creature relating to 
another, where the two have separate substances – or towards itself, as is the case with 
God’s substance.117 Eckhart thus distinguishes relation from the other categories of 
perfection, which have inhering existence, by showing that relation receives its genus as 
a category by ordering a subject to its opposite:  
 
Relation alone does not receive its genus as a category from a subject nor 
through ordering to a subject, but rather to its opposite. For this reason relation 
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is the only kind of category that is not absorbed into substance in the Godhead, 




Eckhart here makes two points significant for my argument about the Trinity. First, as I 
have already said, he identifies relation as a category which exists outside of essence in 
God and second, he places these two categories, essence and relation alongside each 
other within the Godhead (in divinis), a term which he uses once again as an all-
encompassing term for the whole of God.
119
 By employing the category of relation he 
distinguishes his exegesis of Exodus 15:3 from that of Moses Maimonides who 
emphasises the total apophatic separation of the unum from all categories of accident, 
including relation. As we saw in chapter 1, Eckhart’s apophasis does not leave us with 
nothing, but with everything, or with the divine ‘somethingness’,120 which is neither this 
nor that (‘non esset haec vel illa’).121 In this section of the Commentary Eckhart places 
relation within the sphere of apophatic signification by, as Markus Enders suggests, 
employing the category of relation ‘to safeguard God’s Trinitarian mode of Being’.122 
Eckhart then goes on, once again, to show the difference between how creatures 
have substance and perfections and how God’s essence/substance contains his 
perfections, however, this time he reveals that by relation, he is in fact talking about the 
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thought.’ Essential Eckhart, note 59, p.329. 
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122 Enders, p.385. 






 He suggests that the persons of the Trinity have perfections, in this case 
knowledge, according to their self-sufficient essence, not according to their distinct 
personhood.  The Trinity is here acknowledged in its position within the Godhead 
because the category of relation, which defines the connection between the persons of 
the Trinity, is equal with essence, not absorbed into it or subordinate to it. Eckhart 
makes this clear by considering how relation exists as a genus within the Godhead: 
 
It is different with Paternity and similar relations in the Godhead, for the idea of 
substance and that of relation are not the same in the way that the ideas of 
knowledge and quality are in us. The relation in God keeps the genus of relation 
and is different from the idea of substance, just as in us the ideas of quality and 
of substance are different. Therefore, God is not simply and by the same idea 
God the Father and God as substance, but he is God as substance by one idea 
and Father by another. I say that different ideas are distinguished according to 
different genera, not only in the way species is distinguished from genus (e.g., 
knowledge from quality) where the difference is only imperfect. Further (and 
ingeniously) note that the idea of relation is a genus, but since it is not existence 
or inhering existence, as said above, it creates no distinction of existence and 
essence, because insofar as it is a relation it does not regard existence, essence, 
or substance, but rather what is totally opposite to itself. For this reason the 
existence of the Father and that of the essence are one in the Godhead, and the 
same is true of the relations that distinguish the persons of the Son and Holy 
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Spirit. These relations are not directed to existence; they distinguish neither 




Relation here retains its status as genus within the Godhead, and is separate from 
substance/essence. God is therefore Father and essence by two different ideas. 
However, this difference is not like the difference between qualities or dispositions that 
we have already seen Eckhart negate from God. It is instead a difference that is 
sustained within apophatic discourse. It is, in other words, something true about God 
which cannot be negated but which is signified in the apophatic process which negates 
the limitations of human signification whilst still gesturing beyond itself towards God as 
that which he is. The ‘mutually opposed persons’ are therefore as real a feature of God’s 
eternal existence as God’s essence is. Since Eckhart utterly denies that God possesses 
multiplicity or distinction in the creaturely sense, yet affirms the presence of Trinity as 
relation in the Godhead, the distinction of the persons must be a different kind of 
distinction from that of creaturely distinction, a distinction, but not a multiplicity. 
Because relation is not a genus of accident in the sense that it indicates quality or 
property, but instead implies some kind of ‘flow of relation’,125 it does not inhere upon 
existence, or create distinction between essence and existence. The apophatic 
signification of God’s essential existence can therefore, according to this definition of 
relation, co-exist alongside relation in the Godhead, since the presence of relation as a 
genus or category in the Godhead does not steer us away from the apophatic affirmation 
of God’s existence.126 The Trinity, as we shall see more clearly in 2b and 2c, is 
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therefore a divine category of distinction which exists beyond creaturely distinction and 
is thus signified through the same method of apophasis which negates human knowing 
whilst still signifying God. This argument about relation therefore shows that the Trinity 
exists in the same eternity as the essence. In his exegesis of John 1:1 Eckhart again 
makes this quite clear: 
 
Here we must make special note of the fact that the intellect is completely and 
essentially intellect (totally pure understanding), especially in God, and perhaps 
in him alone insofar as he is the First Principle of all things. Reality and intellect 
are the same in him. Therefore, ‘the relations which accompany the activity of 
the intellect’ in the Godhead are real. And so ‘the Word,’ that is, the Son, ‘who 
proceeds in an intellectual way’ from the Father ‘is not a relation of reason 
alone, but a real relation, because intellect itself and idea’ are realities, or ‘are a 
single reality.’[Aquinas, STh Ia.28.1.ad 4] Thus Augustine says: ‘The realities 
that make us blessed...are the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.’127 
 
Here Eckhart reaffirms the unity of being and understanding (reality and intellect) in 
God, i.e., the fact that God’s existence and knowledge are identical.128 As we saw in 
chapter 1, this unity between being and knowing is identical with the negation of 
negation, which affirms God’s necessity. The difference here is that Eckhart affirms the 
‘real relations in the Godhead’ alongside this same affirmation of the unity between 
reality and intellect. The relations of the Trinity, as we saw in the Commentary on 
Exodus, are therefore real relations, not ancillary properties which can be negated or 
                                                                                                                                         
where the distinct persons exist eternally and, because of their existence, their self-expression and love of 
one another, creation itself is able to exist. See discussion below on Eckhart’s use of bullitio and ebullitio 
and what this means for creation.  
127 In Ioh., n.34, p.133.  
128 As we saw in chapter 1, in In Ex. and in the Op. tri., and in apparent contradiction with Q. Par. I. 




absorbed. In the process of identifying different interpretations of ‘In the principle was 
the Word’, Eckhart therefore affirms the absoluteness of God’s triune being. As he 
states in the Commentary on John immediately before the passage just quoted: 
 
There is still a fourth way to explain ‘In the principle was the Word,’ by noting 
that the Word, the Son in the Godhead, has four properties. First, that he is 
innermost – ‘Receive the innermost Word’ (Jm. 1:21). Second, that he is the 
Firstborn of the whole creation – ‘The image of the invisible God, the Firstborn 
of the whole creation’ (Col. 1:15). Third, that he is always being born and 
always has been born, as was explained above. Fourth, that he proceeds from the 
Father according to the intellect, just as the Holy Spirit proceeds according to 
love. This is what is said in this passage: The ‘in’ signifies the first property; 
‘the principle’ signifies the second; ‘was’ indicates the third, because it is a 
substantive verb in the past imperfect; and ‘Word’ stands for the fourth, because 




The first of these points indicates that the Son is related to God as he is in himself, being 
innermost he ‘pertains to God and to divine things insofar as they are divine’.130 The 
Son then is a real part of God’s immanent existence. The second point concerns how the 
Son is the ‘Word’ or ‘idea’ of God,131 and Eckhart here follows the Christian 
neoplatonic teaching that God creates through the Word, since the Word, or Son, is the 
exemplar of every creature according to whom all existence is patterned.
132
 The third 
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point here identified is one of the principle themes of his German sermons, that of the 
eternal birth of the Son in the Godhead.
133
 This is significant, since it identifies the 
Son’s birth as an eternal act thus showing how it is in fact part of the single reality 
which God eternally is in himself. The final point we saw above is that the Word 
proceeds from the Father according to the intellect, because it is the idea or exemplar 
according to which God creates. By identifying the Son or Word as proceeding 
according to intellect, the category of relation is again affirmed alongside the essence 
within the Godhead, not as something absorbed into it or surpassed by it.  
We have seen from this section that in creatures the flow of relation occurs 
between two separate subjects and in creatures these subjects have a separate 
substance/essence from one another. In God the persons of the Trinity still have the 
flow of relation between one another, where the relating subject acknowledges the 
otherness of that to whom it relates (the Father acknowledges the Son as other than the 
Father by recognising him as begotten from the Father), but in this case the other to 
whom the subject relates shares the same essence and thus is not distinct from the 
subject in the way that creatures are distinct from one another. The relating subject in 
God therefore relates to itself and in so doing acknowledges the other as truly other, 
truly distinct, whilst also still sharing the same essence. The distinction between persons 
cannot therefore be validated in the creaturely terms of separateness between substances 
                                                                                                                                         
of created things, is not something outside God towards which he looks, as in our case the figure on the 
wall is related to the painter who looks to its exemplar, but the Word is in the Father himself.” (In Ioh., 
n.41, p.136). He follows this passage in In Ioh. with an affirmation that Christ is innermost, suggesting 
that an exemplar or image that comes from what is inward is greater than an external image: “it is better 
to remember that an exemplar that is beheld from without is never the principle of the artist’s work unless 
it comes with the idea of the inhering form. Otherwise, a dabbler could make a picture as well as an 
artist” (In Ioh., n.41, p.136). This affirms that the Son, to function as the exemplar of creation, must exist 
within God, not as something outside of him. Despite existing in himself as Son and by inference, as 
Trinity, God still therefore maintains the same unity and self-sufficiency that we have seen in In Ex., 
since the presence of the Son within, rather than outside the Godhead, means that God does not depend 
upon anything outside of himself to express himself as creator.  
133 See McGinn (2001), Ch. 4, pp.53-70. The birth of the Word will be the main focus of part of chapter 3. 
I will not therefore examine it here. 




or between objects, since the persons who are distinct from one another, still have a 
mutual essence and are one God. 
134
 In God therefore, the category of relation signifies 
something true, but which is beyond the creaturely definition of distinction between two 
relating persons or things, since all creaturely categories of distinction are negated 
through apophasis, or rather, absorbed into the unity of the essence. God’s relationality, 
or rather, the Trinity, is therefore signified in the same way as his essence, in the 
apophatic sphere of signification which points to the ‘something’ that exists beyond 
creaturely categories and causes them. 
 
 
2b. Bullitio and Ebullitio 
 
In Eckhart’s theology, the terms bullitio and ebullitio form – along with creatio – the 
‘three stages of productive exitus’ from the Godhead,135  that is, three stages of God’s 
active and creative self-expression as Trinity. This section will help to show how the 
essence and persons are actually equal to one another, not two separate ‘parts’ present in 
the Godhead. It will also identify some points about the nature of God’s connection with 
creation which will be very important as we turn in chapter 3 to consider how what we 
have learned about the structure of God’s existence and identity relates to the structure 
of the soul’s existence and identity in detachment. 
Eckhart makes it very clear that God, whose essence is his existence, cannot 
withhold himself from that which exists: ‘Just as nothing is denied to Existence Itself, 
so too existence denies itself in nothing (“It cannot deny itself”) and denies nothing. It 
accepts and gives freely.’136 This view, that God necessarily gives himself to creatures, 
is already present in Eckhart’s earliest text, the Discourses of Instruction, delivered to 
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the novices and confreres in Erfurt, between 1294 and 1298.
137
 He states in the very first 
chapter, that God must necessarily give himself to a truly obedient soul: 
 
Wherever a man in obedience goes out of his own and gives up what is his, in 
the same moment God must go in there, for when a man wants nothing for 
himself, God must want it equally as if for Himself. So in all things that I do I do 




Here God enters the truly obedient soul which goes out of itself, but Eckhart then states 
even further, that God would not be God if he did not want for the soul everything that 
he wants for himself, no more or less.
139
 God is thus incapable of not giving himself to 
the human soul which orientates itself towards him. While the Discourses are here 
concerned with human will and obedience, this necessary divine self-giving correlates 
with God’s conferring of existence to things discussed in the Commentary on Exodus, 
since it is precisely God’s giving of himself, his self-expression, whether through 
creating humanity or uniting himself to an obedient soul, that he cannot withhold from 
creation or from the soul. For Eckhart, the evidence of this necessity is the fact that God 
has given himself; he has created and has already granted salvation to humanity. 
Eckhart’s suggestion that God necessarily gives himself does not undermine God’s 
freedom, rather, it states that regardless of what God might be, revelation shows that 
God is related to creation. God must therefore communicate himself to creation because 
he has revealed himself to be self-communicative through creating the universe and 
saving humanity. If we do not recognise that God must be the way he has revealed 
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himself to be, then we are effectively questioning the authenticity of God’s revelation. 
Apophasis and detachment both work to negate even the possibility of this questioning 
God’s authenticity, since they are processes by which the soul re-orientates her knowing 
and being in such a way that the existence of the Christian God of revelation becomes a 
basic principle of the soul’s existence and understanding. The necessity of divine self-
communication which Eckhart speaks about, does not therefore undermine God’s 
freedom, it accepts God’s revelation. Importantly for us here, this validates the Trinity 
as something that must be true about God because God’s self-expression is always 
triune, as we shall see from Eckhart’s description of the bullitio-ebullitio-creatio. God’s 
being himself and relating to creation and to the human soul thus depends upon his 
existence as Trinity, since it is only as Trinity that he expresses himself and has any 
kind of relationship with creation and with humanity.
140
 
In the Commentary on Exodus Eckhart states quite plainly that God as existence 
itself denies himself in nothing, he gives himself wholly, as existence, to everything that 
is and in that sense all things receive him fully. Unlike the Discourses, based on 
Cassian’s Collations and intended to instruct novices and confreres,141 the Commentary 
– as one would expect from its scholastic genre which differs in structure and intent 
from the Discourses – aims to specifically outline the way in which God relates to 
creation, hence its deliberate and clear use of apophatic formulae in the language. 
Through apophatic signification Eckhart distinguishes between God’s essence and 
persons with regards to the free giving of existence to creatures. He makes it clear that 
the conferring of existence is not done by the essence, even though the essence is 
existence itself, since the essence in and of itself does not act, generate or create. The 
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essence is still the cause of existence since, as we shall see in 2c, the essence is the 
power (potentia) of begetting in the Father, not the Father himself, yet it is still the 
Father who performs the act of begetting and the triune self-expression which enacts the 
creation of the universe from nothing.
142
 As we have seen, when Eckhart considers 
God’s essence, he does so in a way that expresses God’s necessity and self-sufficiency, 
the Trinity however is, for Eckhart, an expression of the fact that God is self-
communicative and that his act of communication both creates the universe and points 
to his relation with creation: 
 
Third, note that the repetition (namely, that it says ‘I am who am’) indicates the 
purity of affirmation excluding all negation from God. It also indicates a 
reflexive turning back of his existence into itself and upon itself and its dwelling 
and remaining fixed in itself. It further indicates a boiling or giving birth to itself 
– glowing in itself, and melting and boiling in and into itself, light that totally 
forces its whole being in light and into light and that is everywhere totally turned 
back and reflected upon itself, according to that saying of the sage, ‘The monad 
gives birth to’ (or gave birth to) ‘the monad, and reflected love or ardent desire 
back upon itself.’ Therefore John 1 says, ‘In him was life’ (Jn. 1:4). ‘Life’ 
expresses a type of pushing out’ by which something swells up in itself and first 
breaks out totally in itself, each part into each part, before it pours itself forth 
and ‘boils over’ on the outside. This is why the emanation of the persons in the 




                                               
142 Eckhart makes this clear in In Ex. n.28 p.50-1. I will return to this passage in 2c, when we explore 
Eckhart’s use of the terms potential and actual, or potency and act, in relation to God’s essence and 
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143 In Ex., n.16 p.46. 




In this text Eckhart again uses the term in divinis.
144
 It refers to the Godhead which is 
here shown to ‘contain’ the Trinity in itself but not in an order of priority with the 
monad (again a synonym for essence, signifying God’s unity or oneness). The lack of 
hierarchy between essence and Trinity here is clear, since the same statement ‘ego sum 
qui sum’ which apophatically signifies the essence as identical with God’s necessary 
and self-sufficient existence also signifies the reflexive turning of this existence – the 
essence – into itself, boiling up and over into the triune life and self-expression. The 
essence and Trinity are thus both signified in this single statement of Exodus 3:14 and 




Eckhart describes the nature of this Godhead with the bullitio and ebullitio 
imagery. The ‘ego sum qui sum’ of Exodus 3:14 is here taken as an expression of the 
reflexive intra-divine flow into, up and over from itself where the God’s essence turns 
in upon itself and boils up into the Trinity, relating to itself. In that self-knowing and 
self-loving or ‘ardent desiring’ of itself God’s triune category of divine distinction or 
personhood emerges and expresses itself. It overflows, swelling up and over from itself 
and from there flows into the act of creation. Creation which is itself an effect of God’s 
self-expression, therefore becomes a sign, not only of God’s necessity, as we saw 
earlier, since existing things point to existence itself as their cause, it is also a sign of the 
Trinity as the act which had to express itself if creation was to exist. We are therefore 
reminded again of the passage from the Discourses where God ‘must want for the soul 
everything that he wants for himself,’ since it is precisely as self-expressive act that God 
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creates the soul and thus relates to her and therefore, inasmuch as the soul exists, she 
reveals that God is self-communicative, creative and relational.
146
  
This unity between the self-expression of the Trinity and the divine act of 
creation is consistently used in Eckhart’s theology and it is worth considering one other 
instance where he makes the same point, in the Commentary on John, before going on 
to consider the bullitio and ebullitio in more detail: 
 
God speaks once and for all, but two things are heard, as the Psalm says. Job 
declares, ‘God speaks once and for all; he does not repeat the same message a 
second time’ (Jb. 33:14), because by means of a single action he both generates 
the Son who is his heir, light from light, and creates the creature that is darkness, 





The speaking once and for all is God’s single act in the single now of eternity. It is both 
the begetting of the Son, who is light from light and the creation of the universe, from 
darkness or nothing. The unity of the two things heard in the single act of speech is 
reminiscent of the bullitio-ebullitio passage from the Commentary on Exodus, where the 
monad (or essence) turned into itself reflexively (Ex. 3:14) and where the emergence of 
the persons was the precondition for the boiling over of creation from God, who 
expresses himself in the universe through the single divine act of creation, revelation 
and salvation.
148
 The Trinity is not therefore negated, but remains present and is, in a 
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sense, signified through the apophatic affirmation of God as he is in himself, since it is 
the Trinity which acts, not the essence, even though the essence is, in a sense the power, 
or potency (potentia) of that divine action. By signifying, apophatically, the way in 
which God, as existence itself, relates to that which exists, (i.e. as the necessary cause of 
creation, which, since creation is the visible effect of God’s activity, also signifies 
God’s existence), we discover not only the essence but also the Trinity; the self-
communicating act through which God expresses himself and freely creates. Once 
again, the Trinity is not therefore negated through apophasis but rather affirmed in its 
equality with the essence.  
Eckhart’s clearest use of the boiling imagery is in sermon XLIX on Matthew 
22:20. The sermon is an extended treatment of the concept of ‘image’ and begins with a 
discussion of how an image is related to that of which it is an image.
149
 The image in the 
sermon refers to Christ, the image ‘of “the invisible God”’,150  who is ‘also “first born” 
before all created things’.151 It also refers to creatures who are created is according to 
this Christological image, which ‘is set before every creature as the exemplar to whom 
they are to be patterned’.152 In this sense the image discussed in the sermon has the 
same two-fold sense as the ‘boiling’, first in terms of the persons of the Trinity, and 
second, in terms of the emergence of creation from the same single act of triune self-
expression. The image, states Eckhart, is the ‘form of life’ which emanates as ‘a simple 
formal emanation that transmits the whole pure naked essence’.153 Eckhart is 
considering here how creatures receive the Word, the image of God and from this 
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reception come into their own individual existence.
154
 The divine image, Christ, does 
not have particular creaturely existence, identified through the possession of attributes, 
but is rather the primordial swelling up of life itself: ‘It is a form of life, as if you were 
to imagine something swelling up from itself and in itself and then inwardly boiling 
without any “boiling over” yet understood.’155  
There are a number of points which Eckhart makes about Christ-as-image, 
which help to clarify its relation to that from which it emanates – i.e. from the power 
(potentia) of the essence by which it emerges in its relation, as begotten from the Father. 
The image is ‘similar to God’,  indeed, equal to him since ‘equality belongs to the 
perfection of the image’.156 It is also ‘the expression and emanation of its source’.157 
This second point needs clarifying since the source of the image is in fact the same 
divine essence which turns in upon itself and was signified in the apophatic affirmation 
of Exodus 3:14.
158
 The essence is therefore logically the source of this emanation of the 
image or Word, since it is through the turning of essence in upon itself that the image is 
generated. This first stage of ‘production of existence’ is therefore 
 
that by which something from itself, out of itself, and in itself, produces a pure 
nature, pouring it forth formally without the cooperation of the will, but rather 
with its concomitant activity. This is the way the Good diffuses itself. This is 
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The bullitio of the primordial image produces a pure nature which is the source of 
creaturely existence, but whose purity is a reflection of its identity with that from which 
it boils. If we compare this with the bullitio passage from the Commentary on Exodus 
n.16, we have a strong sense of the relation between this initial bullitio in the Godhead, 
and the essence. The essence is the source of the bullitio in the sense that it is through 
God’s turning in upon himself, ‘the reflexive inward turning of the monad’ (In Ex. 
n.16), that he boils up from himself, in himself, and out from himself, producing a pure 
nature or image which is similar, indeed, equal to, that of which it is an image. In other 
words, the Son is a perfect expression of the essence which turns upon itself and the Son 
shares this essence mutually with the Father who gives birth to the Son. Two points 
about image that Eckhart identifies earlier in the sermon help to clarify this: 
 
it follows that the image and its exemplar are not separately numbered as two 
substances, but the one is in the other. ‘I am in the Father, and the Father is in 
me’ (Jn. 14:11)...This is the sixth property of the image. Seventh, it is 
consequently necessary that the image be found only in intellectual nature where 
the same reality returns to itself in a ‘perfect return,’ and where the one that 
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gives birth is one and the same with the child or offspring, finding oneself in the 




This passage identifies some significant parallels between the bullitio and the category 
of relation explored in 2a which defines the persons of the Trinity. In the above passage, 
the image and its exemplar (in this case referring to the Son and the Father) have one 
mutual essence (referred to in the above passage as substance).
161
 The category of 
personhood, in this case discussed in terms of image rather than relation, as we saw in 
2a, is not therefore contrary to the category of essence, since the persons all possess the 
same essence. To emphasise this essential unity between image and exemplar, Eckhart 
again refers to the perfect return of ‘intellect’ upon itself, an introversion which mirrors 
the description of the movement of the self-reflecting monad in the Commentary on 
Exodus. The synonymy between essence and intellect is clear since both function as 
‘that which reflects upon itself’ turning in on itself with ‘a perfect return’ (reditione 
complete) whilst all the time ‘remaining one.’162  This synonymy is further indicated in 
the passages from the Commentary on John n.34 that we saw above, where the Word is 
identified by Eckhart as intellectual in nature since it proceeded from the Father by way 
of intellect, where the intellect turns in upon itself in the same perfect return with which 
the monad turned in upon itself and from which the bullitio of the Trinity ‘emerges.’163  
Whether it is intellect, monad or essence returning perfectly upon itself, Eckhart is still 
making the same point about God: namely, that it is when the essence, or any of the 
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synonyms which Eckhart uses to signify essence, turns in upon itself, or ‘relates’ to 
itself, that the Trinity emerges. 
It is essential to remember at this point that the Trinity is something that God is 
eternally, to refer to the ‘emergence’ of the Trinity is for the sake of expression only. 
When we talk about the Trinity ‘emerging’ from the introverting of the essence, we 
must remember that this is not an ontological statement about the dependence of the 
Trinity upon some pre-existent essence, but an exploration of human reason into how 
oneness and threeness are eternal and identical in God. The essence turns in on itself 
and in so doing generates an image of itself of which it is immediately the exemplar. 
The Father exists as exemplar at precisely the same eternal ‘now’ as the Son exists as 
image. As I have asserted throughout this thesis and will continue to demonstrate, 
Eckhart views the Trinity as an eternal reality, existing in the same eternity as the 
essence about which he also speaks. We saw in the analysis of the Commentary on 
Exodus, that one of the properties of God’s eternal existence, or his essence, is that the 
eternal is unchanging. In other words, what is eternal, always was, is and will be since 
its eternity is, by definition, a term which signifies complete otherness from time and 
thus from the linearity of human reasoning of cause and effect. Bearing this in mind, 
when the essence turns in on itself, it does not do this at a particular moment. Rather, 
inasmuch as it is essence, it is also turning in on itself and thus also giving rise to the 
Trinity. Inasmuch as God exists and is one, or essence, he is therefore also Trinity, 
because ‘as soon as’ (where ‘as soon as’ really means ‘always’) he is essence he is 
turning in on himself and emerging from essence as activity, or rather, as Trinity. The 
problem we come across is really one of the limitation of human language and intellect. 
In an analogous sense to how we cannot properly conceive of how an electron is both a 
wave and a particle, we cannot conceive of how God is both one and three, both 




potential and actual, both indistinct and distinct. The non-duality between these terms is 
signified in ‘eternity’ for precisely the reason that eternity transcends the creaturely or 
temporal view of distinction and indistinction, of object and subject and of linear 
causation. In a sense, eternity is to time what apophasis is to language, it signifies a 
sphere of ultimate truth and reality where the limitations language and logic within our 
normal processes of understanding are transcended. However, its internal logic – 
eternity’s view of itself, or God’s view of himself – is thus impenetrable to the 
reasoning mind which persists in defining things in terms of the lesser system, in this 
case time or language, that is surpassed in truth, meaning and even in reality, by a 
greater system, in this case eternity, which brings together features, in this case Trinity 
and essence, or distinction and indistinction, that otherwise remain contrary when 
conceived of from within the former system.  
 The Trinity and the essence are not therefore two separate ‘parts’ of God, 
contained together in the Godhead, but are one and the same thing. This will become 
most clear when we consider how Eckhart speaks about potentiality and actuality in 
God, since the terms potential and actual can apply to a single object while 
differentiating between absence and presence of a feature or quality in that object, in 
this case, of unexpressed and expressed existence. We will look at this in depth in 2c, 
but it is worth noting here Markus Vinzent’s claim, that one of Eckhart’s seminal 
insights is his suggestion, as we have seen above, that the power or potential for 
begetting lies not with the Father, but with the essence.
164
 Eckhart makes this claim 
quite plainly in the Commentary on Exodus: 
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as the better authorities say, the power [potentia] of begetting in the Father is in 
the essence rather than in Paternity, and this is why the Father begets God the 
Son but does not beget himself the Father. He gives the Son divine existence and 
the existence, wisdom, and power of the Father, but not the fact that he is the 
Father. Rather he gives him the fact that he is Son by reason of a relation of 




In this passage the Son shares the same essence as the Father and the essence is the 
potentia for the emergence of the Father-Son relation. It is therefore only insofar as God 
is essence that he can turn upon himself and emerge as the persons of the Trinity in the 
reditione completa which turns and pushes into itself, boils up and overflows as the 
Trinity and as cause of creation. The persons of the Trinity are, in turn, defined by the 
eternal category of distinction. Their distinction is affirmed apophatically, after the shift 
from temporal signification to eternal signification. It is a distinction beyond creaturely 
spatio-temporal categories and is thus described by Eckhart, as we saw in 2a, as a 
distinction in terms of relation, a distinction defined by mutual unity and connectedness, 
not by autonomy, hierarchy or logical priority. The distinction of persons therefore 
always points towards their unity (their mutual essence) since they are the self-
expressive dimension of that unity. In plainer words, the Trinity is what happens when 
the essence expresses itself, but the essence always expresses itself since it is eternal, so 
also the Trinity always is. Moreover, this triune self-expression occurs in such a way 
that it does not undermine the oneness of the essence which in turn does not nullify the 
real distinction of the personal relations of the Trinity within the Godhead. The Trinity 
also does not emerge one person at a time, but as a whole, since all the persons have the 
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same essence or potentiality and no person could exist distinctly outside of the relation 
of opposition which defines their distinct personhood. 
 Considering how difficult it is to describe or understand what Eckhart is trying 
to say here, it would not be unreasonable for interpreters to persist in suggesting that the 
bullitio still appears to set up a kind of priority of essence over Trinity, since it seems to 
be only due to the prior existence of essence that the bullitio can take place. However, 
as I suggested above, Eckhart makes it quite clear that this is only a logical ordering and 
that the reflexive turning of essence upon itself happens eternally. In other words the 
term ‘prior’ simply cannot be applied to any feature of God’s existence or identity in 
relation to itself. Just as the essence cannot not be since it is existence and the cause of 
all that exists so also the Trinity cannot not be since it is the means by which God’s 
essence eternally acts, creatively and self-expressively and the existence of creation 
points to the Trinity as a real feature of God’s eternal existence. For Eckhart, the kind of 
hierarchy that would place the Trinity below essence simply cannot be applied in 
eternity since such hierarchies are a category of order singularly limited to time where 
time is already an effect of the God whose existence, because it is the way it is, has 
created even time itself.
166
 God is prior to ‘prior’ and his priority is itself the cause that 
enables us to exist, to speak and thus to mistakenly apply ‘prior’ to God. True 
knowledge of God therefore depends upon our admission of dependence upon him as 
eternal cause. The significance of revelation here becomes inescapable, since it is only 
through revelation – through which this eternal other has chosen to express himself – 
that human knowing could have any knowledge of him at all, for apart from his self-
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expression, human reason is incapable of penetrating eternity, of knowing God’s 
knowing of himself. Instead we must recognise him as the other which he is, an other 
which actually communicates itself and desires to be heard. 
Because Eckhart views the Trinity as eternal, he is able to view the birth of the 
Word as something that happens eternally. God therefore always begets and the essence 
always turns in upon itself in a perfect return, an introverting which in its turn, points to 
the Trinity’s eternal emergence and thus also to the birth of the Word, the begetting of 
the Son. We can see this clearly in a passage from the Commentary on John which 
begins with a discussion of two ways in which the term ‘idea’ can be understood, an 
argument we have already come across in the First Parisian Question when Eckhart 
distinguished between human and divine knowledge.
167
 He suggests in the Commentary 
on John that an idea can be posterior to a thing from which it is abstracted, and it can be 
prior to a thing as its cause. This second sense is what the Word is as idea in God, and it 
is this divine idea which defines all creatures since as exemplar it gives them their 
existence. It is also therefore the intrinsic principle that the human intellect grasps in the 
effects, i.e. creatures, that it sees produced by this primordial and causal idea.
168
 In this 
second sense of idea, the agent who, in having the idea, causes an effect, is able to 
contain this idea within itself even after the effect has been produced.
169
 This agent is of 
course God, and the idea is Word which is begotten of the Father, where the Father 
actualises the potentia for begetting from the essence which he shares with the Son. The 
Father therefore receives his fatherhood in the act of begetting, and is not the person of 
the Father prior to the birth of the Son. As such, he cannot have the power of begetting 
as a personal property, since the moment he was Father, he had begotten the Son and 
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was begetting the Son eternally. Eckhart states this in the Commentary on John where 
he shows that the Son, or idea, was present in the first intellect and was always begotten 
as Son by the Father. God, who begets the Son as a perfect image of himself eternally 
and so the persons of the Trinity are also eternal.
170
 An even clearer example of this 
comes from the German sermon Pr. 53, which considers this same sense of the Son as a 
spoken and unspoken Word of God, as something which comes forth and has effects but 
also remains wholly within that from which it was spoken. This sermon also connects 
this teaching about the Son to creation and thus provides a useful bridge for us here in 
2b, to turn back and consider the ebullitio which Eckhart uses to describe how the 
Trinity relates to creation, which we must consider to complete the analysis of sermon 
XLIX. In this German sermon Eckhart states:  
 
God is a word, an unspoken word...He is something, but who can utter this 
word? None can do so but He who is this Word. God is a word that utters itself. 
Where God is, He utters this Word – where He is not He does not speak. God is 
spoken and unspoken. The Father is a speaking work, and the Son is the speech 
at work. Whatever is in me has to come out: as soon as I think of it, my word 
makes it known, but it remains within. Thus the Father speaks the Son 
unspoken, and he remains within. I have also said before, God’s outgoing is His 
ingoing. In proportion to my nearness to God does He speak Himself in me. It is 
thus with all rational creatures, that, the more they go out of themselves with 
their work, the more they go into themselves. This is not the case with physical 
things; the more they work, the more they go out of themselves. All creatures 
wish to speak God in all their works; they all speak as well as they can, but they 
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cannot speak Him. Willy-nilly, whether they like it or not, they all want to speak 




The first line of this passage reminds us of the apophatic principle at work in Eckhart’s 
thought, who can utter the unspoken Word which God is? The answer, of course, is God 
alone, only God knows himself or can speak himself forth. God, as a Word that utters 
itself is therefore a self-sufficient speech act, reminding us of the self-sufficient essence, 
as it was described in the Commentary on Exodus. The word that utters itself thus also 
mirrors the turning of the essence in upon itself, or reflecting upon and understanding 
itself. Since this reflection occurs eternally then wherever God is ‘He utters this Word.’ 
He does not speak this Word where he is not, i.e. the Word is unspoken in that which 
does not exist, in the nothingness negated through apophasis. As we saw with the 
example of the agent in the Commentary on John, the Word as idea is spoken and 
unspoken, it emerges as the self-expression of God through the reflection of essence 
upon itself, but it also remains within that essence which is its own essence and which it 
shares with the other persons of the Trinity.
172
 The Father, is a speaking work, because 
he only exists as Father insofar as he begets the Son and has a relation of opposition 
with the Son. The Son is the speech at work because as exemplar of creatures, it is only 
through the Father’s speaking of the Son, or more generally, through God’s existence as 
Trinity, that he creates.
173
 Eckhart then refers again to the act of speaking where the idea 
of what is spoken comes forth in speech but remains within the speaker as idea and 
identifies this once more with the Father’s speaking the Son who comes forth but, as 
idea also remains completely within. The Son does not ‘run out’ in his being spoken, 
like some finite resource, but remains perfectly present as an idea in the Father which 
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the Father contains within himself even while speaking the Son forth. The simultaneity 
between outgoing and ingoing which defines the intra-divine life of the Trinity, is 
identical in structure to the eternal introverting and self-expressing of the essence. It is 
only as essence, as that which is most inward and is its own existence, that God turns in 
upon himself and expresses himself as Trinity. Only through the ingoing of essence 
upon itself does the outgoing therefore occur or in the terms discussed above, only 
insofar as the essence turns inwards in the reditione completa does the Trinity boil up 
and emerge as God’s outgoing.  
The Sermon then turns to creation itself, relating it to the triune life which gives 
rise to it. Creatures, it seems, share in this same ‘ingoing-outgoing’ synchrony as God, 
where the more they go out of themselves, expressing themselves in the activity of their 
work, the more they go into themselves. This simultaneous outgoing and ingoing is only 
a property present in rational creatures, i.e. the human soul, since for Eckhart, it is the 
presence of reason in the soul that identifies her as both the image and likeness of the 
filial exemplar, and because of which she receives both the grace of creation, and the 
grace of salvation, as we shall see in sermon XXV in 3b.
174
 The rational soul’s sharing 
in the same ingoing-outgoing structure as God then leads Eckhart to refer to the soul’s 
absolute dependence upon God for her existence, this time relating it not simply to God 
because he is existence itself, but to God as that which creates through his speaking of 
the Word. Thus, the human soul receives God’s speech within her in proportion to her 
nearness to him. Her participation in true existence is associated directly with her 
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closeness to God as both essence and Trinity, which, as we shall also see in chapter 3, is 
part of the orientation of the soul’s will towards God’s will for her, an orientation which 
does not negate her will, but allows her to be herself and to exist most fully, since it is 
both the orientation towards her cause and end as well as the orientation away from 
attachments and nothingness. This passage therefore identifies, in one fell swoop, the 
flowing interplay between God’s essence and persons, the intra-divine relation of Father 
and Son and the connection between this divine nature and the soul. The life of the 
Trinity is inextricably woven into God’s essential existence, and this in turn overflows 
into the connection between God and creation, both enabling creation and defining it. 
 We must now turn to consider more closely this connection between God and 
creation which is described by Eckhart through the second stage of productive existence 
identified in sermon XLIX, the ebullitio:  
 
The second stage is like the ‘boiling over’ in the manner of an efficient cause 
and with a view toward an end by which something produces something else 
that is from itself, but not out of itself. This production is either out of some 
other thing (and then it is called ‘making’), or it is out of nothing (and then it is 
the third stage of production which is called ‘creating’).175 
 
God’s agency as the efficient cause of creation is expressed through the ebullitio, the 
‘boiling over’ of the triune life from itself, into the act of creatio (ex nihilo), whereby 
our universe is created and directed towards God as its end. Creation is distinct from 
God and dependent upon him, since it comes from nothing. This doctrine of creation 
from nothing concurs with Eckhart’s identification of God as the absolute ‘something’ 
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according to which all creatures receive their existence or somethingness and apart from 
which they are nothing.
176
 The creation from nothing, is itself the third stage of 
productive emanation, and it identifies creation as that which is most ‘other’ from God, 
‘something else that is from him, but not out of him’ as the passage above stated. 
Despite this apparently insurmountable separateness, Eckhart also affirms an 
inescapable connectedness between creator and creation, since the bullitio-ebullitio-
creatio cycle of production, is one single eternal act of divine self-expression: 
 
It is clear how the Image, the Son, the ‘Firstborn,’ with the Father and the Holy 
Spirit, is the one Principle ‘of every creature.’ For it is necessary for something 
first to ‘boil’ itself totally and then finally to ‘boil over’ so that it can be 
completely perfected in itself while overflowing [with a fruitfulness] that is 
more than perfection. (See Avicenna, Metaphysics 8.6 at the beginning) This is 
why nature first nourishes, then gives increase, perfects, and thus produces 




Eckhart here identifies the bullitio as sufficient for God’s perfection. If we imagine the 
essence like an un-plunged French press, the introversion of the press pushes down on 
the fluid which in turn pushes up, the bullitio, the flowing of the fluid representing the 
intra-divine relational ‘movement’ of the triune persons. The Trinity reaches the brim of 
the container without overflowing, thus ‘actualising’ God’s self-expression fully, which 
would otherwise remain unexpressed if he were simply or primarily essence.
178
 Since 
God is eternal, i.e. the essence and the relationally distinct persons are the same single 
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reality, the container and its brimming-ness are simultaneous, the cafetière of God’s 
being a self-knowing and self-loving Trinity is never not being pressed,
179
 and the 
essence is never not the structure which pressed into itself, i.e. the single unified 
structure of God’s divine existence and simplicity. The plunging of the press which 
gives rise to the bullitio of the coffee never stops, it is an infinite press, but it also goes 
further than simply reaching the brim of the container, since it overflows in the ebullitio. 
In his overflowing God is more than just perfect, more than just self-sufficient and self-
contained, since he allows creation to exist as a something outside of himself. Creation, 
in other words, is then identified as an extension of God’s self-expression, something 
we have already considered when we saw that creation, as God’s effect, signified God 
as cause. This is not the only point worth noting however, for the final line of the 
passage above suggests that because God is the way he is, as that which expresses itself 
in the bullitio-ebullitio-creatio flow, creation itself mirrors this same structure of 
creative self-expression, i.e. the triune distinction defined by relation, in the way it 
nourishes, gives increase, perfects and reproduces. The structure of life in creation is 
therefore a mirror image of the flowing self-expression of God’s own perfect identity. 
There could be no clearer sign that for Eckhart, creaturely distinction is therefore, above 
all things, fundamentally triune in its structure and thus relational in its distinction.  
An unusual conclusion in Eckhart’s theology that arises from this point is that 
the existence of nothingness (or attachment), evil, sin and also more generally of 
creatures, who are less than perfect existence itself, is an expression of God’s own 
superabundance. In allowing evil, sin or nothingness to exist, i.e. things that are truly 
other than him, God expresses himself more abundantly, since he allows that which is 
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other than him to exist and as such expressing himself as more than perfectly and self-
sufficiently contained. He expresses himself as creative, and thus his self-expression is 
even more fruitful, since it flows into the life of creatures that are, to the extent that they 
are attached to nothingness, genuinely other than God.
180
 Eckhart was in fact 
condemned for this in article 4 of the Papal Bull,
181
 but it is a logical conclusion of the 
way in which he describes God’s eternal existence and activity as Trinity as well as 
God’s connection with creation. The fact that for Eckhart the bullitio of the Trinity 
within the immanent Godhead, and the ebullitio of the Trinity which overflows from the 
Godhead into creatio (ex nihilo), is all one act, was also condemned in the Papal Bull, 
articles 1-3.
182
 However, for Eckhart, the unity between the act of creation and the self-
expression of the Trinity, is again, a logical conclusion from the fact that God creates 
according to the Word, who is idea, and that creatures possess existence, and human 
souls receive salvation, according to their image (and likeness) to this idea. As he states 
in the Commentary on Genesis:  
 
the ‘beginning’ in which ‘God created heaven and earth’ is the first simple now 
of eternity. I say that it is the very same now in which God exists from eternity, 
in which also the emanation of the divine Persons eternally is, was and will be. 
Moses said that God created heaven and earth in the very first beginning in 
which he himself exists, without any medium or time interval. So when someone 
once asked me why God had not created the world earlier, I answered that he 
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could not because he did not exist. He did not exist before the world did. 
Furthermore, how could he have created earlier when he had already created the 
world in the very now in which he was God? It is false to picture God as if he 
were waiting around for some future moment in which to create the world. In the 
one and the same time in which he was God and in which he begot his coeternal 
Son as God equal to himself in all things, he also created the world. ‘God speaks 
once and for all’ (Jb. 22:14). He speaks in begetting the Son because the Son is 
the Word; he speaks in creating creatures, ‘He spoke and they were made, he 
commanded and they were created’ (Ps. 32:9). This is why it says in another 
Psalm, ‘God has spoken once and for all and I have heard two things’ (Ps. 
61:12). The ‘two things’ are heaven and earth, or rather ‘these two,’ that is, the 
emanation of the Persons and the creation of the world, but ‘he speaks’ them 
both ‘once and for all’; ‘he has spoken once and for all.’183 
 
This passage affirms Eckhart’s apophatic teaching that all way can say about God in 
himself apart from all human signification is that he is, and that he is in a prior and 
infinitely higher sense than creation. However, when we include God’s triune life 
alongside his essential existence, we must recognise that to try and talk about God’s 
self-expression apart from his creative activity is to talk about God as other than he is. 
This does not mean that he could not be Trinity in and of himself separate from 
creation, rather it means that he reveals himself as Trinity to be connected to creation. 
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To ask what God is apart from his creativity does not make sense in face of the fact, 
asserted in the passage above, that God, as Trinity, has created. God has expressed 
himself as Trinity both immanently and economically, and in so doing, he has also 
created according to the image of the Word as the exemplar of all creation. Eckhart is 
really calling for people to understand God according to the manner of his revelation, as 
we saw in the Opus Tripartitum where the fact of God’s existence is signified by the 
existence of creation and where the soul must acknowledge this about God if she is to 
know him according to how he has revealed himself.
184
 In this case it is not only God’s 
existence or essence being signified, Eckhart is pointing to his particular existence as 
self-expressive Trinity which overflows with creativity. The reason creation is created 
from the same single now of eternity in which God is himself – as both essence and 
persons – is precisely because it is created from nothing. Apart from the now within 
which God is himself, there is nothing and nowhere from which creation could come to 
be. In that sense, insofar as creation exists at all as the product of its creator, it exists 
from the same now in which God is himself. 
 When Eckhart therefore states in the passage above from the Commentary on 
Genesis, ‘when someone once asked me why God had not created the world earlier, I 
answered that he could not because he did not exist,’ we should not assume that he is 
suggesting somehow that there was ontologically a point when God did not exist. 
Rather, Eckhart is showing us that if we understand God as he is according to his own 
revelation, to separate him from the act of creation which he has performed, is to 
separate him from the way in which he has expressed himself, in other words, to view 
God as other than he is and in that sense he can be understood not to exist. It is really a 
rather obvious statement, that God does not exist in a view of the universe which is 
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other than the universe actually is, since God’s existence reveals itself in the real 
universe whether or not the individual human allows themselves to perceive this reality. 
This is a very significant point for some of the passages from the German sermons often 
cited as examples where Eckhart prioritises the soul’s union with God’s essence as 
above God’s existence as Trinity. For instance in Pr. 52, he states: 
 
While I yet stood in my first cause, I had no God and was my own cause: then I 
wanted nothing and desired nothing, for I was bare being and the knower of 
myself in the enjoyment of truth. Then I wanted myself and wanted no other 
thing: what I wanted I was and what I was I wanted, and thus I was free of God 
and all things. But when I left my free will behind and received my created 
being, then I had a God. For before there were creatures, God was not ‘God’: He 
was That which He was. But when creatures came into existence and received 





Eckhart here refers to the primordial existence of the soul in eternity, before it was 
created, but rather than doing it from the point of view of affirming God in the highest 
sense through a straightforward negation of negation, he considers it from the soul’s 
perspective, where the soul sees herself as God whose essence contains everything 
indistinctly and who absolutely and necessarily exists, above all distinction and 
attribute, above multiplicity, time or creation. The soul, coming forth from the essence 
then has ‘a God’ whose existence, as we just saw in the Commentary on Genesis, is tied 
up with the existence of creation. This ‘God’ is the ‘God’ whom the soul must pass 
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beyond to reach the ‘God beyond God’ that we saw McGinn refer to, and that Caputo 
suggested was the pinnacle of Eckhart’s teaching on the soul’s union with God.186 
Indeed, in the next passage of Pr. 52, Eckhart himself seems to suggest as much: 
 
Now when we say that God, inasmuch as He is ‘God,’ is not the supreme goal of 
creatures, for the same lofty status is possessed by the least of creatures in God. 
And if it were the case that a fly had reason and could intellectually plumb the 
eternal abysm of God’s being out of which it came, we would have to say that 
God with all that makes Him ‘God’ would be unable to fulfil and satisfy that fly! 
Therefore let us pray to God that we may be free of God that we may gain the 
truth and enjoy it eternally, there where the highest angel, the fly, and the soul 




If we interpret this according to the assumption that Eckhart is happy to ontologically 
subordinate the Trinity to God’s essence, it would be easy to suggest that the ‘God’ 
which the soul must overcome and be free from is the triune God and that the soul’s 
ultimate union is therefore with the God beyond God, the essence, wherein the soul saw 
herself as identical with her first cause, and was in fact her own cause. It is perhaps 
especially important in a passage such as this, that we do not lose sight of the difference 
that Eckhart identified between human knowing and divine knowing, between the 
demands of human logic and ontological reality (reality as God sees it), or between the 
different perspectives of God and the soul which knows him apophatically. Considering 
how Eckhart employs apophasis as an affirmation of God’s existence, we should recall 
here that negation, i.e. the denial of limitedness in speech and knowing – specifically 
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when related to God – is an entirely human category. God does not possess negation in 
himself, except as the negation of negation which is an affirmation and which, as we 
saw in the Latin works, does not exclude the Trinity. Here the soul is called to negate 
from its perspective the kind of knowing of God that it encounters in creatures (‘when 
creatures came into existence and received their created being, then God was not ‘God’ 
in himself – he was ‘God’ in creatures’). This, as we have seen from the ebullitio, is 
God’s existence as Trinity. If Eckhart therefore seeks to ontologically deny the Trinity 
here, he would be directly contradicting everything we have seen from the Latin works 
explored thus far in this chapter.  
It is not however necessary to interpret this passage in quite such a radical way, 
although the way in which Eckhart speaks is of course, deliberately provocative. We 
should once again consider the apophatic affirmation, which signifies God’s absolute 
‘somethingness,’ or rather, the necessity of his existence. When the soul views herself 
from within her first cause and indeed, as her own first cause, this can be seen in light of 
this apophatic orientation of her perspective. The soul, in seeking the God beyond God, 
identifies God as that which absolutely cannot not be and she recognises her 
dependence upon this God – upon God’s essence – by perceiving that she exists 
indistinctly in the essence, which contains all creation and perfections indistinctly and 
un-expressed within itself. The soul is not denying the Trinity per se. Rather, she is 
moving through her perception of God as ‘God’ (Trinity) in creatures, seeing behind 
this the fact that God’s existence is necessary and that her existence is contained 
primordially in this necessarily existing God. The breaking-through of the soul is thus 
nobler than the emanation, since it is precisely in this breaking-through that she realises 
just how absolute her dependence upon God is and how absolute his existence is. But it 
is precisely insofar as the soul actually exists as a creature in the universe that the 




Trinity is not denied ontologically. Her perspective, as we have seen, is reoriented, but 
her being still depends, as it always did, upon God’s creativity in the self-expression of 
the Trinity. The radical denial of ‘God’ in Pr. 52 therefore enacts the reorientation that 
the soul undergoes, it is a rhetorical presentation of the soul’s realisation of God’s 
necessary existence which she recognises through the reorientation of her life towards 
God through detachment, which is, as we shall see in chapter 3, a practical form of 
apophasis. In this passage from Pr. 52, we therefore see the logical summit of the soul’s 
theocentric orientation, her realisation of God’s necessary existence, but we do not have 
to view this as the ontological denial of the Trinity. At the end of Pr. 52, Eckhart adds: 
 
A great master says that his breaking-through is nobler than his emanation, and 
this is true. When I flowed forth from God, all creatures declared, ‘There is a 
God’; but this cannot make me blessed, for with this I acknowledge myself as a 
creature. But in my breaking-through, where I stand free of my own will, of 
God’s will, of all His works, and of God himself, then I am above all creatures 
and am neither God nor creature, but I am that which I was and shall remain for 
evermore. There I shall receive an imprint that will raise me above all the angels. 
By this imprint I shall gain such wealth that I shall not be content with God 
inasmuch as He is God, or with all His divine works: for this breaking-through 
guarantees to me that I and God are one. Then I am what I was, then I neither 
wax nor wane, for then I am an unmoved cause that moves all things. Here, God 
finds no place in man, for man by his poverty wins for himself what he has 
eternally been and shall eternally remain. Here, God is one with the spirit, and 
that is the strictest poverty one can find.
188
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In this passage it is not the flowing forth of creatures, the ebullitio, or exitus, which 
makes the soul blessed, since as Eckhart states, that is simply a statement of the soul’s 
existence. Blessedness depends upon the soul’s returning to God, the reditus, when she 
recognises where she has flowed from and where she is flowing towards. The soul 
breaks-through into God, and is free from her will, from God’s will, from his works and 
from him. In this breakthrough the soul is neither God nor creature, she becomes what 
she was and will remain for evermore, she becomes, or rather she recognises that she 
eternally is what God has assured her that she will be through the promise of salvation 
and this is the highest form of affirmation of the soul’s existence and identity. Eckhart 
uses the same language here to talk about the soul’s self-understanding as he did to 
describe God as ‘that which he was’ earlier in the sermon, and which is reminiscent of 
the ‘Something which is neither this nor that’ from Pr. 2.189 He could not affirm the 
soul’s identity in stronger terms than these, the terms used to describe God’s own being. 
We then see, within this affirmation of the soul’s existence in the highest possible terms, 
that she receives an ‘imprint.’ It is almost certain that by imprint Eckhart here means the 
birth of the Word in the soul, a theme which virtually always accompanies his teaching 
on detachment or breakthrough. As Beverly Lanzetta suggests: 
 
The foundation of Christian metaphysics must be ‘let go’ and ‘let be’ in order to 
enter the most indistinct of indistinctions, to be One. However, Eckhart never 
dispenses with [his] theistic substructure, but views it as mutually affirming with 
the Desert of the Godhead. According to the Meister, the Trinity is such only in 
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relation to its own indistinction, its own death, as the Unity is such only in 




It is precisely because this birth always occurs, in the desert of the Godhead, that the 
soul’s union with the essence cannot be the pinnacle of its union with God, and as such, 
must mean something different. It is for this reason that I have interpreted it as an 
apophatic statement about the soul’s realisation of God’s absolute necessity. The denial 
of the Trinity in Pr. 52 is really the soul’s discovery of God’s necessity, after which she 
once more encounters the Trinity as it truly is, not as some property that God possesses 
and reveals through his creation, but as a category of distinct relation which exists 
eternally and is identical with the fact of God’s necessary existence. The Trinity is seen 
as the boiling up and over that caused creation and, as we shall see in 2c, as the 
actualised self-expression of God, who would otherwise remain in the essence as an un-
actualised potentia. This initial breaking-through of the soul into the Godhead is 
noblest, because it is identical with the first step of apophasis, a step taken for the sake 
of human knowing and for the sake of reorienting human being, but it is not an 
ontological statement about God’s eternal being.  
It is, of course, possible to deny that this interpretation has value. However, we 
would then have to face the inherent contradiction between some of Eckhart’s sermons, 
such as Pr. 52, and the metaphysics taught in his Latin works – which offer much more 
extensive treatments of Eckhart’s thought and which, if push came to shove, could be 
argued to have equal if not greater weight as representations of ‘what Eckhart really 
thinks’ than the few sermons when his preaching reaches its most provocative. I do not 
believe that our interpretation of Eckhart need come to this, and the integrated reading 
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of Pr. 52 with the Latin teaching on the Trinity that I have offered in 2b hopefully stands 
as a reasonable argument in support of that claim.   
 
 
2c. Potential and Actual  
 
As we saw in 2b, the Trinity and essence do not exist in the Godhead as two separate 
parts of God; instead they are two expressions of a single whole. The essence is the 
reality of God unexpressed, inactive, indistinct and contained within itself. The Trinity 
is the same reality expressed, active, relationally distinct and flowing perpetually 
towards the other; both the other within itself, in the perfect relations of the triune 
persons, and the other outside of itself, humanity and the whole created universe. One of 
the ways in which Eckhart expresses the difference between the Trinity and the essence 
whilst still maintaining the sense that they are the same reality, is with his use of 
potentiality and actuality in reference to God. As Vinzent points out, Eckhart identifies 
the potentiality (potentia) for personhood as a property not of the persons themselves, 
but of their mutual essence.
191
 McGinn indicates the same point in his analysis of 
Eckhart’s trinitarianism: 
 
The distinction between grunt as precondition (i.e., pure possibility) for 
emanation and the Father as actual source for the God who becomes is reflected 
in Eckhart’s frequent appeal to what to many may seem a rather obscure axiom 
of scholastic trinitarian theology. In his Commentary on Exodus Eckhart says: 
‘The better authorities say the potentiality of begetting in the Father is in the 
essence rather than the Paternity, and this is why the Father begets God the Son, 
but does not beget himself the Father.’ This means that the root of all the Son’s 
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divine existence, wisdom, and power is from the ground or essence; but the 




McGinn’s work convincingly shows the prevalence of the theme of the ground in 
Eckhart’s theology, even though the term grunt only specifically occurs in the German 
works. Drawing on this thesis in the quote above, he identifies the ground with God’s 
essence and describes it as the pure possibility for emanation. However, he deviates 
here from his own translation of potentia as ‘power’ in Teacher and Preacher,193 
instead referring to ‘potentiality’ and thus giving a stronger sense of Eckhart’s teaching 
that the Trinity exists, in a sense, unexpressed and indistinct in the essence. Eckhart 
makes the same point in the Commentary on Exodus when he considers how the persons 
of the Trinity exist relationally in God: 
 
The third preliminary notion is that act proceeds from essence according to the 
ideas and properties of the attributes. For example, Paternity in the Godhead is 
that thing which is the essence, and the essence in the Son is really that which is 
Filiation. Nevertheless, we truly and properly say that the Father begets, not the 




The ‘attributes’ which define the distinction of the persons, i.e. paternity, filiation and 
spiration, are not possessed by the persons in and of themselves; instead they are 
received through the essence. These attributes describe the nature of the relation 
between the persons but the power for the possession of these attributes is in the 
indistinct potentia of the essence or ground, not in the relationally distinct persons 
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themselves. God is therefore three only insofar as he is one since the one is the potentia 
for the distinction of the three. He is also only one insofar as he is that which always 
emerges into threeness as we saw above, for the one always turns in on itself and relates 
to itself and its oneness is, in this sense, always expressing itself as three. 
The essence should not therefore be conceived of as static or passive. It is static 
in one sense, as the unmoved mover of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Λ, 1071b – 1073a), but 
it is also defined by the brimming potentiality within it and by the eternal actualising of 
this potentia in the self-expressive and creative life of the Trinity. Eckhart says as much 
in the Commentary on Exodus referring to Moses Maimonides teaching that ‘in God 
there is no mutability, no potentiality that is not act’,195 and again in the First Parisian 
Question: ‘In God there is no passive potentiality. But there would be unless 
understanding and existence were the same in God.’196 As we saw in 2b, God always 
begets the Word, the persons of the Trinity always emerge in the bullitio and ebullitio, 
and the essence therefore is never un-actualised or passive potentiality. Eckhart 
describes it as potentiality in itself for the sake of illustrating its relation as potentia to 
the persons. The distinction between potential and actual is therefore a logical 
distinction for the sake of human knowing, not an ontological distinction in God, whose 
potentiality is always actualised, and whose actuality always emerges from its potentia 
in the essence. There is therefore a sense in which we literally cannot picture the 
‘object’ being described, since it possesses the properties of potential and actual which 
we always either perceive as distinct from one another, as something that will happen or 
something that has happened, or in some kind of order of causation. But God’s 
potentiality and actuality are neither of these things. He possesses them eternally, in the 
same realm of truth that apophasis signifies and thus completely beyond the bounds of 
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our normal comprehension. As I shall suggest in the conclusion to this chapter, it is for 
this reason that I believe apophasis is not simply a noetic category, a way of 
understanding, since understanding falls down in the face of God’s reality. Rather, it is a 
way of understanding through being with God, as we saw in Farrer’s description of 
metaphysics at the start of this chapter, where the soul does not know God as a concept 
or an idea, but as a real something which she relates to in her existence, who, through 
that relation, reveals himself to her understanding and shapes her existence according to 
his own. 
One of the unusual results of placing the potentiality for distinction in the 
essence is that the persons each possess the same potentiality, their mutual essence, but 
which is actualised in each in the particular distinction of their personhood. However 
their personhood is itself defined wholly in terms of their relations with one another, not 
in terms of an autonomous distinction of each person from the other. It is as such not 
‘possession’ but ‘sharing,’ ‘giving’ or ‘reciprocity’ which defines God’s distinction as 
persons who boil up together from the potentia of the essence from within the now of 
eternity and overflowing from itself in the economic acts of creation and salvation. As 
Eckhart states in the Book of the Parables of Genesis: 
 
The one activity that belongs to the Father also belongs to the Holy Spirit and 
the Son. Thus the words ‘God created,’ for God is one in the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. The activity is one, for Moses says ‘created’ in the singular. The one 
God and his one activity are not divided into many things, but they unite many 
things and gather together what has been divided. Thus, the One or Unity is not 
divided into numbers, but unites numbers in itself.
197
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God has persons, but not as multiplicity, since the single act of self-expression by which 
God is triune and through which he creates, is distinct from all creaturely activity and 
multiplicity by its unity, a unity expressed by Eckhart’s identification of the essence 
rather than the persons as the source or potentia for this act. As Eckhart states in the 
Commentary on John, ‘the power [potentia] of generating in the Godhead directly and 
more principially belongs to the essence rather than to the relation that is paternity,’198 
and again in sermon XXV but inverted, ‘The divine essence...neither generates nor 
creates, only the divine subject.’199 Here the ‘subject’ refers to the persons of the Trinity 
and, as McGinn points out, the passage is  
 
a paraphrase of a technical scholastic formula in which the word here rendered 
as ‘subject’ is actually ‘supposit,’ i.e., the concrete subject of the 
predication...The divine essence as such is never the concrete subject of the 
predication of divine actions, within the Trinity or without, but only the divine 




It is thus the Trinity and never the essence which acts. God begets and is begotten as 
Trinity, even though the essence is, properly speaking, the potentia for all divine 
activity and he also creates as Trinity. The essence is not begotten, it does not beget and 
it does not create. As such, it is only as Trinity that God can create and remain truly 
God. For Eckhart, since God has created – since the universe actually exists and we are 
in it – the existence of the Trinity is affirmed necessarily, since its effects are evident. 
McGinn also points us to another instance of the same formula in the Commentary on 
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John where Eckhart distinguishes between God’s relations (where the subjects or 
persons relating to each other have the same nature or substance) and analogical 
relations, i.e. creaturely relations to God, where  
 
what is produced derives from the source, but is nevertheless beneath the 
principle and not with it. It is of another nature and thus is not the principle 
itself. Still, insofar as it is in the principle, it is not other in nature or other in 
supposit. A chest in its maker’s mind is not a chest, but is the life and 




Eckhart here refers to one of the logical principles which leads to his particular use of 
potentiality and actuality in God; namely that ‘what is produced or proceeds from 
anything is precontained in its source,’ a point that is ‘universally and naturally true, 
both in the Godhead (the topic here) and in natural and artificial things’.202 We have 
seen this already in the Son’s being spoken and remaining unspoken. Here however, 
Eckhart presents four conclusions regarding this point: ‘[1] What proceeds is in its 
source; [2] it is in it as a seed is in its principle, [3] as a word is in one who speaks; and 
[4] it is in it as the idea in which and according to which whatever proceeds is produced 
by the source.’203 The logic of causality, which defines Eckhart’s examination here of 
the divine ideas – God’s creating of things according to his idea of them contained in 
the Word which is itself the ‘image of the invisible God’ and the exemplar of all 
creation – is the same logic which he uses to explain how God’s essence and Trinity 
relate to each other and to creation. However, while God is connected to creation as its 
cause, he is not subject to the same ‘rules’ of logic which define creaturely existence. 
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When Eckhart applies this logic to God it differs in precisely the sense in which God’s 
substance differs from creaturely substance, as self-sufficient cause of all subsequently 
existing things, whose substance, perfections, attributes etc., are distinct in creatures but 
contained indistinctly in the self-sufficient essence of God. However, as we have also 
seen, this affirmation of God’s existence includes the Trinity as equal and (as we now 
see) identical with the essence. As such the logic which in creation sets up an order of 
causation and dependence of creatures upon their creator, does not instigate the same 
sense of dependence within God himself, since the Trinity and essence are in fact the 
same reality, identified as expressed and unexpressed, or actual and potential. The 
distinction between these two ‘dimensions’ of God’s being is also, as we have seen, a 
creaturely distinction, made for the sake of understanding how God relates to creation as 
its cause, and not for the sake of describing an ontological distinction between the 
essence and Trinity as two separate parts in God.  
Eckhart thus utterly distinguishes God from creation, by showing how his 
distinct persons and indistinct essence exist beyond creaturely categories of distinction 
or multiplicity. This fact is shown here through the teaching on potentiality and 
actuality, and also shown as we saw in chapter 1, through Eckhart’s apophatic method. 
However, in accord with his dialectical style, Eckhart also points to the total 
connectedness of creatures with God, since the existence of creation is one with the 
same act by which God expresses himself as Trinity. The problem that this creates in 
Eckhart’s theology is not therefore simply that interpreters (in our time and Eckhart’s) 
view him as subordinating Trinity to essence; it is also the unusual over-connectedness 
between creation and the Trinity. As Vinzent points out: 
 




Without differentiation between the divine essence’s potentiality for fatherhood, 
sonship and spiritness, there is no distinction between these and the divine 
essence’s potentiality for creation. Criticised during the Cologne Process for this 
daring concept, Eckhart maintains that there cannot be any differentiation within 
the divine substance, as it is nothing but pure potentiality – another name for 
God’s nature of detachment.204 
 
We therefore encounter the same implication with Eckhart’s teaching on potentiality 
and actuality that we saw with the bullitio-ebullitio-creatio process; that the Trinity and 
creation seem too connected in Eckhart’s theology, through the same apophatic method 
with which Eckhart demonstrated their separateness.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks for Chapter 2  
 
When we compare the affirmation of the Trinity seen in this chapter to any of the 
German sermons where Eckhart appears to prioritise essence over Trinity it might seem 
like a brazen contradiction. However, as Frank Tobin points out, Eckhart’s concern to 
emphasise the simultaneous unity and separateness between God and creatures in the 
truest way possible, often leads him to prioritise certain features of his thought over 
others for the sake of making his point: 
 
what distinguishes Eckhart’s thought from more traditional Christian thought is, 
in particular, his insistence that neither the division nor the union between God 
and creature had been sufficiently expressed. Indeed, he himself cannot do both 
elements justice in a single utterance, and he attempts to remedy this in part 
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through dialectical juxtaposition of statements. One cause of confusion 
concerning his total view is that in many contexts he treats only one side of his 





Eckhart therefore takes metaphysics to a previously unexplored extreme, advocating 
both absolute separation between God and creation, and absolute union, but always, 
implicitly or explicitly, depending upon his apophatic method and his analogical safety 
net, in quantum. I would like to add to Tobin’s point that we can see a similar dialectical 
language with Eckhart’s concept of God, when sometimes he seems to deny and at other 
times affirm the Trinity as a reality in God as he is in himself. This is connected to 
Eckhart’s teaching on simultaneous separateness and unity between God and creation, 
but it is a point that I believe can be dealt with in and of itself, and which, in so doing, 
helps to clarify the nature of the connection and separation between creator and creature 
that Tobin identifies.  
This dialectical method is perhaps one explanation for the difference between 
the affirmation of the Trinity we have seen in this chapter and the apparent denial of the 
Trinity that we come across in some of the German sermons.
206
 We have seen in the 
Commentary on Exodus that Eckhart apophatically affirms the identity between God’s 
existence and essence. He then goes on to discuss the Trinity – God’s relational 
distinction – and shows that it exists in the Godhead without apparently contradicting 
the simplicity, unity, necessity, self-sufficiency and priority (with regards to creation) of 
God’s essence. The Trinity in other words does not stand in the way of the unity of the 
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essence, while, as we saw above, one essence in no way inhibits the Trinity. Instead, the 
Trinity is affirmed alongside the essence, as Eckhart states in Pr. 10:  
 
I once preached in Latin (it was on Holy Trinity Day), and I said that the 
distinction in the Trinity comes from the unity. The unity is the distinction, and 
the distinction is the unity. The greater the distinction, the greater the unity, for 




In this quotation, we see the synonymy Eckhart indicates between the unity (of the 
essence) and the distinction (of the Trinity) in God. However, Pr. 10 is also one of the 
frequently cited sermons to support a view of detachment as a union between the soul 
and the Godhead or essence, in other words, a union with God ‘beyond’ the Trinity. 
After the passage above Eckhart goes on to state: ‘If there were a thousand Persons 
there would still not be more than one unity.’208 This can easily be read to imply that the 
number of persons in the Trinity is irrelevant in the face of God’s unity. As Bernard 
McGinn points out, it would be wrong to ignore passages like this where Eckhart seems 
to prioritise God’s unity or essence as that towards which the soul aims in its 
detachment, but he adds, ‘if we stop there and refuse to recognise that the unum 
dialectically demands expression as a Trinity of Persons we shall also be false to the 
Meister.’209 As we have seen throughout this chapter, there is a very real sense in which 
the Trinity cannot be negated or absorbed into the essence. The sceptic might suggest 
that Eckhart is simply paying lip service to church teaching, as Caputo seems to imply, 
distinguishing in Eckhart’s theology between the ‘doctrine of the divine unity’ and the 
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‘Christian dogma of the Trinity.’210 Such a view however, once more overlooks the 
dialectical quality of Eckhart’s teaching.211 McGinn is right to indicate the priority 
Eckhart gives to the hidden Godhead, it is certainly a feature of his preaching that 
distinguishes his thought from that of his contemporaries and predecessors. However, I 
would like to suggest that, just as the apophatic negates the application of creaturely 
categories to God but does not deny what God is in himself, so also, the prioritisation of 
the essence in his teaching on detachment is primarily Eckhart’s attempt to instil an 
apophatic ‘habit’ in the minds of those whom he preached to and taught, not an attempt 
to make ontological statements about God that deny the Trinity.
212
 In other words, he 
advocates the need for the human soul, the mind, indeed, the whole human individual, 
to logically prioritise the essence in her approach to God, as a way of recognising the 
fact that God necessarily exists and recognising the truth about her relationship with this 
God. The purpose of such an apophatic habit is simple. As I suggested in chapter 1, the 
apophatic affirmation is in fact a radical negation of atheism and atheistic habits of 
thought and speech, or rather, a radical statement of the absoluteness and truth of God’s 
existence, as that which simply cannot not be. If, as I believe, this is one of the primary 
functions of apophatic discourse in Eckhart’s theology, then it does not need to be 
interpreted ontologically as a statement negating or subordinating the Trinity to the 
essence. Instead, it might be the case that for Eckhart the apophatic is the first step that 
the human mind or soul takes towards real faith.  
                                               
210 (1978) p.112 (my italics). 
211 Not to mention the attitude it implies towards the specific tenets of Christian faith. 
212 He makes it quite clear in his Discourses of Instruction that he considers ‘habit’ a defining feature of 
what he describes as detachment later in his life: “a man must learn to acquire an inward desert, wherever 
and with whomever he is. He must learn to break through things and seize his God in them, and to make 
His image grow in himself and in essential wise...All he needs to know is that he intends to exercise his 
skill, and even if he is not paying full attention, wherever his thoughts may stray, he will do the job 
because he has the skill. Thus a man should be pervaded with God’s presence, transformed with the form 
of his beloved God, and made essential by Him, so that God’s presence shines for him without any effort; 
rather he will find emptiness in all things and be totally free of things. But first there must be thought and 
attentive study, just as with a pupil in any art.” Discourses of Instruction, p.492. 




Denys Turner suggests that, unlike Dionysius who is content to let ‘theological 
language break down under the weight of its internal contradictoriness’, Eckhart ‘wants 
to force the imagery to say the apophatic’.213 While Turner is referring primarily to the 
German works, the same point could be made of apophasis generally in Eckhart’s 
theology if we are reading his Latin and German works as consistent with one another. I 
would like to suggest as we finish this chapter, two ways in which Eckhart does 
precisely what Turner suggests, but not, I think, in the way that Turner means it. Firstly, 
Eckhart definitely goes out of his way to subvert his own discourse: as is commonly 
attested to in analyses of his German works,
214
 and, as we have seen, also in his Latin, 
works where he sets up dialectical opposites according to his theory of analogy and uses 
apophasis, itself a self-contradictory mode of discourse, to signify not simply the 
limitedness of human language and the nothingness of creatures in and of themselves, 
but also the absolute somethingness of God’s being as both essence and Trinity. The 
first way in which he therefore ‘says the apophatic,’ is that he uses the negation of 
negation to signify God’s separateness from creatures, but does not, in the course of this 
negation, deny the Trinity. The apophatic affirms the truth of God’s nature whilst 
identifying and negating the falsehood of creaturely categories applied to God. In other 
words it does not leave us with nothing, but with everything, conceived from the 
standpoint of absolute theocentricity, and thus by its very nature it seeks to signify the 
unsayable, to point to its necessity and to enable the soul to relate to it as her God.  
This leads onto the second point which is not in fact to do with ‘saying’ the 
unsayable at all. Instead, as I just suggested, the apophatic is used by Eckhart to verbally 
signify the kind of perspective or habits of perspective which lead the soul into a real 
relationship with a real God, a perspective moreover, where the soul perceives God in 
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all things and all things in and from God. She does not only seek to know God, she 
understands herself and the whole of creation theocentrically and this form of 
understanding is the truest form of understanding the soul could have.
215
 Apophasis thus 
signifies the perspective which accompanies a particular way of life, it is not understood 
as an object of thought, but known through a way of living.
216
 This way of life, as we 
shall see in chapter 3, is in fact detachment, the soul’s breaking-through (durchbrechen) 
into her silent ground where she is united with God in the pure essentiality of his being 
and also united with the boiling up of the triune life.
217
 She recognises her unity with 
her primal cause,
218
 and in that unity with God’s essence she appears separate from the 
Trinity.
219
 However, in the silent ground or citadel,
220
 the uncreated spark of the soul,
221
 
(which she has broken-through into and wherein she is united with the indistinction of 
                                               
215 Pr. 103, p.59. 
216 Pierre Hadot makes a similar suggestion in his analysis of Stoic philosophy. He suggests that theory 
and practice are never separated and that our understanding of Stoic philosophy should not be simply in 
terms of the philosophical concepts, but in terms of how the truth of these concepts is encountered 
through their incorporation into the individual adherent’s perspective through spiritual exercises. 
Philosophy as a Way of Life (Oxford and New York: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), pp.60; 82-86.  
217 Pr. 29, DW II, pp.76-77. “This [human] spirit must transcend number and break through multiplicity, 
and God will break through him: and just as He breaks through into me, so I break through in turn into 
Him. God leads this spirit into the desert and into the unity of Himself, where He is simply One and 
welling up in Himself. This spirit is in unity and freedom.” Walshe, pp.124-5. Here in the German, the 
welling up in himself has the same sense as the boiling up of the Trinity in the essence or monad that we 
saw in Latin in In Ex.,n.16, p.46. 
218“While I yet stood in my first cause, I had no God and was my own cause: then I wanted nothing and 
desired nothing, for I was bare being and the knower of myself in the enjoyment of truth. Then I wanted 
myself and wanted no other thing: what I wanted I was and what I was I wanted, and thus I was free of 
God and all things. But when I left my free will behind and received my created being, then I had a God. 
For before there were creatures, God was not ‘God’: He was That which He was. But when creatures 
came into existence and received their created being, then God was not ‘God’ in Himself – He was ‘God’ 
in creatures.” Pr.52 p.421. 
219 “this One alone lacks all mode and property. And therefore, for God to see inside it would cost Him all 
His divine names and personal properties: all these He must leave outside, should He ever look in there. 
But only insofar as He is one and indivisible, without mode or properties (can he do this): in that sense He 
is neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost, and yet is a Something which is neither this nor that.” Pr. 2, p.81. 
220 “So one and simple is this citadel of the soul, elevated above all modes, of which I speak and which I 
mean, that that noble power [will] I mentioned is not worthy even for an instant to cast a single glance 
into this citadel; nor is that other power I spoke of [intellect], in which God burns and glows with all His 
riches and all His joy, able to cast a single glance inside; so truly one and simple is this citadel, so mode- 
and power-transcending is this solitary One, that neither power nor mode can gaze into it, nor even God 
Himself!” Ibid. 
221 “I have sometimes spoken of a light that is in the soul, which is uncreated and uncreatable. I 
continually touch on this light in my sermons: it is the light which lays straight hold of God, unveiled and 
bare, as He is in Himself, that is, it catches Him in the act of begetting.” Pr. 48, p.310. 




God’s essence) she receives the birth of the Word.222 In fact, she receives the Word in 
precisely the same way as it is eternally begotten from the Father.
223
 This reception of 
the eternally begotten Word, identified by Eckhart repeatedly in his German sermons, is 
the same act as the bullitio of God’s eternal, creative and self-expressive actualising of 
the Trinity which, as we saw in 2b, Eckhart describes in terms of the begetting of the 
Son as the Word or idea of the Father and as the exemplar of creation. Through 
detachment the soul is therefore united with God’s essence in the ground and in the 
same ground she is united with the Trinity. She is, in effect, caught up into the whole 
life of God, because she relates to God as he is in himself, as essence and Trinity.  
The breakthrough of detachment thus resembles the negation of negation in the 
sense that it removes bounded ideas and signifiers from the soul’s approach to God, but 
it does not leave her with nothing. Instead her perspective is reoriented to become 
theocentric. This perspective, which the soul gains through detachment, overflows into 
the whole of her being such that her activity is itself an expression of the same 
theocentricity that she possesses inwardly in her understanding – theocentric perspective 
is therefore not simply an intellectual understanding of truth, it is fundamentally 
entwined with the soul’s being and acting.224 The soul thus resembles God, in that she 
possesses inwardly the same reality that she expresses outwardly. Her inward union in 
the ground and her activity in the world express the same synchronisation of potentiality 
                                               
222 “When the will is so unified that it forms as single one, then the heavenly Father bears His only-
begotten Son in Himself – in me. Why in Himself, in me? Because then I am one with Him, He cannot 
shut me out, and in that act the Holy Ghost receives his being, his becoming, from me as from God. Why? 
Because I am in God. If he does not receive it from me, he does not receive it from God: he cannot in any 
way exclude me.” Q.25, p.92. 
223 ‘Note this: God has no place more His own than a pure heart and a pure soul. There the Father begets 
His Son, just as He begets him in eternity – neither more nor less.’ Q. 5a, p.105. 
224 “For all the truth learned by all the masters by their own intellect and understanding, or ever to be 
learned till Doomsday, they never had the slightest inkling of this knowledge and this ground. Though it 
may be called a nescience, an unknowing, yet there is in it more than in all knowing and understanding 
without it, for this unknowing lures and attracts you from all understood things and from yourself as 
well.” Q. 101, p.36. 




and actuality as God’s own being as one and three.225 The unsayable that Eckhart seeks 
to say is therefore the act of being with God. Apophasis and detachment ‘say the 
unsayable’ by pointing to being itself as a sphere where the soul gains understanding 
and the truth about God, the soul and reality, is not therefore only encountered through 
intellect or language. It is the act of living and of relating, not simply of knowing, where 
a real union between the soul and ‘something’ other than herself is possible, just as it is 
the act of self-expression that gives rise to the relational other in God’s intra-divine life, 
and the created other in the universe which he causes and relates to. The apophatic 
perspective leads the soul outside of purely intellectual or linguistic exercises and into 
the territory of change, of growth, where understanding and releasing herself from 
illusory habits of thought and action is the primary focus. It is not the comprehension 
and contemplation of scholastic metaphysics or epistemology that matters, it is the 
participation in the reality that they signify that Eckhart aims to teach.  
Turner appears to predict this argument, stating that if we are concerned with 
what Eckhart’s speech ‘does’ and ‘only secondarily with what what he says means’ then 
the speech becomes less like poetry, and more like propaganda:  ‘in which no 
restrictions on truth or meaning are permitted to inhibit the achievement of belief in the 
propogandised: and this is propaganda regardless of whether the belief induced is true 
or false.’226 His warning is an important one. But we should not, for the sake of 
avoiding the charge of propaganda, interpret Eckhart’s scholastic metaphysics without 
its implicit faith commitment. Just because certain aspects of Eckhart’s teaching accord 
with our modern (or post-modern) perspective, we should not thoughtlessly bypass 
Eckhart’s commitment to Christian doctrine, to church practice, to his Dominican 
                                               
225 I will mention this point in chapter 3, where I will consider how in the German works Eckhart talks 
about the soul’s union with God through detachment. Unfortunately, due to the constraints of this thesis, I 
will not be able to explore properly how the inner-outer structure of the soul’s being resembles the same 
potential-actual structure of God’s nature.  
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lifestyle and to the authority of scripture, all of which coloured and indeed gave birth to 
his thought. Turner’s comment highlights a problem with how one should approach 
interpreting Eckhart. We can either recognise that the first step, the apophatic step in 
Eckhart’s thought, is the orientation away from self-focus and towards God-focus, or 
theocentricity, and our reading of his theology might then do justice to his intentions in 
writing it. Or we can avoid this commitment and risk misinterpreting his thought, while 
perhaps increasing its usefulness for inter-faith dialogue, post-modern analysis, or 
discussions of mystical experiences. This is a difference which Robert Dobie highlights: 
 
The difference between theology and philosophy, therefore, is not one of 
content; the difference lies in the way in which the truth of that content is 
appropriated. The one truth can be appropriated as an abstract objective truth, a 
revealed Law that is scrupulously to be fulfilled, or as a truth lived in the 
concrete particularity of the subject. It is this third mode of appropriation, the 
truth as lived, that interests Eckhart without, however, losing sight of its 





It is truth as embodied which matters to Eckhart, not truth as theoretically conceived but 
unverified. The issue is not therefore one of propaganda. It is of accepting that a proper 
understanding of Eckhart’s metaphysics and anthropology requires the interpreter to 
engage with the theocentric way of life Eckhart wishes to teach, not simply viewing his 
theology as a series of conceptual statements about the theocentric perspective that this 
way of life frames. Even more, it is an issue of recognising what effect the Christian 
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God, who is both one and three, has upon creation and human individuality, precisely 
because, for Eckhart, God is the way he has revealed himself to be.  
 The significance of this chapter for my thesis is twofold. First, we have seen 
extensively and with reference to several of the controversial sermons, how Eckhart 
does not in fact deny the Trinity as a real feature of God’s eternal existence, despite the 
fact that Eckhart states, in Pr. 52 for instance, that the soul’s breaking through to the 
ground wherein she receives God as he is essence rather than Trinity, is the noblest 
aspect of the soul’s union. I have interpreted this according to Eckhart’s apophatic 
method, where what is being identified here is in fact a logical affirmation of God’s 
necessary existence, not a subordination of the Trinity to the essence. As we shall see 
later, it is through the identification of God’s nature as detachment that Eckhart goes on 
to show how the soul’s identity exists in precisely the same freedom of self-expression 
as the eternal act of the Trinity, something we have already seen in this chapter in the 
mirroring in creaturely life of the flow of bullitio-ebullitio-creatio. 
Secondly, we have seen in this chapter that for Eckhart, God does in fact possess 
distinct identity or personhood within himself, but this distinct personhood is only 
identifiable in an apophatic context, where all limited creaturely signification which 
defines distinction in terms of multiplicity, in terms of nothingness or attachment, has 
been negated. God’s identity is distinct through its unity, a distinction defined by self-
expression and relation, not by self-possession. God’s distinction is a distinction with 
the other not distinction from the other and this, since it is God’s own nature, is the 
fullest and highest form of distinction that exists. It is therefore the fullest and highest 
form of distinction that anything else can possess, since it is according to God’s 
actualised self-expression as the relationally distinct persons of the Trinity that 
everything else exists distinctly, including the human soul and it is according to this 




divine category of distinction that we must consider the soul’s identity in Eckhart’s 
theology. 
The purpose of my thesis from here is no longer to show that Eckhart does not 
subordinate the Trinity to the essence, this has been sufficiently demonstrated. My aim 
now is to show how the soul’s detachment and union with God, as we have seen him 
identified in chapters 1 and 2, does not actually destroy her individuality. Instead it is 
through her union with God the soul’s identity is created, sustained and saved. It is 
given to her in the most full and free sense possible, as a gift which she does not possess 
in herself, just as God’s persons do not have their own distinction as a possession in and 
of themselves. Her identity is in fact something which she has through her communion 
with God. My claim from here on therefore, is that the soul’s distinct identity in its 
truest form is structured according to the kind of identity that God has. It is not 
something possessed by the soul, but something received through relation and expressed 
into relation. The soul’s distinction exists most fully when she relates to God and 
expresses herself, or pours herself, more and more fully into that relation, just as God 





























Introduction: Being a Soul 
 
I have argued in chapters 1 and 2 that Eckhart does not deny the Trinity or subordinate 
it to God’s essence. My reason in doing so has been to preserve the Trinity as a real and 
eternal category which applies to God, without which we cannot grasp how Eckhart 
conceives of the soul’s union with God or how he understands the soul’s identity. 
Without this we also cannot establish in a way that is fair to Eckhart’s teaching, whether 
or not the soul is lost or absorbed into God in her union with him.  
As I have claimed above, Eckhart’s trinitarian theology presents us with a 
transformed understanding of distinction. Beginning with the apophatic affirmation 
which identifies God as that which truly exists and whose essence is his existence, we 
have seen how Eckhart goes on to consider God’s trinitarian life as the actualised self-
expression of this essence which, without the self-expressive act of the Trinity, would 
remain unexpressed and indistinct within itself. The Trinity is distinct where the essence 
is indistinct, there are three distinct persons within it who have distinct existence, 
however, their distinction for Eckhart, as I have shown, is not something they possess in 
and of themselves, but something they possess through their relation with one another. 
Relational distinction thus points to the unity which combines the persons. This unity is 
their mutual essence and is therefore the potentia for their boiling up as self-expressive 
and creative Trinity. The unity also points to the persons as the active self-expression of 
God; the actualisation of the potential for self-expression in the essence. This potential-
actual dichotomy, we have seen, is not like it would be in time, where the potentiality 
would be prior to the actuality and require a cause to become actualised. Instead, in 




God, who is his own cause and his own self-sufficiency, the potentiality is always 
actualised. The Son is always begotten, the Father always begets, and the Spirit is 
always breathed forth.
228
 God’s relational distinction as Trinity is therefore an eternal 
reality, as real and eternal as the essence.  
The Trinity is also intimately tied up with creation, since the boiling up of the 
persons always overflows into creativity, by which our universe came forth from God in 
the same act in which he was himself as Trinity. Here we have a similar teaching on the 
absolute connection between God and creation that we saw in the Opus Tripartitum, 
when Eckhart claimed that the existence of creation was itself evidence that God 
exists.
229
 This argument was given in the context of affirming God’s necessity, since 
God is existence itself. When it comes to the Trinity, we see a similar connectedness: 
creation exists insofar as it comes forth from the single act of triune self-expression. 
This seems to tie God’s triune life up with the life of creation, and indeed Eckhart 
suggests as much in some of the sermons, and was criticised at Cologne for precisely 
this claim. However, as I suggested above, in accord with Eckhart’s apophaticism 
viewed as a negation of atheism, this can be seen in the context of what I am suggesting 
is Eckhart’s broader theological request, that people engage with God as he has chosen 
to reveal himself. It is a request that God’s revelation, in scripture, in the incarnation, 
and in creation, be taken seriously and viewed as they actually are for Eckhart – as signs 
that point first and foremost to God, by virtue of its existence as an effect of his self-
expressive and creative triune act. Eckhart makes this point in a passage which 
considers the synonymy between distinction and indistinction in the Commentary on 
Exodus: 
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at the expense of some of Eckhart’s other teachings. 
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What is as dissimilar and similar to something else as that whose ‘dissimilitude’ 
is its very ‘similitude,’ whose indistinction is its very distinction? God is 
distinguished from everything created, distinct, and finite by his indistinction 
and his infinity...Therefore, because he is distinguished by indistinction, is 
assimilated by dissimilitude, the more dissimilar he is the more similar he 
becomes. Thus, the more that one tries to speak about the ineffable, the less that 
one says about it as ineffable, as Augustine says in Christian Doctrine. Again, 
someone who denies time actually posits it, as Averroes says, because to deny 




Here the distinction and indistinction synonymy refers to the connection between God 
and creation, but as we saw in chapter 2, it applies equally well to the connection 
between essence and persons in the Trinity. In the final sentence Eckhart identifies 
precisely the point I have made about human speech throughout my thesis, that the act 
of speaking actually assumes the conditions which enable it to exist as speech – in this 
case time – and thus signifies those conditions through its own existence, even if the 
speaker seeks to superficially deny them with words. Eckhart uses this logic in the 
passage just quoted, as an analogy to clarify the penultimate sentence in the quote; that 
the more an individual tries to speak about the ineffable, the less they actually say. It is 
through unsaying then, through apophasis, that an individual therefore encounters what 
is true about the ineffable, since the silence of negation itself identifies the ineffable 
God as that with which the soul always has a connection. The point about speech in 
relation to time that Averroes makes is thus also true of speech in relation to God. It is 
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for precisely this reason that apophatic speech functions as a negation of atheism; 
apophasis is merely the alignment of speech, through its self-denial, with what Eckhart 
believes to be a revealed truth –God is the creator and salvation of humanity. Both in his 
teaching on the essence and in his teaching on the Trinity, Eckhart is therefore trying to 
create in his audience a sense of what it really means to take God as he actually is, as he 
has revealed himself.  
Eckhart calls his readers to let God be himself in their souls, to take him there 
where he is what he is, and to begin their relationship with him from that point. It is, I 
shall suggest below, precisely insofar as the soul does this, that she enters into her 
identity most fully, and the identity which she enters into – and indeed, which she 
already is insofar as she exists at all – is structured according to God’s identity from 
which she received her identity in the first place. By this I mean that she has her own 
identity according to the same relational distinction which defines the Trinity and 
which, in fact, defines all distinction, but which the soul only recognises when she 
aligns herself to the truth of God’s existence through detachment. The distinct persons 
of the Trinity are self-expressive, not self-possessive, defined by their movement 
towards the other rather than ownership of themselves and in this sense they are 
perfectly free. It is in this sense that the soul also has her own identity. She is herself the 
more she gives herself away, the more she communicates herself and receives the other 
in that same relation of reciprocal communication and acceptance. She thus has identity 
in precisely the same freedom in which God has his identity, a freedom defined by self-
giving uninhibited by mistrust. She is herself through the unmerited reception of grace 
and through the response to this grace in the only way that acknowledges its reality – 
accepting it as it is given, freely and abundantly.  




It is thus precisely insofar as we preserve God’s triune identity in Eckhart’s 
theology that we can also see how Eckhart preserves the soul’s identity in her union 
with God, since it is only according to the triune identity that the soul exists as she is 
and has individual identity at all. It is perhaps also precisely insofar as the soul 
participates in this triune life that we as modern readers see her identity disappearing, 
since the more she is viewed from the point of view of relational distinction, the further 
she is from the way in which we commonly view distinction today; as distinction from 
rather than distinction with the other.
231
 Were Eckhart to comment upon our reading of 
his theology today, he might point out to us that it is precisely insofar as we view the 
soul’s participation in God’s life as a loss of self, that we exhibit the kind of perspect ive 
which does not view God as he is, which does not allow God to be himself in us. This is 
why Eckhart’s theology begins and ends with detachment, because without detachment 
– from ourselves, from the habits of our perspective and activity, from our routine ways 
of knowing and ‘doing’ God – we will never realise the extent to which we do not let 
God be himself, since he cannot be present in the soul if there is even ‘a single image’ 
between her and God.
232
  
Eckhart’s teaching on detachment has been eloquently and insightfully 
examined by a number of scholars, as has his teaching on the birth of the Word in the 
soul. Due to the constraints of this thesis and of my argument, I am not able to go into 
as deep an analysis as I would like to, and as such I will not be able to explain some of 
the points about Eckhart’s teaching on detachment which have, after all, already been 
identified in much of the secondary literature that I have referenced. In my analysis I 
will draw heavily upon a cycle of four sermons on the eternal birth of the Word, Prr. 
101-104, where Eckhart outlines some of the key points about how the soul becomes 
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detached, enters its ground, and receives the eternal birth of the Word in its ground.
233
  I 
will interpret the teaching of detachment found in these sermons in accordance with the 
view of God that we have gleaned from chapters 1 and 2.  I will then look at how the 
soul’s identity seems to disappear in her union with God. I will look at how, through the 
birth of the Word she shares in God’s identity by letting go of ‘self.’ It is this loss of self 
and sharing in God’s identity which might at first seem like a loss of individuality in the 
soul. However, I will suggest that Eckhart is in fact presenting us with the truth of what 
the soul in fact is, and how she perceives, from within her relationship with God, a 
relationship defined by the reception of grace. The loss of self is therefore simply an 
orientation of perspective away from self-focus or falsehood and towards theocentricity 
or truth. Drawing upon several German sermons and upon the Latin sermon XXV, we 
will see that through no merit of her own the soul receives existence and salvation from 
God. The only response she can make to this is to receive the two graces (existence and 
salvation) as they are given – freely. Only when she responds thus, does she 
acknowledge her own existence and identity as it truly is, and in precisely the same 
moment she also acknowledges God as he is. She recognises that a true understanding 
of herself and of God depends upon an acknowledgment of the relationship that already 
exists between them and towards which she must direct her understanding and activity 
if she is to live and to perceive in a way that accords with what is true. As such she must 
not try to possess or control the graces she receives which include her existence and 
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most extensive explorations of the language of the ground (the term and its derivatives appear no less than 
thirty-three times). In addition, so many other of the major themes of Eckhart’s preaching appear in this 
Christmas cycle that it can be described as a vernacular summa of his mysticism.” (2001), p.54. 




individual identity. She must not try to possess and turn them into objects which she 
falsely believes belong to her. Instead, through detachment she accepts them as graces 
freely and abundantly given to her from beyond the bounds of her control.  
 
 
3a. Detachment and the Eternal Birth 
 
In this section I will examine Eckhart’s teaching on detachment, the ground, and the 
birth of the Word. It is somewhat artificial to distinguish between them, since Eckhart 
does not speak about the ground of the soul without also speaking about the birth of the 
Word that occurs there. Even one of the most extreme examples of Eckhart’s denial of 
the Trinity in the soul’s union with the Godhead in the silent citadel of the soul in Pr. 2, 
ends with a prayer that ‘we may be such a citadel to which Jesus may ascend and be 
received to abide eternally in us in such wise as I have said’.234 He thus refers back to 
the first part of the sermon where the soul, to become detached, had to become free and 
virginal so that she could overflow with a fruitful wifeliness, bearing fruits back into 
God just as he bore them through the birthing of the Word in the ground of the soul.
235
  
As I suggested in chapters 1 and 2, the prioritisation of the soul’s sharing in the 
unity of the Godhead (in the essence) in Eckhart’s sermons is not an ontological denial 
or subordination of the Trinity, it is in fact a logical affirmation of the first ‘step’ of 
detachment – the recognition of God’s necessity. Eckhart’s discussion of detachment is, 
in other words, a poetic but logical (in the sense that it accords with what is true about 
the universe) consideration of the ‘process’ the soul must go through to be united with 
God. Eckhart’s teaching on how the soul knows God through detachment is therefore 
identical to the apophatic approach we saw in his Latin works as we see from this 
passage in Pr. 104: 
                                               
234 Pr. 2, p.80. 
235 Pr. 2, pp.78-79. 





The intellect can only find rest in ‘pure unmixed being itself...’ which is God. 
Therefore, in this life, the intellect cannot find rest...However much God may 
reveal Himself in this life, yet it is still as nothing to what He really is. Though 
truth is there in the ground, it is yet veiled and concealed from the intellect. All 
this while, the intellect has no support to rest on in the way of a changeless 
object. It still does not rest, but goes on expecting and preparing for something 
yet to become known, but so far hidden. Thus there is no way man can know 





In this passage Eckhart identifies the apophatic nature of human knowledge of God. The 
intellect cannot know God like it knows objects in creation. In creation the soul knows 
through its powers when they make contact with something in the world, ‘set to work 
and make an image and likeness of the creature, which they absorb.’237 This creaturely 
knowing is precisely the kind of knowing which we have already seen in the Latin 
works, where Eckhart suggested that creaturely knowledge occurs through encountering 
things that exist in the world, whereas God’s knowledge occurs beyond ‘things’ and is 
in fact their cause. For the soul to know God, she cannot therefore do it with creaturely 
knowing, but must pass beyond all images and likenesses of creatures. She must even 
pass beyond the powers of the soul themselves: intellect, memory, love, will, these are 
all means by which the soul effects things and approaches truth in a creaturely way.
238
 
They enable the soul’s activity in space-time, and as such her ‘every external act is 
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effected by some means.’239 To know God through detachment however, means to 
know him without means, to know him from the soul’s essence, from her ground:  
 
in the soul’s essence there is no activity, for the powers she works with emanate 
from the ground of being. Yet in that ground is the silent ‘middle’: here nothing 
but rest and celebration for this birth, this act, that God the Father may speak His 





The soul’s real knowing of God here comes from her unknowing of creaturely 
categories when she enters into the indistinction of the ground through detachment.
241
 It 
is in this same silent middle of the soul, in her ground where she knows God essentially 
and without mediation that she also receives the birth of the Word. In fact, this passage 
identifies the silent ground as a place of rest and celebration for this birth. As we shall 
see later on, the soul in her ground thus resembles God’s own intra-divine life, where 
from the essence or indistinction, the Word is born and spoken forth as part of the triune 
activity.  
For Eckhart, detachment is thus the stripping away down to the barest of being, 
down to the ground where the soul is the same as God’s essence. The defining feature of 
the ground is apophatic; it is separate from creatureliness, from multiplicity and from 
the self: 
 
we will take the words, ‘In the midst of silence there was spoken within me a 
secret word.’ – ‘But sir, where is the silence, and where is the place where the 
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word is spoken?’ – As I said just now, it is in the purest thing that the soul is 
capable of, in the noblest part, the ground – indeed, in the very essence of the 
soul which is the soul’s most secret part. There is the silent ‘middle,’ for no 
creature ever entered there and no image, nor has the soul there either activity or 
understanding; therefore she is not aware there of any image, whether of herself 




When Eckhart speaks here about the absence of images or creatureliness in the ‘middle’ 
or ground of the soul, he is referring specifically to the way in which the soul knows 
things in time. This creaturely knowing is precisely the kind of knowing which we have 
already seen negated in the apophatic affirmation of the Latin works, where Eckhart 
distinguished between nothingness – creaturely knowledge that occurs through 
encountering things that exist in the world – and  somethingness – God’s knowledge 
which occurs beyond ‘things’ and is in fact their cause. The total absence of any image 
in the ground, either of creatures or of the soul herself, leaves space for God to be 
himself in the ground and, as such, the soul’s ground is identical with God’s own 
ground: 
 
As surely as the Father in His simple nature bears the Son naturally, just as 
surely He bears him in the inmost recesses of the spirit, and this is the inner 
world. Here God’s ground is my ground and my ground is God’s ground. Here I 
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Thus, in the ground, the soul does not only pass beyond creaturely knowing, she 
seemingly passes beyond her conception of a distinction between herself and God, since 
their ground is in fact one and the same. If we bear in mind the similarity here between 
Eckhart’s teaching on detachment and his apophatic teaching in the Latin works seen 
above, then the soul appears to be perceiving her participation in precisely the same 
unity between God and creation embodied in Eckhart’s claim that God is existence 
itself, as we saw in 1b, and also in the unity between creation and the Trinity, where the 
birth of the Son in the Godhead boils up with the other persons and overflows into 
creation, being born in creation as the exemplar in the same now in which he is born 
eternally in God, as we saw in 2a-c. As Eckhart states in the first lines of Pr. 101: ‘Here, 
in time, we are celebrating the eternal birth which God the Father bore and bears 
unceasingly in eternity, because this same birth is now born in time, in human 
nature.’244 He states it again at the start of Pr. 102, ‘I say as I have often said before, that 
this eternal birth occurs in the soul precisely as it does in eternity, no more and no less, 
for it is one birth, and this birth occurs in the essence and ground of the soul.’245 When 
Eckhart says that the birth in the soul is the same as the birth in eternity in God, he 
therefore speaks completely in accord with the teaching on the Word as exemplar of 
creation which we saw in 2b.  
Just as apophasis was not actually a negation but an affirmation, so also 
detachment is not simply a stripping down to the ground or to the essence. Detachment, 
like apophasis, is also a process by which the soul’s being and knowing is reoriented 
towards her exemplar. In other words, through detachment the soul is reoriented such 
that her perspective is in accord with the truth of her existence. Like apophasis, 
detachment therefore aims to align the soul’s perspective with this truth and to do so she 
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must cease to define knowledge in terms of creaturely categories: 
 
in truth, if you would find this noble birth, you must leave the crowd and return 
to the source and ground whence you came. All the powers of the soul, and all 
their works – these are the crowd. Memory, understanding, and will, they all 
diversify you, and therefore you must leave them all: sense perceptions, 
imagination, or whatever it may be that in which you find or seek to find 
yourself. After that, you may find this birth but not otherwise – believe me!246 
 
Detachment, as we saw with apophasis, is not simply a statement about union with 
God’s essence, it is concerned fundamentally with the birth of the Word, and thus with 
the self-expressive life of the Trinity.
247
 To become detached the soul must pass beyond 
creatureliness completely, but the telos of detachment is not emptiness, it is fullness 
through the reception of the birth of the Word. The ground is thus identical with God’s 
ground, not simply through their mutual indistinction, but through their mutual 
potentiality for the birth. As Lanzetta suggests: 
 
For Eckhart the quest for the naked Godhead is essential to rejoin the inner life 
of divinity at the well of renewal and regeneration where new spiritual life 
comes forth. While the Trinity reveals the divine in its activities of 
interpenetration, interrelation, and mutuality, the Desert of the Godhead, as the 
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The ground thus resembles the essence as the potentiality for the Godhead, indeed, 
Eckhart defines the ground as ‘“potential receptivity,” which certainly does not lack 
being nor is it deficient, but it is the potential of receptivity in which you will be 
perfected’.249 The soul’s ground, like God’s essence, is defined in terms of its 
potentiality. Unlike God’s essence however, which is self-sufficient, the soul’s full 
potentiality is actualised by reception of the birth of the Word. God does not need to 
orientate himself towards himself in a particular way to actualise his own potentiality as 
Trinity, but does this ceaselessly and eternally, whereas the soul must orientate herself, 
or rather, be oriented, towards God if her potentiality is to be actualised. 
 The soul does not reorient herself by her own power however, since her powers 
have been abandoned through detachment (not abandoned ontologically, i.e. she has not 
ceased to be a soul, but the value of her own powers as things which can grasp truth has 
been negated). In Pr. 104 Eckhart distinguishes between the passive and active intellect. 
The active intellect experiences things in the world and introduces them to the passive 
intellect by turning them into images which the passive intellect can then reflect 
upon.
250
 Through detachment, as we saw, the soul must pass completely beyond her 
creaturely ways of knowing and defining things. As such, she must let her active 
intellect become silent: ‘Indeed, when a man is quite unpreoccupied, and the active 
intellect within him is silent, then God must take up the work and must be the master 
workman who begets Himself in the passive intellect.’251 When the intellect is silent, 
God himself takes on the role of the active intellect in the soul in an analogous if not 
identical way to how he became the genus for all things whose genus or categories are 
dissolved in the indistinction of his essence, as we saw in 1b. Through detachment the 
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soul is also so united to God that all her activity and will becomes his.
252
 It is therefore 
not by the soul’s power that she receives the birth of the Word, or acts in accord with 
God’s will, or even knows things in the world with her active intellect.  It is by God’s 
power that she exists thus in detachment, and their unity is such that God cannot not 
enter the soul when she exists like this: 
 
You would like to partly prepare yourself and partly let God prepare you, but 
this cannot be. You cannot think or desire to prepare yourself more quickly than 
God can move in to prepare you...you should know that God must act and pour 
Himself into you the moment He finds you ready. Do not imagine that God is 
like a human carpenter, who works or not as he likes, who can do or leave 
undone as he wishes. It is different with God: as and when God finds you ready, 
He has to act, to overflow into you, just as when the air is clear and pure the sun 
has to burst forth and cannot refrain. It would surely be a grave defect in God if 
He performed no great works in you and did not pour great goodness into you 




The soul, Eckhart makes quite clear, cannot by her own power prepare herself for God 
to enter her. The soul can only become detached and that is not, as we have seen, an 
affirmative act; it is not a means or a knowledge, but an unknowing and a negation of 
means. Insofar as the soul does this she is united with God to such an extent that he 
must overflow into her. Eckhart here uses the double negative of apophatic affirmation, 
indicating that it is in fact necessary for God to enter the soul who empties herself down 
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to the ground. Inasmuch as he is God, he must do this, since he and the soul are so 
united. This necessity that Eckhart identifies in God is once again a way for him to 
show that our understanding of God must be in accord with how he has revealed 
himself. God has created, and he has offered creatures their beatitude through salvation. 
To say that God must enter a soul who opens herself to him, is therefore really to affirm 
that God has expressed himself honestly through revelation; he must do this because he 
has revealed this to be something eternally true about himself.
254
 It is, once again, an 
attempt on Eckhart’s part, to show us that our approach to God should be one that 
allows him to be himself. In fact, as we see again shortly when we look at sermon XXV, 
Eckhart is effectively requesting that the soul views herself and God in terms of the 
grace and freedom  in which God exists, through which he creates and in which the soul 
therefore finds her own existence most fully. 
 
 
3b. The Loss of Self? 
 
As we saw above, to become detached the soul must stop trying to approach God with 
her creaturely actions and her creaturely knowledge and instead enter into her ground, 
becoming a silent nothing, waiting for God to speak into her. The ground is not however 
empty, it is fraught, as we saw above, with potential receptivity for God, which God 
must act to fulfil. As such, the silencing of the soul’s creaturely knowing and of her 
selfhood resembles a kind of attentive listening – a negation of distraction rather than a 
negation of everything – since it is only by giving complete attention to the possibility 
of God’s presence through detachment that the soul will be able to receive that 
presence. She receives it in a manner which accords to the true structure of God’s own 
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being, both through the union with his essence in their mutual ground, and through the 
reception of the birth of the Word:  
 
our Lord says, ‘no one hears my word or my teaching unless he has abandoned 
self.’ For to hear the Word of God demands absolute self-surrender. The hearer 
is the same as the heard in the eternal Word. All that the eternal Father teaches, 
is His being and His nature and His entire Godhead, which He divulges to us 
altogether in His Son and teaches us that we are that same Son. A man who had 
gone out of self so far that he was the only-begotten Son would own all that the 
only-begotten Son owns. Whatever God performs and whatever He teaches, all 
that He performs and teaches in His only-begotten Son. God performs all His 
works that we may become the only-begotten Son. When God sees that we are 
the only-begotten Son, He is in such haste to get to us and hurries so much as if 
His divine being would be shattered and destroyed in itself, that He may reveal 
to us the abysm of His Godhead and the plenitude of His being and His nature: 
God then hastens to make it our own just as it is His own. Here God has delight 
and joy in abundance. That man stands in God’s ken and in God’s love, and 




It is at this point in detachment where one could claim that soul’s identity seems to 
disappear most completely, not only through the initial negation of self in detachment 
but also through the birth of the Word where the soul is no longer herself separate from 
God for she has become identical with the Word.. The passage above can be interpreted 
in light of the teaching about God that we saw in chapters 1 and 2. God expresses 
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himself in the soul through his triune life and especially through the begetting of the 
Son who, as the exemplar of creatures, communicates God to creatures directly in their 
substance, in other words it is because of the Son that they are creatures at all. This is 
especially the case for the human soul, who alone receives the birth of the Word in her 
ground,
256
 a point that indicates her uniqueness amongst creatures because she has 
intellectual nature.
257
 When the Father thus gives birth to the Son, he communicates the 
entire Godhead, since it is through the essence that he has the potentia for begetting, not 
through himself as Father. Thus the activity of the Trinity communicates God’s unity, 
oneness or essence even though it speaks through the act of the relationally distinct 
persons. The difference in this passage from the Latin works we examined above, is the 
specific identification of the soul as the Son, an identity that occurs through the birth 
and it is in this sense that her own identity seems to disappear. How can the soul still be 
considered as the same individual when she has let go of all creatureliness, all powers, 
all selfhood? Or when she has had her powers, her active intellect, will, knowledge and 
desire – replaced with God’s own? Or when she has in fact become identical with the 
Word? For Eckhart, as we shall shortly see, to be inwardly passive and thus to 
receive/suffer (lîden) God’s presence within the soul is the greatest beatitude. It is 
precisely this sense of self-loss and union with God that makes Eckhart’s theology so 
fruitful for comparison with Buddhist and Hindu mysticism.
258
 The soul appears 
completely united with and indistinguishable from all that is God’s, and in this sense her 
own selfhood seems to disappear. As Eckhart states in a beautiful passage in Pr. 1: 
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God alone is free and uncreated, and thus He alone is like the soul in freedom, 
though not in uncreatedness, for she is created. And when she emerges into the 
unmixed light, she falls into her Nothingness and in that Nothingness so far from 
the created Something, that of her own power she cannot return to her created 
Something. God with His uncreatedness upholds her Nothingness and preserves 
her in His Something. The soul has dared to become nothing and so cannot of 
herself return to herself, for she has departed so far from herself before God 
comes to the rescue. That must be so, for, as I said, Jesus went into the Temple 
and cast out those who were buying and selling, and said to the others, ‘Take 
this hence!’259 
 
The createdness of the soul is an insurmountable fact, and it remains so even when the 
soul perceives herself from within her first cause. Entering the ground is not a cessation 
of the soul’s createdness; instead it is the means by which the soul bypasses the 
limitations in her creaturely understanding of God. In the ground she thus falls away 
from all createdness, including her own self – she negates herself and becomes nothing. 
In doing this, she lets go of all her creaturely power and understanding by which she 
would otherwise be able to come back to herself, but she does not cease to be existent, 
for God is still able to enter into her, the negation does not therefore negate the fact that 
she is. God in turn, must enter into her and in so doing he upholds the soul in his 
somethingness, he sustains her with his own being because she can no longer sustain 
herself. He does this, as we just saw in Pr. 12, by making her identical with his Son. She 
appears to have completely disappeared as she was in herself, but reappears within the 
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divine categories of personhood. In a certain sense this passage is really about the soul’s 
recognition that she was never able to sustain herself and always depended upon God 
for her existence and sustenance whether she recognised it or not. The soul’s 
reorientation is therefore not really a change or a transformation in the soul nor is it a 
denial that she is a creature. Instead it is about the soul’s recognition in her 
understanding and her being, that apart from God she is nothing. Detachment then is the 
way in which the soul recognises the truth about reality and about her dependence upon 
God. It is also the way in which she lives according to this truth which, having 
recognised it through detachment, she no longer has the capacity to ignore without 
ceasing to become detached. 
In Pr. 67, a sermon rarely cited in scholarship, Eckhart identifies Christ as the 
category in which the soul possesses personal being after the act of detachment. He 
states that the indistinction of the ground is ‘the highest perfection of the spirit to which 
man can attain spiritually in this life’, where the soul ‘grasps the pure absoluteness of 
free being, which has no location, which neither receives nor gives: it is bare ‘self-
identity’ which is deprived of all being and all self-identity’.260 But he then adds,  
 
This is not the highest perfection: that which we shall possess forever with body 
and soul. Then the outer man will be entirely maintained through the supportive 
possession of personal being, just as humanity and divinity are one personal 
being in the person of Christ. Therefore I have in that the same support of 
personal being in such a manner that I myself am that personal being while 
totally denying my awareness of self, so that I am spiritually one according to 
my ground, just as the ground itself is one ground. Thus according to the outer 
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being I should be the same personal being, [but] entirely deprived of my own 
support. This personal man-God-being outgrows and soars above the outer man 
altogether, so that he can never reach it...Thus, just as the inner man, in spiritual 
wise, loses his own being by his ground becoming one ground, so too the outer 
man must be deprived of his own support and rely entirely on the support of the 




This passage identifies a critical point I have been making about detachment, that it is 
not an ontological change in the soul, not an ontological loss of self or an ontological 
denial of the Trinity. It is instead a reorientation, a theo-centering of the soul’s entire 
existence where this theocentricity is really just an admission of what is true about 
reality, since everything that exists depends totally upon God and not upon itself. Our 
manner of knowing God should thus resemble the manner of our existence – depending 
upon God and not upon ourselves and detachment is the process by which the soul 
recognises this. Through detachment the soul removes her dependence upon herself and 
turns instead to God, losing herself in the process, but also gaining through this apparent 
self-loss, a union with the Son, through his birth in her ground, which resembles – in 
time – the same union with the Son that Eckhart here identifies as the eternal perfection 
of the soul. This eternal perfection is in turn identified as a reception of grace, since the 
soul referred to in this passage, to be able to exist in possession of personal being, must 
be ‘directed by the gracious being by which, through grace, he is supported’.262 The soul 
is thus ordered according to God’s being and shares in the personhood of the Son, not 
through any means of her own, but through a total dependence upon grace.  
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 In sermon XXV, Eckhart identifies two graces which the soul receives from God 
through no merit of her own. The first of these, ‘usually called “grace freely given”,’ is 
received by all creatures and is the grace of existence. The second is ‘saving grace’, and 
that is ‘proper only to intellective and good creatures’, i.e. to the human soul.263  The 
soul thus receives existence and salvation through no merit of her own and by them she 
both flows out from God, and returns to him, in precisely the same flow of triune life 
with which he boils up in himself, boils over into creativity, and unites creation to 
himself through his Son, as we shall see below when we return to Pr. 67. Apophatic 
theology and detachment are both processes of orienting the soul’s understanding of 
herself and her universe in such a way that she recognises this grace. She acknowledges 
that she has done nothing to deserve either of them and she only receives them insofar 
as she is ordered towards God: 
 
no creature seems to be able passively to receive grace or any kind of perfection, 
especially a common one, insofar as it is a creature, or insofar as it is this and 
that; but only insofar as it is ordered to God, and thus excluded and removed 





The soul’s only appropriate response to the reception of grace is the one embodied in 
detachment and apophasis – she must orient her being and understanding in such a way 
that she acknowledges these graces for what they are – the ordering principles of her 
existence – and allows them to define who she is and what she does. She therefore 
responds to grace with the same freedom in which it is given, by freely receiving, and 
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her life thus resembles the same perfect freedom and reciprocity that defines God’s own 
triune existence and self-expression.
265
 
The birth of the Word in the soul is therefore directly in accord with this 
teaching on grace and, as such, with the teaching on salvation that the second grace of 
sermon XXV implied. It is precisely through the soul’s participation in God’s life 
through the union with the begotten Son which happens eternally in God, temporally in 
the incarnation, and continually in the human soul, that the soul is united with God in 
both her inner and outer dimensions – in other words, in the whole of herself, her 
ground and her activity.
266
 This is made even clearer by Eckhart in Pr. 67, where he 
talks about the soul’s union with God in terms of the hypostatic union which he 
discusses with reference to God’s non-dual existence as essence and Trinity: 
 
We have now therefore two kinds of being. One ‘being’ is according to the 
Godhead, bare substantial being, the other is personal being, and yet both are 
one ‘substance.’ Now since the same substance whereby Christ is a person, as 
the bearer of Christ’s eternal humanity, is also the substance of the soul, and yet 
there is one Christ as regards substance, as regards both being and person, so too 
we must be the same Christ, following him in his works, just as he is one Christ 
as regards his humanity. For, since by my humanity I am of the same genus, 
therefore I am so united to his personal being that, by grace, I am one in that 
personal being and am that personal being. So, since God dwells eternally in the 
ground of the Father, and I in him, one ground and the same Christ, as a single 
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bearer of my humanity, then this (humanity) is as much mine as his in one 
substance of eternal being, so that the being of both, body and soul, attain 




These two kinds of being are the essence and Trinity that have been the subject of this 
thesis and in this passage, as we saw in chapter 2, the bare substantial being (essence) 
and the personal being (Trinity) are one substance, they are united with each other and 
also with the soul. The soul’s union with Christ through the substance she shares with 
him and which Christ assumed in the incarnation is the means by which she shares in 
the same personal being that Christ is himself as the Son in the Trinity. The beatitude of 
the soul is thus placed in its participation in this Christological identity, which draws the 
soul into the life of the Trinity and thus into the eternal reality of God who is both 
essence and Trinity.  
The soul’s beatitude, insofar as she can attain it in time, is therefore dependent 
upon this same union with God, where, through grace, she no longer supports herself, 
but is supported by God’s personal being and, more importantly, recognises that she is 
supported thus by receiving that grace in a state of detachment, of non-possession. The 
passage above from Pr. 1 where the soul became a nothing and God supported her with 
his somethingness, is thus revealed as a statement about the soul’s reception of personal 
being and existence itself, from God through grace. As such her beatitude depends upon 
her allowing God to be himself in her:  
 
Our bliss lies not in our activity, but in being passive to God. For just as God is 
more excellent than creatures, by so much is God’s work more excellent than 
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mine. It was from His immeasurable love that God set our happiness in 
suffering, for we undergo more than we act, and receive incomparably more than 
we give; and each gift that we receive prepares us to receive yet another gift, 
indeed a greater one, and every divine gift further increases our receptivity and 
the desire to receive something yet higher and greater. Therefore some teachers 
say that it is in this respect that the soul is commensurate with God. For just as 
God is boundless in giving, so too the soul is boundless in receiving or 
conceiving. And just as God is omnipotent to act, so too the soul is no less 
profound to suffer; and thus she is transformed with God and in God. God must 
act and the soul must suffer, He must know and love Himself in her; she must 
know with His knowledge and love with His love, and thus she is far more with 
what is His than with her own, and so too her bliss is more dependent on His 




The activity which does not grant the soul her bliss is all the creaturely knowledge and 
self-focus present in the soul’s perspective before detachment. By negating her attached 
activity through detachment and becoming passive to God, she acknowledges herself as 
she truly is, receiving God as he is in himself – as her cause and as her beatitude. She 
passively suffers him to be in her ground and therein receives gifts from him. Her 
passive reception of God is thus comparable to her possession of personal being in 
eternity, where the inner and outer dimensions of her being were also supported through 
grace. God’s identity is here shown as boundless giving and the soul’s identity as 
boundless receiving. Inasmuch as she receives God she is therefore herself, inasmuch as 
she acknowledges grace as the defining feature of her identity and her universe she 
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enters into her individuality most fully. In this sense the soul’s identity resembles God’s 
own, since her distinction is not defined as something separate from God, but as 
something received through her relation with God and the ‘place’ where we must 
therefore look if we seek to find the soul’s individuality, where her identity exists and is 
sustained, is within her relationship with God. Her identity then is not in her per se, it is 
in God’s reception of her – in their relation. The soul subsequently has this relational 
identity more and more truly, the more she passively receives God and enters into this 
relation. This is the kind of union that Eckhart seeks to convey through the birth of the 
Word and, as I have suggested throughout, it is both enabled and signified through a 
theocentric orienting of the soul’s perspective.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks for Chapter 3 
 
In Pr. 103, Eckhart responds to an imagined question from his congregation, it might 
even be the same question that we have been asking him in the course of this thesis: 
‘Well sir, since you are always assuming that some day this birth will occur in me, that 
the Son will be born in me – now, can I have any sign by which to recognise that this 
has taken place?’269 This is a difficult question, since, if the soul loses itself in the birth, 
how can it know that it has received the birth? The fact that the question creates this 
paradox should itself cause us to pause before assuming that Eckhart believes the self is 
lost or denied in her union with God. Eckhart’s response speaks for itself: 
 
Yes indeed!...I am often asked if a man can reach the point where he is no longer 
hindered by time, multiplicity, or matter. Assuredly! Once this birth has really 
occurred, no creatures can hinder you; instead, they will all direct you to God 
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and this birth. Take lightning as an analogy. Whatever it strikes, whether tree, 
beast, or man, it turns at once toward itself. A man with his back toward it is 
instantly turned round to face it. If a tree had a thousand leaves, they would all 
turn right side up towards the stroke. So it is with all in whom this birth occurs, 
they are promptly turned toward this birth with all they possess, be it never so 
earthy.  In fact, what used to be a hindrance now helps you most. Your face is so 
fully turned toward this birth that, no matter what you see or hear, you can get 
nothing but this birth from all things. All things become simply God to you, for 
in all things you notice only God, just as a man who stares long at the sun sees 
the sun in whatever he afterward looks at. If this is lacking, this looking for and 




In this chapter I have attempted to show that detachment is concerned with the soul’s 
perspective and not with its ontological status as a self or of the Trinity and this is in 
fact precisely what Eckhart implies in this passage, where the presence of the birth in 
the soul is evinced in the theocentricity of the soul’s perspective. She sees so 
theocentrically that even those things which previously hindered her are now an aid 
towards her vision of God. 
We will see more clearly the significance of this analysis of the German works 
in the general conclusion below and also look at how it fits with the general concerns of 
my thesis. At the end of this chapter however, I would like to acknowledge that my 
analysis of these German works has been brief to say the least, and a proper 
interpretation of Eckhart’s trinitarian teaching on detachment will be a project for the 
future. I fully admit the brevity with which we have explored detachment, the birth of 
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the Word, the ground of the soul, how the soul knows through its powers and all the 
other points mentioned above. There are also some points which relate directly to my 
thesis which I have not had the opportunity to draw out, for instance: predestination; the 
relationship between the soul’s inner and outer being and the connection of this to the 
active-passive dichotomy; the fact that detachment is not an ideal of contemplation or 
mystical experience but relates just as much to the fruitful overflow of activity from the 
soul; the figure of the just or noble man who features as an ideal of the detached soul in 
several of Eckhart’s works; the living without a why which defines the soul’s existence 
when it is detached; Eckhart’s teaching on sin and evil, which are examples of 
attachment but do not exhaustively define all of attachment; Eckhart’s approach to 
church practice and especially to the sacraments; a closer analysis of christology and 
soteriology as well as an engagement with Eckhart’s pneumatology which is often 
overlooked but which relates significantly to his teaching on love. This list is not 
exhaustive, but my aim in naming a number of my major thematic omissions is to make 
it clear that I know how limited my analysis has been. It was merely my intention in this 
chapter to show how we might read Eckhart’s teaching on the soul’s identity and her 
union with God in the German works when we accredit more value to his trinitarian 
theology and to his understanding of apophasis as a habit of mind which prioritises God 
and, precisely insofar as it allows God to be himself, also negates the habits of normal 












‘Christ is all and in all!’ 
 
In Ben Morgan’s recent work On Becoming God, he criticises the existentialist and 
post-modern use of mysticism and mystical language as a tool, used to try and break out 
of the structures of the rationalist philosophy of the enlightenment and early 20
th
 
century. He suggests specifically that the post-modern critique of the Cartesian concept 
of selfhood is still rooted in precisely that form of selfhood. The philosophers Morgan 
criticises view truth and reality from within the Cartesian assumption of autonomous 
individualism, even whilst trying to critique the assumptions therein of how an 
individual relates to truth or to reality. They do this without realising that the problem is 
not with the concept of the truth but with the understanding of what the self is who 
seeks that truth and how one should understand that process of seeking.
271
 Morgan 
suggests a different model and shows that a relational understanding of what it means to 
be a self provides the kind of structure which responds to the post-modern rejection of 
the Cartesian self and also provides us with a different kind of framework within which 
we can better understand Meister Eckhart’s theology.272  
The concept of selfhood which Morgan presents has certain similarities with 
Eckhart’s teaching on the Trinity of interrelated persons which in turn define all identity 
and distinction in the universe. Morgan does not make this connection but it is a useful 
parallel with my argument. Drawing on how Eckhart speaks about relation and 
personhood in the Trinity I have aimed to provide a critique similar to that which 
Morgan makes of the Cartesian self, but in the context of Eckhart’s rejection of 
nothingness and attachment, or rather, as I have also called it, his negation of atheism. 
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The habits of the soul who focuses on nothingness and attachment have startlingly 
similar features to the model of selfhood that Morgan critiques. In both cases identity is 
defined more in terms of separateness from the other rather than in terms of relation and 
reciprocity.  
Morgan stops short of identifying God’s existence as a feature of reality which 
ontologically changes the status of the individual’s relationship to themselves and to 
truth. Instead he treats God more as something which has a noticeable effect upon the 
individual’s perspective, but the question of whose existence remains nonetheless 
unanswered. Eckhart has no qualms about assuming God’s existence, or at least, 
arguing for God’s existence in a way that seems, from a modern perspective, to beg the 
question. In fact his whole theology hinges on this question begging, since it is God’s 
real existence alone that gives salvific importance to the de-centering of self and the re-
centering of God. This is why I think it is helpful to consider apophaticism as a negation 
of atheism and why Morgan’s reading is not therefore sufficient. For Eckhart, God is an 
inescapably real principle behind everything that exists, the structure of whose being 
moreover – as one and three – lends itself to the ordering of reality. To suggest that an 
understanding of what the self is should be viewed from within this all-encompassing 
view of God, does not advocate salvation through absorption and loss of individual 
identity, it identifies a perfectly theocentric view of reality – a perfectly faithful view – 
as the true way of viewing the universe. It may seem astounding to readers of Eckhart 
that he begins with the assumption of God’s existence, but what is really more 
astounding is that some scholars interpret Eckhart’s theology from outside of the 
context of this belief through the assumptions that they make about what it means to be 
an individual and what it means to exist in the universe. Eckhart is, after all, a devout 
Christian who devoted his whole life to what he believed he was called to do in accord 




with his faith in God and his obedience to the church.
273
  To doubt the integrity of his 
commitment therefore, or to overlook the real effect that faith in a living God has upon 
his thought, means that we interpret Eckhart’s theology as other than it was intended to 
be. That is perfectly acceptable, as long as scholars acknowledge that they are doing this 
and as long as there is a fruitful reason for doing so.  
As I have suggested in this thesis, even though the soul’s point of view is filled 
with God such that she cannot perceive herself as distinct from God, that does not mean 
that the soul does not have some kind of distinct identity in her relationship with God. 
In actual fact she has that identity because she has a point of view from which to 
perceive God as all-encompassing. If Eckhart’s apophaticism genuinely led to silence 
and nothingness then the soul would herself become a silent nothing. But Eckhartian 
negation does not do this. Instead it leads to the Christian God who contains 
indistinction and distinction, essence and Trinity, indistinctly from each other. A God 
who graciously gives individual existence to all creatures whose in-formed existence 
boils-over from God through no merit of their own but through God’s own self-
expressive freedom and grace. L. Stafford Betty’s article “Towards a Reconciliation of 
Mysticism and Dualism” is useful for explaining this point.274 He suggests that Eckhart 
confuses the distinction between anthropology and ontology by identifying himself with 
his Lord without acknowledging the prior condition of his own selfhood as that which 
enabled this experience: 
  
There is no good reason that there should not be two beings ultimately involved 
in the experience of mystical unity. I do not mean to deny the mystic his claim to 
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a unitive experience. Granted that he loses all awareness of himself as subject 
confronting object. Granted that he loses even his awareness of...the fact of the 
absorption itself. Granted that for the mystic there is only the immediate fact of 
the Reality. In other words, the experience is one of...undifferentiated unity. But 
it is one thing to describe an experience and quite another to analyse the factors 
underlying the experience. To me it seems – and it always has seemed – 
perfectly plausible to posit two entities as constitutive of the experience. Why, 
after all, should we retreat from the obvious explanation – that the mystic and 
his Reality are ultimately as different from each other as the swimmer and the 
ocean ‘enveloping’ him, or the thinker and the problem ‘consuming’ 
him...[Eckhart] fails to distinguish the experience itself from the – how shall I 
put it? – ontological scaffolding of the experience.275 
 
Betty then adds 
 
the anti-dualist is correct in saying that there is no subject and object 
experienced at the height of mystical unity. But to conclude on the basis of this 
that there is therefore no subject and object in fact is...to base an ontological 
claim exclusively on an experience, and not on the experience in addition to the 
context of the experience. Moreover, it is illogical in a far more basic sense to 
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Betty’s work might seem an unusual choice for defending my argument but it is a 
helpful one. Betty is right to identify the difference between the ontological facts of 
union between the individual and God and the experience of that union. He is right also 
to suggest that just because the individual no longer perceives their own individuality 
does not mean they do not possess individuality or inhabit an individual position in 
space-time.
277
 The problem with his claim when we apply it to Eckhart’s theology is 
that the ‘ontological scaffolding’ of Betty’s perspective includes assumptions about how 
we should approach God, or reality, which differ radically from Eckhart’s own. His 
assumptions in fact overlap with the habits of attachment which define the self in terms 
of the nothingness which Eckhart’s teaching on detachment intends to negate from the 
soul’s perspective and self-understanding.278 Eckhart does not confuse anthropology 
with ontology and he has a very real ontological scaffolding within which his discussion 
of the soul’s identity and union with God occurs. As we have seen throughout this 
thesis, Eckhart’s ontology views reality in terms of God’s structure as one and three, the 
intra-divine relations between persons, the connection between persons and essence and 
the relationship between God and creatures. Understanding these features which 
undergird and give rise to the whole of everything transforms our concept of distinction, 
since what is truly distinct is distinct in terms of its relation to God. In this sense the 
creature-creator relationship mirrors the intra-divine relations of the Trinity, where 
distinction does not exist in a materially dualist sense, i.e. one object separate from 
another in space and time, but solely in terms of relatedness between the persons. None 
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of the persons of the Trinity is distinct in and of themselves, they receive their 
distinction from each other, from the relationship between them. The bullitio, the intra-
divine self-expression of the Trinity, is inseparable from the act of divine self-
expression outwards from itself – the ebullitio and creatio. Creation itself is therefore 
seen by Eckhart in the context of this same flow of divine distinction that defines the 
persons of the Trinity who overflow from themselves in the self-expressive act of 
creation and it is according to this category of distinction that Eckhart views the soul’s 
individuality. 
This theocentric vision of reality is what the soul encounters through her 
detachment. She thus recognises God in all things, even in her own self, which in a very 
real sense can be understood wholly in terms of God since everything about her 
selfhood has been received without merit through grace and according to the structure 
of God’s own being and self-expression. The soul thus sees only God, even when she 
looks at herself. Why should she not, since such a theocentric vision is surely the truest 
view of a universe understood according to the Christian ontology which structures 
Eckhart’s experience and description of reality?  But, as Betty suggested, the soul’s 
individuality does not disappear simply because her perspective is filled with God. 
God’s persons do not have their individual personhood in and of themselves but in each 
other, received from the other through relation, and in that sense held and given by the 
other. There is a perfect reciprocity in the Trinity where each person receives their 
personhood wholly and perfectly from the other in precisely the same moment or now in 
eternity – all boiling simultaneously from the essence – and none exists separately from 
the other prior to or outside of this now of simultaneous relating. God boils up into the 
full relational reciprocity all at once – or rather, he never hadn’t, never didn’t, and never 
doesn’t boil up in the single eternal self-expression of existent and active Trinity. Since 




God’s distinction and personhood is like this and God is the defining principle of 
reality, we must therefore view Eckhart’s teaching on the soul’s identity and existence 
in accord with his concept of God’s distinction-through-relation. Identity cannot 
therefore be an object which the soul possesses in and of itself, it is something she 
receives from God continually and in receiving – insofar as she sees reality truly, 
through detachment or apophasis – she continually looks to and sees God alone, even 
when she considers herself. What could be more completely satisfying for the soul in 
her being and knowing, than to have her vision so filled with her beloved God that she 
no longer spares a thought for herself? If God is a real feature of perspective, as he is for 
Eckhart, what else should or could the soul do that would more truthfully fulfil her own 
being and identity? As Eckhart says: 
 
 Should anyone ask what God is, this is what I should now say, that God is love, 
and in fact so loveable that all creatures seek to love His loveableness, whether 
they know it or not, or whether they wish to or not. So much is God love, and so 
loveable, that everything that can love must love Him, whether it will or no. 
There is no creature so worthless that it could love anything evil; for whatever 




Betty has a very different view to this, even though he provides a useful structure to 
help our understanding of Eckhart. While he may not wish to prove or disprove the 
question of God’s existence, it is nonetheless viewed as a question which rational 
human enquiry can approach and respond to in a meaningful way through the 
application of reason. Betty is not, in other words, trying to place God at the centre of 
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ontology and anthropology in the same way as Eckhart does. It is not therefore 
surprising that he advocates dualism as a necessary description of mystical union, since 
his approach assumes the kind of subject-object or object-object framework required for 
the kind of rational analysis his enquiry depends upon. But this framework necessarily 
defines the uniqueness of things in terms of their separateness from each other. Eckhart 
does not do this because the God who created reality and in whom he believes, exists in 
such a manner that this definition of how things are in reality is false, since it allows 
things to be defined in and of themselves in a sense separate from their creator. This is 
not possible within Eckhart’s ‘ontological scaffolding.’ It is impossible to approach God 
in a manner that begins with “I am, and I wish to explore whether or not God is.” For 
Eckhart, God’s existence is predicated in that very first ‘I am’ as its cause, its end and 
its salvation.  
How then is the soul still distinct from God when the whole of her existence is 
understood in terms of God? A different and more telling way of asking the same 
question is to say, “How can we keep part of ourselves separate from God in a 
theocentric universe?” The answer for Eckhart is, as we have seen, by considering 
ourselves from the point of view of nothing. In other words, for us to desire to retain 
some part of ourselves apart from God as if this were somehow a preservation of 
individual identity, is, in the ontological and anthropological system within which 
Eckhart’s teaching functions, to desire for a part of our self to literally be nothing. If 
there were a part of us separate from God in this way, it would not preserve the self at 
all, it would negate the self since it is only in terms of her relation to God that the soul 
exists and has identity. 
We might continue to ask why this is hard to accept. Eckhart’s theology suggests 
that this is because our habits of thought, our habits of self-understanding, our habits of 




activity and language, are rooted in the kind of possessiveness that has no place in 
freedom or grace and no place in God. Why, Eckhart would ask, would we want the self 
to be these things that are imperfect? Why do we want our perspective to be defined and 
fractured by its experience of suffering, of evil, sin and nothingness? These are not true 
things, they have a deficient cause,
280
 they are negations of what is true and good – 
negations of what is fully God – and they ignore God’s self-expression. As Eckhart says 
in Pr. 86, it is essential to understand these things as real features of human existence 
but also to recognise that they are opposite to human beatitude and our response to them 
should be to pass beyond them, not to define ourselves in terms of them.  
This raises an interesting problem with the ‘nothings’ Eckhart negates since, 
according to his metaphysics, thought about nothings is itself a kind of nothing, separate 
from God’s knowing, and the object known by that thought is also nothing. Nothingness 
is therefore distinct from God but it has a real effect upon temporal human existence in 
the sense that it misleads us. Our response to this has to be to identify the kinds of 
nothings, the kinds of habits of mind and body, that distract and damage us; that cause 
us to treat ourselves and reality as if it was other than it actually is. Eckhart 
acknowledges this and his teaching on detachment is both an affirmation of God’s true 
being and a kind of apophatic ‘process’ which reforms our damaging habits of thought 
and action, stripping them away and through the vision of God, who is both essence and 
Trinity – with everything we now know that this implies – leads the soul into a new 
habitual way of living and perceiving, where she sees things truly and sees God in all 
things, even those things which previously distracted her.
281
 
Insofar as the individual is detached, she leads a transformed existence which 
mirrors her eternal existence with God. Individuality is therefore preserved in the flow 
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towards God. Insofar as the soul flows towards God, and is caught up in the flow of 
relation that is God’s triune life, she has selfhood, but she does not have it as a 
possession. Instead, she has it in the same way that the persons of the Trinity have self –
as a gift from the other, a gift of perfectly reciprocal identity and distinction defined by 
God’s own freedom and grace. The moment the soul turns away from the flowing out of 
her free gift of identity from God and tries to look at that gift, to possess the gift rather 
than simply to be the gift, she ceases to actualise herself as a real self and starts to tend 
towards her own non-existence. Eckhart repeatedly points out, that humans mistakenly 
try to be a kind of self that cannot and indeed does not, exist in a theocentric universe. 
We want to be the kind of static possess-able object which has no place in a reality 
where identity is always defined by reciprocity or relation and never defined by 
possessiveness.  
So the self, in a sense, is lost. There is no object I can possess and identify as 
me, as mine, and from which I think I know things, where my knowledge is also a 
personal possession. There is no space for such an object in a perspective that is filled 
with divine light – with the brilliant darkness of the Dionysius poem.282 However, even 
though she cannot see herself, the soul’s selfhood still exists and she exists by being that 
point of view which turns itself always towards God and which expresses itself in 
creation through an activity which also reflects God’s existence and expresses the 
reality of his relationship with the soul. To deny that this is a meaningful form of 
personhood, is to deny that the persons of the Trinity possess a meaningful form of 
distinct personhood since it is the triune life which gives the soul this individuality and 
to deny that the persons of the Trinity say something meaningful about God is really to 
deny the Christian God. Objectively speaking, this might not be something that worries 
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us today, but if we suggest that Eckhart’s concept of identity does not sufficiently 
sustain the individuality of the soul in her union with God, whilst also denying that the 
God in whom Eckhart believes actually exists, we are applying an ontological criticism 
to something that has only been granted the status of theory. However, for Eckhart God 
is not a theory. Eckhart knows God exists and that he exists in a certain way. It is 
according to this particular way in which the Christian God exists that Eckhart’s 
concept of human identity makes sense. He views identity from within the paradigmatic 
Christian model of death and rebirth, transformation or resurrection, since the soul dies 
to its attachment to a false Godless view of reality, of the universe and of self. What is 
born is a renewed vision and activity in creation which reflects the promised renewal 
that, for Eckhart, God genuinely offered to the world through his Son.  
The question of how we should read Eckhart thus requires us to assess our own 
concept of selfhood. Do we seek to possess ourselves and thus necessarily exclude 
ourselves from Eckhart’s perspective – at least, on its own terms – since Eckhart 
identifies our habit of self-possession as a fantasy which blocks us from the existing 
God? Or do we allow ourselves to conceive of selfhood in a different way, in Eckhart’s 
way, where what it means to exist distinctly is to let go of possessiveness, of control, to 
live according to the way in which our lives have been received from the God in whom 
Eckhart believes, freely as a gift of grace which we did nothing to deserve? In this 
perspective, identity is reciprocal rather than self-contained: it receives itself and gives 
itself back in thanks. The soul that does not see itself does not lose itself, it gives itself 
away and in that act of giving it possesses its identity in the only way that makes sense, 
as something always expressed towards the other and received from the other.  
To really understand how Eckhart views reality rather than to simply filter his 
teaching through our own 21
st
 century assumptions means to try and change those 




assumptions in our reading of Eckhart, or at least to identify their effects upon our 
interpretation as much as we can. Strangely, our way of understanding must therefore 
follow the path of detachment. We must begin with a ‘going in,’ a turn away from our 
current assumptions about what is true and about how we should know things and be 
ourselves. We should orientate ourselves in a different way, imagining what it must be 
like to view reality in the way that Eckhart does. We must begin with detachment and 
apophasis just as Eckhart does, for only then can his teaching on God’s identity and the 
soul’s identity begin to make sense. It may seem to be a considerable risk to open 
ourselves in this way, to allow our intellect to be informed by a grace and a relationship 
that is beyond our control, but in fact, we are assured, it will make sense if we are 
willing to become detached, for Eckhart promises: 
 
God cannot leave anything void or unfilled, God and nature cannot endure that 
anything should be empty or void. And so, even if you think you can’t feel Him 
and are wholly empty of Him, that is not the case. For if there were anything 
empty under heaven, whatever it might be, great or small, the heavens would 
either draw it up to themselves or else, bending down, would have to fill it with 
themselves. God, the Lord of nature, does not allow that anything be empty or 
void. Therefore, stand still and do not waver from your emptiness; for at this 
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